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ABSTRACT 
 
The role of epistemic communities in influencing policy formulation is underexplored in 
International Relations theory in general and in nuclear non-proliferation studies in particular. This 
thesis explores how epistemic communities – groups of experts knowledgeable in niche issue areas – 
have affected nuclear non-proliferation policy formulation in two important and under-studied 
cases: the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) 
and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. It demonstrates that applying 
an epistemic community approach provides explanatory power heretofore lacking in explanations of 
these cases’ origins. 
 
The thesis applies the epistemic community framework to non-proliferation, using Haas’ (1992) 
seminal exploration of epistemic communities in the context of natural scientific and environmental 
policies. Specifically, it analyses the creation and successful implementation of ABACC and the CTR 
Program, which, respectively, verified the non-nuclear weapon status of Argentina and Brazil and 
facilitated the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. These cooperative nuclear non-
proliferation agreements are shown to be the result of a process involving substantial input and 
direction from experts constituting epistemic communities.  
 
The thesis explores the differences in the emergence, composition, and influence mechanisms of the 
epistemic communities behind ABACC and the CTR Program. It reaches the conclusion that 
understanding the role of an epistemic community in non-proliferation policies leads to the 
possibility of creating more effective non-proliferation policies in the future.  
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Chapter One 
 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Puzzle 
 
 ―Proliferation begets proliferation.‖ 
 
George P. Schultz, former U.S. Secretary of State (1984) 
 
Current events indicate that the issues of nuclear weapons proliferation and non-
proliferation are high on the diplomatic and international agenda. U.S. President Barack 
Obama has pledged to rid the world of nuclear weapons, while Iran and North Korea are 
advancing their nuclear weapons ambitions. Iranian suspected and North Korean 
declared nuclear weapons programmes have once again prompted the fear that 
proliferation might indeed beget proliferation. However, were we to step back and 
analyse the history of nuclear proliferation, we would be reassured that such an outcome 
is not always likely. Despite the global spread of scientific and engineering knowledge, 
technology, and nuclear materials since the inception of the Manhattan Project in 1939, 
the extensive horizontal nuclear weapons proliferation predicted by scholars and 
practitioners has not occurred. For the purpose of this study, the term ―proliferation‖ is 
used in a horizontal, rather than vertical, context. In other words, it describes the spread 
of nuclear weapons to states not yet possessing them, as opposed to the increase in 
nuclear weapons arsenals – through the development of new and improved weapons 
design – of the existing nuclear weapons states. Nuclear non-proliferation, therefore, 
refers to the prevention of an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear 
weapons. 
Contrary to the fear of proliferation begetting proliferation, it is worth noting 
that upon a close inspection of nuclear weapons proliferation history, in every decade 
following the dawn of the nuclear age, fewer and fewer countries became nuclear weapon 
 2 
states.1 In the first decade of the nuclear age (1945–1955), three states tested nuclear 
devices (the U.S.: 1945, the USSR: 1949, and the UK: 1952). In the second decade of the 
nuclear age (1955–1965), two states tested nuclear explosives (France: 1960 and China: 
1964). In the third decade of the nuclear age (1965–1975), only one additional state 
exploded a nuclear device (India: 1974). The fourth and fifth decades of the nuclear age 
remained dormant in that no other state tested a nuclear device, even though there was 
widespread belief that during this period, Israel had also become a nuclear weapon state.2 
By the sixth decade (1995–2005), India and Pakistan became fully-fledged nuclear 
weapons states (both tested in 1998). Currently, we are in the middle of the seventh 
decade (2005–2015), and so far, only one country – North Korea – has tested a nuclear 
device.3 To surmise, from the first ever use of the atomic bomb in 1945 to the present 
day, only nine out of the 192 UN member states ―have the bomb‖ (Schelling 1976: 77), 
even though approximately 30 additional states could have had the bomb because they 
had the technological capability of acquiring a nuclear weapons programme.4 Why is it 
then that countries that could have developed a nuclear weapons programme chose not 
to? 
In contrast to the plethora of academic literature available on why countries seek 
to acquire nuclear weapons (Quester 1973, Epstein 1977, Greenwood et al. 1977, Betts 
1977; 1993, Dunn 1982, Meyer 1984, Spector 1984, Goldblat 1985, Davis and Frankel 
                                                 
1 In this study, the definition of nuclear weapon states is taken from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT). The NPT defines a nuclear weapon state as one that has ―manufactured and exploded a nuclear 
weapon or other explosive device prior to 1 January 1967‖ (Article IX, clause 3). 
2  Please note, that the precise date of when Israel became a nuclear weapon state has never been 
confirmed. In addition, there is no evidence to confirm that it has tested a nuclear device.  
3 North Korea‘s nuclear weapon status is questionable because while it is likely it exploded two nuclear 
devices (in 2006 and 2009), the success of those tests is debated.  
4 States with the technological capability to acquire a nuclear weapons programme include countries that 
were using commercial nuclear power reactors to generate electricity and had a fairly advanced civilian 
nuclear technology programme in place (i.e., having one or more of the following: research reactors, power 
reactors, nuclear engineers/scientists). While there is not a definite number of nuclear weapon capable 
states, various estimates range from 36–56 countries with most analysts agreeing on 40, including the 
number of actual nuclear weapon states (Meyer 1984: 41, Arms Control Today 1995: 33–36, Levite 2002/3: 
62, Hymans 2006: 4, Blanc and Roberts 2008, Rublee 2009: 31, Müller and Schmidt 2010: 157–158).  
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1993, Frankel 1993, Thayer 1995, Ogilvie-White 1996, Sagan 1996/1997, Hymans 2006, 
Cirincione 2007),5 there are fewer published studies exploring why countries do not seek 
to acquire nuclear weapons (Reiss 1988; 1995, Solingen 1994; 2007, Potter 1995, 
Schneider and Dowdy 1998, Paul 2000, Levite 2002/2003, Rublee 2009, Müller and 
Schmidt 2010).6 The aim of this thesis is to add to these studies by examining to what 
extent epistemic communities – groups of experts knowledgeable in niche issue areas – 
can be influential in nuclear non-proliferation policy formulation. The epistemic 
community framework, which is discussed in more detail later in this chapter, is an 
approach that has not been pursued in this area before.  
This chapter provides an overview of the nuclear non-proliferation puzzle and 
sets up the argument to be developed. It is structured in six parts. In the first section, 
background information on the issue of nuclear weapons proliferation and non-
proliferation is provided. In the second section, the existing explanations for non-
proliferation are discussed. In the third section, the insufficiency of these explanations is 
highlighted. In the fourth section, the theoretical approach adopted in this study is 
presented. In the fifth section, the cases selected to explore in this thesis are introduced. 
Finally, it provides an overview of the thesis. 
 
1.1 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Puzzle   
In a 1958 study of the implications of advanced military technology, the U.S. National 
Planning Association predicted that by 1970, ―most nations with appreciable military 
strength will have in their arsenals nuclear weapons‖ (National Planning Association 
1958: 41–42). In March 1963, U.S.  President  John F. Kennedy reiterated this concern in  
                                                 
5 The dominant motivations for states to acquire nuclear weapons include security, status/power/prestige, 
domestic factors (including bureaucratic pressure), and technological/scientific interest. 
6  Others include Spector 1992, Liberman 2001, Campbell et al. 2004, Hymans 2006, Solingen 2007. 
Unpublished studies include Doyle 1997 and Walsh 2000. Most of these studies are comprised of single 
case studies, but some include systematic comparison of cases. 
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a speech before the UN General Assembly in which he famously predicted that by 1973, 
an additional 21 countries might develop nuclear weapons (U.S. President 1963: 280). 
Predictions of widespread proliferation were based on two assumptions: first, the 
expectation that nuclear technology would become more widely available and, second, 
the assumption that a decision to proliferate would trigger a cascading effect. In fact, in 
every decade since the discovery of the ―absolute weapon‖ (Brodie 1946, Paul et al. 1998), 
the consensus view has been that nuclear weapons would spread more widely than 
actually occurred (see Brodie 1946, Deutsch 1957, Burns 1965, Epstein 1977, Carnesale 
et al. 1983, Arnett 1990, Sagan and Waltz 2003).7 It is therefore remarkable that the 
number of nuclear weapon states today is far lower than originally anticipated. In more 
than six decades, only nine countries have become nuclear weapon states even though 
approximately 30 additional states could have become nuclear weapon states, as shown in 
Figure 1.1. Why, then, did these nuclear-weapon capable countries not pursue a nuclear 
weapons option?  
Figure 1.1: 
Potential vs. Actual Nuclear Proliferation, 1945–20108 
Year
N
um
be
r o
f S
ta
te
s
 
                                                 
7 See also Morgenthau 1948; 1964, Schelling 1966, Herz 1970, Betts 1977; 1993, Jervis 1976; 1979–1980; 
1988; 1989, Myrdal 1975, Quester 1973, Bundy et al. 1982, Mandelbaum 1983, Mearsheimer 1984/1985; 
1990; 1993, Meyer 1984, Mueller 1988, Schell 1982, Waltz 1981; 1990, Weltman 1981/1982, Beinart 1998, 
Chafetz 1993, Dunn 1991, Frankel 1993, Allison 2004, Lavoy 2006, Rosen 2006, Tertrais 2006, Cirincione 
2007. 
8 This figure is taken from Hymans who graphically charted nuclear capable states against nuclear actual 
states in five yearly increments from 1950–1990/2000 (Hymans 2006: 4). Using both his model and data 
from Meyer 1984, Arms Control Today 1995, Levite 2002/3, Roberts 2008, Rublee 2009, and Müller and 
Schmidt 2010, this figure shows potential versus actual nuclear proliferation from 1945 to the present day. 
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1.2 Existing Explanations for Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
International Relations (IR) theories provide convincing arguments that explain why 
there are so few nuclear weapon states. Described as ―the most effective instrument to 
moderate the effects of systemic characteristics‖ (Frankel 1993: 37), the provision of 
superpower security guarantees was seen by many realists as a specific mechanism 
through which to curb nuclear proliferation (Waltz 1981, Meyer 1984, Van Evera 
1990/1991, Deudney 1993, Frankel 1993, Reiss 1995, Thayer 1995, Greenwood et al. 
1997, Mearsheimer 1998). The security guarantees argument maintains that although 
strong states may be able to secure themselves against threats by acquiring a nuclear 
weapons programme, weaker states may instead seek to secure themselves by aligning 
with a powerful, nuclear-armed ally – a concept known as extended deterrence. This 
argument predicted that positive security guarantees extended by the superpowers 
throughout the Cold War would ensure nuclear restraint. During the Cold War, the 
USSR and the U.S. extended positive security guarantees to their allies to protect them 
under their respective nuclear umbrellas. This proved to be a successful strategy because 
many countries were prevented from pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. This 
approach is best illustrated by the Warsaw Pact countries which had no choice but to 
remain non-nuclear or risk damaging their relations with the Soviet Union.9 Similarly, 
many U.S. allies, including Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and several Western European 
states, were persuaded to give up their nuclear weapons ambitions by a U.S. security 
guarantee (including the NATO nuclear umbrella), which allowed them to feel confident 
of their security situation.10 Ariel E. Levite‘s research on ―nuclear reversal‖ fits with the 
                                                 
9 Warsaw Pact (1955–1991) countries included the Soviet Union, Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. 
10 Japan was protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella through the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security. Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain are NATO members and are therefore 
protected under NATO‘s nuclear umbrella. Australia has a military alliance with the U.S. through the 1951 
ANZUS Treaty. South Korea (1953, U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual Defense Treaty) and Taiwan (1979, Taiwan 
 6 
realist thesis since he argues that a combination of the provision of security guarantees 
and domestic regime change led states to pursue non-proliferation policies (2002/2003). 
He pursues this argument with reference to the case of Germany in which he argues that 
regime change coupled with the extension of U.S. security guarantees led to the 
renunciation of Germany‘s indigenous nuclear weapons capability (2002/2003: 83–85). 
A second influential explanation for the scarcity of nuclear states is the neo-
liberal institutionalist perspective, which seeks to explain how international institutions 
and regimes increase the possibilities of cooperation between states. This argument puts 
forward the notion that states cooperate with international institutions and regimes 
because of lowered transactions costs and greater transparency (Keohane and Nye 1977, 
Keohane 1984; 1989, Baldwin 1993, Axelrod and Keohane 1986; 1993, Lipson 1993, 
Doyle 1997a). The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the centrepiece of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime and many academics have cited the salutary effects of 
the regime in curtailing proliferation (Greenwood et al. 1977, Nye, 1981; 1985; 1987, 
Meyer 1984, Smith 1987, Reiss 1988, Sagan 1996/1997).11  
Within the non-proliferation regime, rules and norms are established through the 
NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and nuclear weapon free zones.12 
The NPT was opened for signature in July 1968 and entered into force in March 1970, 
with the intention to prevent the spread of  nuclear weapons. Over the years, 189 
                                                                                                                                            
Relations Act) were given U.S. security guarantees when their respective nuclear weapons ambitions were 
abandoned.   
11 The origins of the regime can be traced to December 1953, with President Eisenhower‘s Atoms for 
Peace Program (Nye 1985: 17). 
12 Nuclear weapon free zones are areas throughout the world that are protected against the use, storage, 
and testing of nuclear weapons. Today, there are seven nuclear weapon free zones: (1) Antarctic Treaty, 
1959, which covers Antarctica; (2) Tlatelolco Treaty, 1969, which covers South America, Latin America, 
and the Caribbean; (3) Rarotonga Treaty, 1983, which covers the South Pacific (i.e., Australia, the Cook 
Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Nieu, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Tonga, 
Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa); (4) Bangkok Treaty, 1995, which covers South East Asia (i.e., 
Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam); 
(5) Pelindaba Treaty, 1996, which covers Africa (54 independent African states); (6) Mongolia, 2000, the 
first instance of a single state declaring its sovereign territory nuclear free; and (7) Semi-Palatinsk Treaty, 
2006, which covers Central Asia (i.e., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). 
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countries (including the first five nuclear weapon states) signed the Treaty, as shown in 
Figure 1.2. 13  The NPT established a two-tier bargaining system between the five 
recognised nuclear weapon states (the nuclear haves: the U.S., Russia, the UK, France, 
and China) and all the other signatories (the nuclear have-nots). The five nuclear weapon 
states pledged to work towards nuclear disarmament and to help the non-nuclear weapon 
states acquire peaceful nuclear technology; in exchange, the non-nuclear weapon NPT 
signatories agreed never to seek nuclear weapons programmes. 14  Proponents of this 
institutional IR perspective point out that of these signatories, most states never tried 
pursuing a nuclear weapons programme and that only five signatories are nuclear weapon 
states. Therefore, neoliberal institutionalists may argue that states complied with the non-
proliferation regime because the benefits (e.g., assistance with nuclear energy 
programmes and technology transfers) outweighed the costs of a nuclear weapons 
programme (e.g., economic and political). 
Figure 1.2: 
Number of States Ratifying the NPT, 1968–2006 15 
 
                                                 
13 Of the five recognised nuclear weapon states, three signed the NPT in 1968 (U.S., USSR, and UK) and 
two in 1992 (France and China). Every country in the world has signed the treaty, with the exception of 
India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea. North Korea had signed the NPT, but in 2003, it withdrew from 
the treaty. 
14 To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building measure between its signatories, 
the treaty establishes a safeguards system under the responsibility of the IAEA. Safeguards are used to 
verify compliance with the treaty through routine inspections conducted by the IAEA. The treaty 
promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear technology and equal access to this technology for all 
signatories, while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons use (UN Department of 
Disarmament Affairs 2002). Within the regime, nuclear technology supplies are controlled through a 
number of multilateral export-control agreements, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group (1974) and the 
Zangger Committee (1971–1974). These agreements make it extremely difficult for countries to acquire 
nuclear weapons technology. 
15 The figures pertaining to when states ratified the NPT were collected from the United Nations Office 
for Disarmament Affairs website.  
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Etel Solingen‘s research on nuclear forbearance is embedded within neoliberal 
institutionalism. She argues that economic liberalism coupled with democratisation is a 
useful approach in explaining nuclear non-proliferation (1994). She posits that economic 
benefits of complying with the nuclear non-proliferation regime prompted domestic 
coalitions into supporting a non-nuclear weapons policy, and in states where these 
coalitions had strength, they moved towards this policy. In order to gain the benefits of 
foreign investment and integrate further into the international economy, states gave up 
their nuclear ambiguity. Solingen pursues this argument with reference to the case of 
South Africa, the only country known to have manufactured nuclear weapons and then 
voluntarily dismantled them. She notes that after the end of apartheid, South Africa 
wanted to normalise its relations with the international community and also ―gain access 
to the IAEA club‖ (1995: 211). A post-apartheid South Africa wanted an end to its 
international isolation in order to integrate into the international economy and one way 
to do this was to sign the NPT, which it did in 1991. As shown in Figure 1.2 above, by 
1991, a vast majority of UN member states (144) had already signed the NPT, thereby 
granting them access to the ―IAEA club‖. South Africa‘s signature on the treaty not only 
granted it access to the IAEA club, but also to the wider international community.16 
Harald Müller and Andreas Schmidt take Solingen‘s main proposition one step 
further by arguing that the combination of the existence of the NPT and 
democracy/democratisation is a sufficient cause for nuclear non-proliferation (2010: 128). 
In their research, they analyse the political systems of countries in relation to the start of 
nuclear weapon activities post-1970. They conclude that from a post-1970 perspective 
(i.e., after the existence of the NPT), no single democracy was inclined to start any 
nuclear weapon activities and that countries that became democracies renounced their 
                                                 
16 For more on the South African nuclear reversal/rollback, see de Villiers, Jardine, and Reiss 1993, Reiss 
1995, Stumpf 1995/1996, Paul 2000, Long and Grillot 2000, Liberman 2001, Kutchesfahani and Lombardi 
2008. 
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nuclear weapon activities. One of the examples that they use to support this argument is 
the case of Spain, an autocratic country that had started nuclear weapon activities in 1970. 
Yet, over the years, it transitioned to a democratic country, subsequently renouncing its 
nuclear weapons ambitions (2010: 37). 
 A third explanation in the literature emphasises that the international norm 
against the possession of nuclear weapons dissuades countries from pursuing a nuclear 
weapons option. This constructivist approach focuses on how international norms 
emerge and converge around institutions, emphasising normative pressure (Checkel 1997, 
Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Barnett and Finnemore 1999). Scholars refer to different 
categories of norms: regulative norms, constitutive norms, and evaluative/prescriptive 
norms (Katzenstein 1996, Checkel 1997, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Risse 1999). 
Regulative norms order and constrain behaviour; constitutive norms create new actors, 
interests, or categories of action; and evaluative/prescriptive norms entail a moral 
judgement (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). Therefore, the norm against the 
possession of nuclear weapons – which was developed after the Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
bombings – can be best understood as a mechanism for constraining behaviour and as a 
moral rejection of nuclear weapons. While some advocates of norms-based explanations 
for constraining nuclear behaviour refer to a ―nuclear taboo‖ – which is based on nuclear 
non-use rather than on nuclear non-proliferation (Schelling 1976, Price and Tannenwald 
1996, Tannenwald 1999; 2005; 2007) – two scholars have considered the roles of norms 
in explaining states‘ nuclear non-proliferation decisions. In his research on nuclear non-
proliferation, T. V. Paul argues that states may believe that their acquisition of nuclear 
weapons would ―hurt the international norms and laws that give them legitimacy and 
power. General adherence to regime principles and norms and observance of the NPT 
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appear to restrain other states in the region‖ (2000: 28).17 This suggests that because of 
the norms created and maintained by the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, 
states would not want to acquire nuclear weapons. Maria Rost Rublee (2009) subscribes 
to Paul‘s approach because in her research she examines the ―social environment‖ – the 
norms and ideas which shape how state decision makers conceptualise security and the 
value of nuclear weapons – and concludes that the normative power of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime was an effective mechanism in nuclear weapons restraint.  
The nuclear non-proliferation norm has dissuaded at least one country – 
Switzerland – from pursuing a nuclear weapons programme. Switzerland signed the NPT 
in 1969, but, upon signing, made it clear that it would wait until other countries ratified 
before it did. When Switzerland signed the treaty in 1969, it did so with the following 
declaration:  
On the occasion of the signature today of the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons, the Swiss Government expressly declare that they will not 
submit the Treaty to Parliament for its approval until such time as they consider 
that a sufficient measure of universal support has been obtained by the Treaty 
(United Nations, ―Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament Agreements,‖ 
undated). 
 
Switzerland waited until 1977 before it ratified the NPT, by which time 97 states had 
ratified (shown in Figure 1.2 above) and the non-proliferation norm had become 
significant. 
 A further constructivist explanation of nuclear non-proliferation can be found in 
the work of Jacques E. C. Hymans (2006). Similar to Solingen, Hymans focuses on the 
domestic factors of non-proliferation. He argues that a specific type of threat perception 
– that are socially constructed – combined with a specific type of national identity, 
                                                 
17 Paul argues that no single variable can explain nuclear non-proliferation. While he does not discount the 
NPT and the non-proliferation norm in his research, his main argument surrounds a state‘s external 
security environment, including the number, scope, intensity, and duration of militarised disputes in which 
the state is involved. His explanation for why states do not pursue nuclear weapons is based on his notion 
of ―prudential realism‖ in which states ―balance their interests and capabilities so as to minimise the 
security challenges they pose to others and in expectation of reciprocal benign behaviour in return‖ (2000: 
5). 
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creates a high probability for nuclear weapons acquisition. The case of Australia‘s nuclear 
weapons renunciation illustrates Hymans‘ proposition. When Australian decision makers 
had both the perception of a serious security threat and a high level of nationalism, 
Australia moved towards nuclear weapons acquisition. However, when decision makers 
had only one or neither of these, Australia moved towards nuclear weapons renunciation 
(2006: 114–140).18  
 
1.3 Insufficiency of Existing Non-Proliferation Approaches  
Although the existing non-proliferation approaches are useful in understanding the gap 
between the number of capable versus actual nuclear weapon states (illustrated in Figure 
1.1), empirical evidence indicates that these explanations are not fully sufficient in 
understanding every case of non-proliferation. Two different sets of countries whose 
non-proliferation outcome cannot be fully explained by the existing theoretical 
explanations stand out: (1) Argentina and Brazil, two countries that were suspected of 
pursuing a nuclear weapons programme, and (2) Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, three 
countries that relinquished the nuclear weapons they inherited after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union.19  
Argentina and Brazil were two countries that could have developed a nuclear 
weapons programme yet chose to remain non-nuclear weapon states. Between the 1950s 
and 1980s, both countries were widely suspected by the international community to be 
                                                 
18 Prior to 1972, Australia kept its nuclear weapons option open. However, in 1972, there was a change in 
the political leadership of the country leading to the definitively anti-nuclear weapons, pro NPT Labour 
Party coming to power, culminating in an end to the desire to pursue an Australian nuclear weapons 
programme (Walsh 1997). 
19 In addition to Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, other countries such as Sweden, 
Switzerland, South Africa, Libya, and Iraq also present theoretical and empirical non-proliferation 
anomalies. For a discussion on explanations vis-à-vis most cases of nuclear non-proliferation, see 
Kutchesfahani 2010. (For more on the reasons behind Sweden‘s non-nuclear acquisition, see Garris 1973, 
Cole 1994, Reiss and Litwak 1994, Prawitz 1995, Long 1996, Paul 2000. For more on Switzerland‘s non-
nuclear acquisition, see Paul 2000. For more on South Africa‘s denuclearisation, see de Villiers, Jardine, and 
Reiss 1993, Reiss 1995, Stumpf 1995/1996, Paul 2000, Long and Grillot 2000, Liberman 2001, 
Kutchesfahani and Lombardi 2008. For more on Libya‘s non-nuclear acquisition, see Jentleson and 
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pursuing a covert nuclear weapons programme. This was due to a number of reasons, 
including their longstanding regional rivalry, their ambitious efforts to master the nuclear 
fuel cycle in their pursuit for technical autonomy, and their disdain towards the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Argentina and Brazil were longstanding 
regional rivals under military rule and had consistently competed for regional hegemony. 
Furthermore, both nations had indigenously developed some aspects of the nuclear fuel 
cycle and possessed nuclear facilities that were not subject to regional or international 
safeguards. Similarly, both nations showed increasing disdain towards the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime, particularly the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, 
which Argentina and Brazil both objected to and repeatedly refused to sign and ratify.20 
Such reasons fuelled international suspicions that both nations were indeed intent on 
acquiring a nuclear weapons programme. However, in spite of their ambitious covert 
efforts to develop a nuclear weapons option, Argentina and Brazil remained non-nuclear 
weapon states.  
The existing non-proliferation explanations are not fully applicable to the case of 
Argentina and Brazil because throughout their quest for nuclear technology autonomy 
throughout the 1950s and 1980s, neither country enjoyed good relations with the U.S. or 
with the USSR, and therefore a security guarantee from either superpower was not 
considered an option. Similarly, neither country expressed an interest in signing the NPT 
because both states deemed the treaty and, by extension, the non-proliferation regime, as 
discriminatory and illegal. In addition, during their pursuit of nuclear technology 
autonomy, neither country subscribed to the non-proliferation norm. Most studies argue 
that Argentina and Brazil ended their efforts to develop a nuclear weapons option when 
                                                                                                                                            
Whytock 2005/2006, Bowen 2006, Solingen 2007. For more on Iraq‘s non-nuclear acquisition, see 
Solingen 2007.) 
20 It should be noted that Brazil did sign Tlatelolco in 1967, but it did not ratify it until 1994. Argentina did 
not sign and ratify the Treaty until 1994. 
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they both became democracies in the mid 1980s – Argentina in 1983, Brazil in 1985 
(Carasales 1992; 1995,  Lamazière  and  Jaguaribe  1992, Goldemberg and Feiverson 1994,  
Redick, Carasales, and Wrobel 1995, Solingen 1994, Redick 1995; 1996, Wrobel and 
Redick 1998, Wrobel 1999). 21  However, although their efforts to develop a nuclear 
weapons option ceased when they became democracies, it is important to note that 
negotiations on nuclear issues between the two states had already begun in 1980, when 
both nations were ruled under military leaderships. These negotiations continued 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s prompting the creation of the Brazilian-Argentine 
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) in 1991. 22  The 
creation of ABACC is therefore one of the most important factors in Argentina and 
Brazil‘s non-proliferation outcome since it established joint mutual inspections of both 
countries‘ nuclear facilities verifying their non-nuclear weapon status. Interestingly, its 
creation and how it verified both countries‘ non-nuclear weapon status has been 
overlooked in the existing non-proliferation explanations. While both nations were 
initially hostile to the non-proliferation regime, it is interesting to note that after the 
creation of ABACC in 1991, Argentina and Brazil became fully integrated within the 
non-proliferation regime by signing various international non-proliferation agreements, 
including the NPT.23 
A further set of countries whose non-proliferation outcome cannot be fully 
explained by the existing theoretical explanations are the former Soviet Union states of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, 
Ukraine,  Kazakhstan,  and  Belarus  inherited  an  estimated 4,025, 1,400, and 825 Soviet  
                                                 
21 Other notable texts include Levanthal and Tanzer (eds.) 1992, Stanley 1992, Marzo, Biaggio, and Raffo 
1994, Serrano 1994, Reiss 1995, Hirst 1998, Barletta 2001, Hymans 2006, Doyle 2008. 
22 Please note that ABACC was created in July 1992, after Presidents Menem (of Argentina) and Collor (of 
Brazil) took the decision in July 1991 (through the Guadalajara Agreement) to establish a bilateral 
verification inspection agency. 
23 Argentina and Brazil signed various agreements with the IAEA (Quadripartite Agreement, 1991) and 
ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco (1994) and the NPT (Argentina in 1995, Brazil in 1998).  
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nuclear weapons respectively, making them, overnight, the third, fourth, and eighth 
largest nuclear powers in the world (Lugar 2001: xiii).24 Most studies argue that Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine relinquished their nuclear weapons because of the high costs 
and low benefits attached to their inherited nuclear weapons (Spector 1992, Lepingwell 
1993a; 1993b, Reiss 1995, Shields and Potter 1997, Bertsch and Potter 1999, Stevens 
2008), and not necessarily because of security guarantees, the NPT, the non-proliferation 
norm, or democratisation. As three newly formed independent nuclear-inherited states, 
they did not have a security guarantee or a signature on the NPT. It should be noted, 
however, that over time, security guarantees were offered and signatures on the NPT 
appeared, but this was not until after all countries agreed to assistance from the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.25 Through the CTR Program – a 
U.S.-led intellectual and funding resource – Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were able 
to denuclearise. 26  Similar to ABACC, the creation of the CTR Program and how it 
facilitated the denuclearisation of the three former Soviet states has been overlooked in 
the existing non-proliferation explanations.  
 
1.4 Epistemic Community Framework  
In order to gain a more complete understanding of non-proliferation outcomes and to 
supplement existing explanations, there is a need to broaden explanations to include 
more actors (including scientists and experts) as key actors in non-proliferation. While 
the non-proliferation outcome of Argentina and Brazil and the denuclearisation of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine are well documented, the existing literature lacks an 
analysis of where the ideas behind ABACC and the CTR Program came from. The 
                                                 
24 Figures taken from Norris (1992: 25) who quotes from the Natural Resources Defense Council. The 
precise number of Soviet nuclear weapons deployed in the newly independent states were regarded as state 
secrets. The numbers provided are the estimates of subject matter experts. 
25 Ukraine was the only country to receive security assurances from the U.S., UK, and Russia.  
26 In this thesis, the CTR Program refers to all the various programmes managed by the U.S. Departments 
of State, Energy, Defense, and Commerce, and their counterparts in the former Soviet Union. 
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process of how and why these agreements materialised remain under explored. Within 
the existing explanations relating to the scarcity of nuclear weapon states, little attention 
has been given to the role of non-proliferation experts. In order to rectify this gap, this 
thesis investigates to what extent the epistemic community approach opens up new 
understandings though an analysis and tracing of the origins of two important and 
understudied cooperative nuclear non-proliferation agreements. 
The epistemic community framework was introduced to IR scholars by Peter M. 
Haas (1989; 1992b) to study the role and impact of ideas in international relations and in 
international policy coordination. In a seminal issue of the journal International 
Organization entitled ―Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination‖, 
scholars suggested that the concept of an epistemic community should be treated as an 
alternative approach to the study of international policy coordination and change along 
with neorealism, neoliberalism, dependency and post-structural approaches (Haas 1992a). 
They argued that the epistemic community approach analyses relations between the 
epistemic community and the behaviour of states in international policy coordination 
(Haas 1992a; 1992b, Adler and Haas 1992). The epistemic community framework was 
therefore a further model used to explain patterns of international cooperation and policy 
change in world politics. Described as a ―network of professionals with recognised 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area‖ (Haas 1992b: 3), epistemic 
communities can often influence state decisions. 27  Through their knowledge and 
                                                 
27 Haas defined the concept of  an epistemic community as: ―a network of  professionals from a variety of  
disciplines and backgrounds. They have (1) a shared set of  normative and principled beliefs, which provide 
a value-based rationale for the social action of  community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are 
derived from their analysis of  practices leading or contributing to a central set of  problems in their domain 
and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and 
desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of  validity – that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for 
weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of  their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise – 
that is, a set of  common practices associated with a set of  problems to which their professional 
competence is directed, presumably out of  the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a 
consequence‖ (1992b: 3). 
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expertise in niche issue areas (e.g., in highly technical and complex issue areas) and their 
access to decision makers, members of an epistemic community influence decisions 
when decision makers are faced with conditions of uncertainty and complexity.28 When 
uncertainty and complexity constrain state decision makers‘ actions, they often demand 
particular sorts of scientific or technical information and expertise. Meeting these 
demands can require considerable technical or scientific expertise. Epistemic 
communities are one possible provider of such information and advice because they are 
capable of producing and providing this information due to their possession of policy-
relevant knowledge. Therefore, uncertainty provides both an opening and an opportunity 
for an epistemic community to influence state decision makers. 
The application of the epistemic community framework has been particularly 
prevalent in the realm of natural scientific and environmental policies (Haas 1989; 1990; 
1992c, Peterson 1992, Hjorth 1994, Baark and Strahl 1995, Ringius 1997, Betsill and 
Pielke 1998, Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002). In the field of international security however, 
the epistemic community approach has been relatively under explored.29 Indeed, in their 
concluding paper to the seminal volume dedicated to epistemic communities in 
International Organization, Adler and Haas encourage further research on epistemic 
communities to explore the existence of epistemic communities in the nuclear non-
proliferation field (1992: 387). Given both this encouragement and the fact that the 
epistemic  community  approach  is  under  explored  in the field of international security,  
                                                 
28 ―Uncertainty‖ refers to periods when state decision makers lack specialist knowledge in complex and 
technical issue areas. ―Complexity‖ refers to the nature of the issue areas, whether they are political, social, 
economic, or scientific. In past studies of epistemic communities, these issues have included 
monetary/economic (Verdun 1999, van Daele 2005), macroeconomic (Ikenberry 1992), biodiversity 
(Raustiala 1997), environmental (Haas 1989; 1990; 1992c, Peterson 1992, Hjorth 1994, Baark and Strahl 
1995, Ringius 1997, Betsill and Pielke 1998, Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002), security (Adler 1992, Mendelson 
1993, Wright 1997), population (Drake and Nicolaïdis 1992), plant genetics (Sauvé and Watts 2003), and 
innovation and technology (Sharif 2006).  
29 The application of the epistemic community approach to international security issues include Adler 1992 
(nuclear arms control), Mendelson 1993 (changes to Soviet foreign policy), Wright 1997 (conventional 
arms control), and Barth 2006 (nuclear arms control).  
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this thesis applies the framework to non-proliferation, an area that has yet to be explored. 
Therefore, the main focus of this research is to examine the role of a nuclear non-
proliferation epistemic community in non-proliferation policy formulation in the cases 
under review.  
It should be noted that it is not the intention of this research to suggest that the 
epistemic community‘s role in persuading state decision makers to pursue a nuclear non-
proliferation policy is a monocausal explanation. In fact, the epistemic community 
framework is not being used as an alternative explanation per se, but as an intervening 
mechanism in a larger process. Many scholars working on understanding why and how 
the countries in both cases did not pursue a nuclear weapons programme agree that no 
single factor alone can explain the non-proliferation outcomes (Potter 1995, Reiss 1995, 
Paul 2000, Levite 2002/3, Doyle 2008). This study therefore appreciates the possibility of 
equifinality (in other words, the notion of multiple causality and several explanatory paths 
that lead to the same outcome) in explaining the non-proliferation outcome of the 
countries under review given that alternative processes (e.g., transition to democracy and 
economic liberalism) and several other explanatory factors (e.g., international factors, and 
especially the role of the U.S.) were at play. However, what remains unexplored in the 
literature is the role of an epistemic community in creating the non-proliferation 
agreements under review and this is the gap in the literature that this thesis rectifies. The 
role of an epistemic community in both cases is therefore a further important and under 
explored angle to consider in explaining the process which led to the non-nuclear 
weapon acquisition of these countries. 
 
1.5 Case Study Selection 
The cases selected for this study are two cooperative nuclear non-proliferation 
agreements: ABACC and the CTR Program. These agreements were key factors behind 
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Argentina and Brazil‘s non-proliferation and Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine‘s 
denuclearisation, respectively. While it might appear that there is a difference between 
the two agreements given that Argentina and Brazil never became nuclear weapon states 
whereas Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine relinquished their inherited nuclear weapons, 
it should be noted that both cases are examples of non-proliferation agreements. Earlier, 
the term non-proliferation was defined as preventing an increase in the number of 
countries possessing nuclear weapons. As such, the two cases present two different 
conceptualisations of non-proliferation: on the one hand, an agreement that verified the 
non-nuclear weapon states of two countries that did not pursue a nuclear weapons 
programme in spite of their capability and widespread suspicion (e.g., Argentina and 
Brazil), and on the other hand, an agreement that facilitated the denuclearisation of three 
countries that inherited nuclear weapons, but decided to relinquish them (e.g., Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine). Through the examination of two explanatory case studies, this 
thesis analyses the role of epistemic communities in the creation of ABACC and the 
CTR Program and on how these two non-proliferation agreements facilitated the non-
proliferation of Argentina and Brazil and Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine‘s nuclear 
renunciation, respectively.30   
ABACC and the CTR Program are two examples of many cooperative nuclear 
non-proliferation agreements.31 With the exception of Adler‘s (1992) study on a nuclear 
arms control epistemic community that led to the creation and subsequent 
implementation  of  the ABM Treaty, very little research has been conducted on the roles  
                                                 
30 The explanatory method uses theory to explain the causes and patterns of historical cases (van Evera 
1997: 92). 
31 Other notable examples include the NPT, nuclear weapon free zones (e.g., the Antarctic Treaty, the 
Tlatelolco Treaty, the Rarotonga Treaty, the Bangkok Treaty, the Pelindaba Treaty, the Semi-Palatinsk 
Treaty), the Agreed Framework (signed between the U.S. and North Korea in 1994), the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty, the Fissile Material Cut-Off (FMCT) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty I, 
II, and III. 
 19 
of epistemic communities in creating international security policies. By focusing on 
ABACC and the CTR Program, this study will add to the relatively under explored area 
of analysing how two nuclear non-proliferation agreements facilitated non-proliferation 
and denuclearisation in the respective countries. In addition, this research seeks to 
complement Adler‘s study on an arms control epistemic community by providing an 
analysis into two different non-proliferation epistemic communities. 
 
1.6 Outline of the Thesis 
Given that the existing explanations provided for non-proliferation are not fully 
sufficient to the non-nuclearisation of Argentina and Brazil and the denuclearisation of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, this thesis examines the role that epistemic 
communities played in the creation of ABACC and the CTR Program. The analysis 
illustrates how these non-proliferation agreements facilitated Argentina and Brazil‘s non-
nuclearisation and Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine‘s denuclearisation, respectively. 
Based on these cases, we can infer under what conditions epistemic communities can 
promote non-proliferation policies. In addition, this study can shed light on the 
applicability of this framework to nuclear non-proliferation policymaking. 
 The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter Two analyses the theoretical 
framework of epistemic communities used in this thesis. It focuses on the framework 
developed by Haas – the most widely applied by scholars today – since most of the 
existing literature on epistemic communities use it as a theoretical lens to explain the role 
of these expert communities in international policymaking. Subsequently, the chapter 
provides an overview of the epistemic community literature and discusses the limitations 
associated with its application as a framework. Most research finds the framework to be a 
compelling and useful approach in understanding how and why different policies emerge 
(Adler 1992, Hopkins 1992, Haas 1992a, Verdun 1999, Sauvé and Watts 2003, Van Daele 
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2005), but other research reveals weaknesses in this approach (Drake and Nicolaïdis 
1992, Peterson 1992, Sebenius 1992, Risse-Kappen 1994, Baark and Strahl 1995, 
Jacobsen 1995, Finnemore 1994, Evangelista 1995, Mendelson 1993). As mentioned 
earlier, there has been very little research on the role of epistemic communities in 
international security policy formulation. This study makes a contribution to the 
literature on epistemic communities because it analyses policies related to international 
security and, in particular, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.  
 Chapter Three describes the research design and methodology used in this study 
– notably case study research design and process tracing – to empirically investigate the 
role of epistemic communities in nuclear non-proliferation outcomes. The data was 
collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources included elite 
interviews conducted with knowledgeable academics, policymakers and government 
officials (including diplomats and decision makers) in Austria, Argentina, Brazil, Russia, 
Sweden, the UK, and the U.S. between June 2008 and October 2009. 32  The elite 
interviews were conducted to better understand when and why the motivations behind 
nuclear non-acquisition were realised, how often experts within the community met with 
one another, and what ties or access channels existed between experts and decision 
makers. These interviews were crucial in establishing to what extent the epistemic 
community was able to exert an influence on state decision makers. Other primary 
sources included conference proceedings, congressional hearings and testimonies, official 
documents (e.g., texts of joint declarations and legislation), and articles written by former 
                                                 
32 For the ABACC case, 18 interviews were conducted in English, apart from one, which was conducted in 
Spanish, and translated by a native Spanish speaker (Coromoto Power Febres). For the CTR Program case, 
27 interviews were conducted in English. Interviews were conducted face-to-face, over the phone, and via 
email. Most face-to-face and telephone interviews lasted about one hour, although they ranged from half 
an hour to four and a half hours in length. Due to the sensitivity of the subject being discussed, none of 
the interviews were recorded. Instead, detailed notes were taken throughout the interview. The UCL Data 
Protection Registration Reference Number for this study is Z6364106/2010/03/15, Section: 19, Research.. 
Most interview subjects requested confidentiality and for the purpose of consistency, all interview subjects 
have been anonymised. 
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and current government officials. Secondary sources included newspaper articles, 
websites (such as www.abacc.org), and both scholarly and policy articles and books.  
Chapters Four and Five examine the role of an Argentine-Brazilian epistemic 
community in the creation of the policy behind ABACC. In Chapter Four, historical 
background on Argentina and Brazil‘s suspected nuclear weapons programme is 
provided, and the emergence of an Argentine and Brazilian nuclear non-proliferation 
epistemic community is analysed. In Chapter 5, the process of how the epistemic 
community influenced the creation of the policy behind ABACC between 1980 and 1991 
is examined. The main objective of this case study analysis is to examine to what extent 
an epistemic community was influential in the creation of ABACC. 
Chapters Six and Seven examine the role of an American-Soviet/Russian non-
proliferation epistemic community in the creation of the policy behind the CTR Program. 
In Chapter Six, the scope of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine‘s inherited nuclear legacy 
is analysed, and the emergence of the American-Soviet/Russian nuclear non-proliferation 
epistemic community is discussed. In Chapter Seven, the process of how the epistemic 
community influenced the creation of the CTR Program is examined. The main objective 
of this case study analysis is to examine to what extent the U.S. and Soviet/Russian 
nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community was influential in the creation of the 
Nunn-Lugar CTR Program which, inter alia, facilitated the denuclearisation of the three 
former Soviet states.  
The final chapter, the Conclusions, addresses the thesis overall contributions. It 
revisits the central themes that run through the thesis and summarises the key theoretical 
and empirical findings that emerged from the discussion of the role of epistemic 
communities in both case studies. The thesis asserts that epistemic communities not only 
play a fundamental role in international policy coordination but also deserve a central 
place in our understanding of nuclear non-proliferation outcomes. It also critically 
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evaluates the analytical framework introduced in Chapter Two and applied in both cases 
and analyses the epistemic community framework‘s principal strengths and limitations. It 
concludes by explaining the limitations of the study and proposing suggestions for 
further research.  
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Chapter Two 
 
Applying the Epistemic Community Framework to Analyse the  
Creation of Cooperative Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreements  
 
―Knowledge is the sum of technical information and of theories about 
that information which commands sufficient consensus at a given time 
among interested actors to serve as a guide to public policy designed to 
achieve some social goal.‖ 
 
Ernst B. Haas (1980: 367–368) 
 
The main objective of this chapter is to present the theoretical and conceptual 
framework of epistemic communities. Given that the aim of this thesis is to examine to what 
extent epistemic communities can be influential in nuclear non-proliferation policy 
formulation, it is important to discuss the framework that will be applied to this study. 
The term ―epistemic community‖ has been defined or used in a variety of ways, most 
often to refer to communities of (scientific) experts (Foucault 1970, Holzner 1972, 
Ruggie 1975, Haas 1989; 1992b, Antoniades 2003). Etymologically derived from the 
Greek word ―ἐπιστήμη‖ (episteme), the term refers to knowledge or science. Over the 
years, the concept of episteme evolved from referring to a shared faith in the scientific 
method as a way of generating truth (Holzner 1972), as a dominant way of looking at 
social reality (Foucault 1970, Ruggie 1975), as a way to explore global governance (Haas 
1989; 1992b), and as a way to dominate social discourse and social practice (Antoniades 
2003). As a framework, it was introduced to International Relations (IR) scholars by 
Peter M. Haas (1989; 1992b) to study the role and impact of ideas in international 
relations and in international policy coordination.33  
                                                 
33 While Haas‘s model is the most widely accepted and applied in IR, it should be noted that the epistemic 
community framework was originally introduced to IR scholars by Ruggie (1975). Ruggie borrowed the 
term ―episteme‖ from Foucault (1970) and combined it with Holzner‘s concept of the ―‗proper‘ 
construction of reality‖ (1972: 60–71). Neither Ruggie nor Foucault provided a clear definition of an 
epistemic community, but instead focused their explanations on the term episteme. They described an 
episteme as ―a dominant way of looking at social reality, a set of shared symbols and references, mutual 
expectations and a mutual predictability of outcomes‖ (Ruggie 1975: 569–570). They therefore associated 
epistemic communities with broader and more-widespread social beliefs rather than with the more limited 
set of shared beliefs held by experts. Ruggie defined an epistemic community as ―interrelated roles which 
grow up around an episteme; they delimit, for their members, the proper construction of social reality 
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Epistemic communities represent networks of knowledge-based experts that help 
articulate cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, define the self-interests of 
a state, or formulate specific policies for state decision makers. In short, they assist the 
policy process. As a framework, it is useful for analysing the role of non-proliferation 
experts – i.e., scientists and knowledgeable professionals – in policy-making. This is 
because it assists in analysing and assessing the importance of scientists and experts 
behind the creation of new non-proliferation agreements since it focuses on the role of 
these experts in nuclear policy formulation. Furthermore, it seeks to fill the gaps in our 
knowledge regarding the origins of international policies by proposing as a source of 
policy the ideas and political influence of a network of experts with policy-relevant 
knowledge. Moreover, the role of knowledge and scientific expertise in nuclear non-
proliferation policy formulation – particularly the role of non-proliferation experts 
behind the creation of cooperative nuclear non-proliferation agreements – has been 
overlooked within the IR literature.  
The chapter is structured in four parts. The first section introduces the epistemic 
community framework, including a discussion on its key features, when it is likely to 
emerge, and how it influences the creation of policies that are subsequently implemented 
by state decision makers. The second section outlines the importance of knowledge and 
scientific expertise in policy formulation. The third section conceptualises the nuclear 
non-proliferation epistemic community by applying the epistemic community framework, 
drawing on insights from the existing epistemic community literature to better 
understand to what extent the experts behind the creation of ABACC and the CTR 
Program can be considered an epistemic community, how these experts emerged, 
operated, and influenced non-proliferation policy formulation. In the fourth section, the 
                                                                                                                                            
(1975: 570, emphasis in original). In other words, epistemic communities create a discourse that creates and 
carries out standards of ―normal‖ behaviour (Ruggie 1975: 570). By constructing social reality, Ruggie 
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limitations of the epistemic community approach and how they can be overcome are 
assessed. 
 
2.1 The Epistemic Community Framework 
 
The epistemic community framework was introduced to IR scholars by Haas in 1992 as a 
conceptual tool to explore global governance. It has been used to empirically study the 
role and impact of ideas in international relations and in international policy coordination, 
which can be conceptualised through three key themes identified from the existing 
literature. First, the key features of an epistemic community (including its composition); 
second, the uncertainty and complexity of the issue area, which prompt the emergence of 
an epistemic community; and third how it influences state decisions – i.e., how it creates 
the policies and subsequently influences their implementation as policy. These will be 
considered in turn below. 
 
Key Features 
According to Haas, an epistemic community is ―a network of professionals with 
recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area‖ (1992b: 3). They may consist 
of professionals from a variety of disciplines, but they usually have a shared set of 
principled beliefs, common causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a common 
policy enterprise (Haas 1992b).34 Haas argues that these features distinguish members of 
an epistemic community from members of other groups often involved in policy 
                                                                                                                                            
maintains that political actors develop ideas and norms that underlie an issue area. Moreover, the actors are 
conscious of the construction of these ideas and norms.  
34 According to Haas, members of an epistemic community have ―(1) a shared set of normative and 
principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) 
shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central 
set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages 
between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity – that is, 
intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their 
expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of 
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coordination.35 According to Haas, the solidarity between the members of an epistemic 
community derives not only from their shared interests  
Which are based on cosmopolitan beliefs of promoting collective betterment 
but also from their shared aversions which are based on their reluctance to deal 
with policy agendas outside their common policy enterprise or invoke policies 
based on explanations that they do not accept (1992b: 20).36 
 
Evidence from the existing epistemic community literature suggests that most 
commonly, and perhaps at a minimum, membership of epistemic communities consists 
of at least one group of scientific or technical experts with knowledge of and expertise in 
particular issue areas and of at least one group of relevant government officials (i.e., 
bureaucrats, diplomats, or administrators) who are responsible for making that policy 
within the issue area. 37  For example, Adler‘s (1992) nuclear arms control epistemic 
                                                                                                                                            
problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human 
welfare will be enhanced as a consequence‖ (1992b: 3). 
35 In his introduction to the special issue of International Organization dedicated to the role of epistemic 
communities in international policy coordination, Haas outlines how to distinguish epistemic communities 
from other interest and/or knowledge-based groups and organisations, including advocacy coalitions, 
advocacy networks, think tanks, social movements, and bureaucratic agencies (1992: 16–20). He argues that 
epistemic communities differ from interest groups because epistemic community members have shared 
causal beliefs and cause-and-effect understandings. If members of an epistemic community were 
―confronted with anomalies that undermined their causal beliefs, they would withdraw from the policy 
debate, unlike interest groups‖ (Haas 1992b: 18). Haas also claims that epistemic communities need to be 
distinguished from the broader scientific community as well as from members of professions and 
disciplines since the ethics of an epistemic community stem from its principles and shared beliefs instead 
of a professional code. Members of any discipline or profession can ―share a set of causal approaches or 
orientations and have a consensual knowledge base, but they lack the shared normative commitments of 
members of an epistemic community‖ (Haas 1992b: 19). Finally, Haas stresses that the beliefs and goals of 
epistemic communities differ from those of bureaucratic bodies. Even though epistemic communities and 
bureaucratic politics ―share a focus on administrative empowerment of specialised knowledge groups‖ 
(Haas 1992b: 19), bureaucracies operate to preserve their budgets and agency mission, whereas epistemic 
communities apply their knowledge to a policy endeavour subject to their normative and causal beliefs. 
Dobusch and Quack (2008) provide a general overview on distinguishing between epistemic communities 
and social movements. They argue that the two groups differ in the pursuit of their goals. Epistemic 
communities influence political actors through facts and arguments – i.e., knowledge – whereas 
social/advocacy networks use pressure as the key component in their mobilisation strategy (Dobusch and 
Quack 2008: 11). For more on advocacy coalitions, see Sabatier 1998, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993. On 
think tanks, see Stone 1996, Stone et al. 1998; on advocacy networks, see Keck and Sikkink 1998; on social 
movements, see Touraine 1981, Tarrow 1994, Walker 1994, Diani 1998, Cohen and Rai 2000. 
36 In addition, Haas argues that the members‘ institutional ties, informal networks, and collective political 
activities also add to the persistence and solidarity of the community in several ways: ―They provide 
members with a valuable institutional structure in which to compare information and to find moral support 
for their sometimes socially and politically marginalized beliefs. They also strengthen the commitments of 
individuals and inhibit them from subsequently recanting the beliefs shared with and reinforced by their 
fellow community members‖ (1992b: 20).  
37 It should be noted that in many cases the membership of these constituent groups overlap, as experts 
take positions in government, while government officials leave the government to work on the issue in the 
private sector. 
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community was comprised of physicists, nuclear scientists, economists, civilian strategists, 
and government officials; Hjorth‘s (1994) scientific-technological epistemic community 
was comprised of scientists, representatives from national governmental authorities and 
official research institutes; Haas‘ (1989) ecological epistemic community was comprised 
of ecologists, marine scientists, high-ranking officials from specialised agencies (such as 
the United Nations Environment Programme), government officials, engineers, 
physicists, oceanographers, and microbiologists; and Hopkins‘ (1992) food aid epistemic 
community was comprised of economic development specialists, agricultural economists, 
and government administrators.38 These examples illustrate that epistemic communities 
comprising experts with expertise in niche issue areas and government officials are likely 
to influence policy formulation. This is because the scientific intricacies of complex issue 
areas such as nuclear disarmament, environmental protection, pollution reduction, and 
food aid security, require expertise in niche issue areas. In addition, members of these 
different epistemic communities included government officials, who afforded the 
epistemic community access to decision makers.  Since epistemic community members 
are respected within their own disciplines, they have the ability to extend their influence 
– through their knowledge – to eventually reach major actors in the policy coordination 
process, culminating with decision makers. 
 
Emergence 
The increasingly complex and technical nature of the ever-widening range of issues on 
the international agenda confronts national policymakers with severe uncertainties (Haas 
                                                 
38 Added to the examples presented here, the epistemic community literature also comprises analyses on an 
environmental scientist community (Haas 1989; 1992, Baark and Strahl 1995, Ringius 1997, Betsill and 
Pielke 1998, Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002, Sauvé and Watts 2003), a cetologist community (Peterson 1992), 
a Keynesian community (Ikenberry 1992), a financial regulators community (Kapstein 1992), a biological 
diversity community (Raustiala 1997), a conventional arms control community (Wright 1997), a central 
bankers/economic community (Verdun 1999, van Daele 2005), a critical loads community (Zito 2001a), a 
competition law community (van Waarden and Drahos 2002), an innovation and technology community 
(Sharif 2006), and a scientific epistemic community (Barth 2006). 
 28 
1992b). Decision makers obliged to deal with issues of greater complexity rely 
increasingly on experts to ―ameliorate the uncertainties and help them understand the 
current issues and anticipate future trends‖ (Haas 1992b: 12–13). As a result, the 
consensus view within the epistemic community literature has been that ―under 
circumstances of complexity and uncertainty, governments will consult with expert 
communities in search of new ideas that make sense of the problem‖ (Drake and 
Nicolaïdis 1992: 41).39 Within the epistemic community literature, ―uncertainty‖ refers to 
periods when state decision makers are faced with an international agenda of complex 
and technical issues and they lack specialist knowledge in these issue areas.40 Complexity 
refers to the nature of the issue areas, whether they are political, social, economic, or 
scientific. In past studies of epistemic communities, the nature of such issue areas have 
included security (Adler 1992, Mendelson 1993, Wright 1997), population (Drake and 
Nicolaïdis 1992), monetary/economic (Hopkins 1992, Verdun 1999, van Daele 2005), 
macroeconomic (Ikenberry 1992), plant genetics (Sauvé and Watts 2003), biodiversity 
(Raustiala 1997), innovation and technology (Sharif 2006), and environmental (Haas 1989; 
1990; 1992c, Peterson 1992, Hjorth 1994, Baark and Strahl 1995, Ringius 1997, Betsill 
and Pielke 1998, Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002) issues.   
New developments or unprecedented events – whether political, social, 
economic, or scientific – give rise to demands from decision makers for particular sorts 
of information. Meeting these demands can require considerable technical or scientific 
                                                 
39 See also Haas 1989; 1990; 1992a, Mendelson 1993, Hjorth 1994, Baark and Strahl 1995, Liftin 1995, 
Radaelli 1995, Yee 1996, Raustiala 1997, Ringius 1997, Thomas 1997, Wright 1997, Betsill and Pielke 1998,  
Verdun 1999, Toke 1999, Zito 2001a, Simon 2002, Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002, van Waarden and Drahos 
2002, Antoniades 2003, Sauvé and Watts 2003, Howorth 2004, Jacobs and Page 2005, van Daele 2005, 
Sharif 2005, Barth 2006, Trommer and Chari 2006, Mitchell et al. 2007, Dobusch and Quack 2008, Marier 
2008, Dunlop 2010. 
40  It should be noted that in IR, uncertainty has multiple definitions, including fear, ignorance, and 
indeterminacy (Rathbun 2007: 536). Rathbun (2007: 536) argues that realists define uncertainty as fear (and 
prepare for possible conflict), rationalists define fear uncertainty as ignorance (and judge intentions of 
others), and constructivists define uncertainty as indeterminacy (and ascribe meaning). In this thesis, it is 
used in the context of (technical) unfamiliarity with niche issue areas (e.g., nuclear non-proliferation).  
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expertise. Epistemic communities are one possible provider of such information and 
advice because their 
Professional training, prestige, and reputation for expertise in an area highly 
valued by society or elite decision makers accord them access to the political 
system and legitimize or authorize their activities. Similarly, their claims to 
knowledge, supported by tests of validity, accord them influence over policy 
debates and serve as their primary social power resource (Haas 1992b: 17). 
 
Further, while decision makers have access to vast amounts of information, the existing 
studies on epistemic communities have shown that policy-oriented knowledge from 
authoritative sources is a scarce resource. Epistemic communities, however, can provide 
numerous types of knowledge – including policy-oriented knowledge – to decision 
makers because they  
Can elucidate the cause-and-effect relationships and provide advice about the 
likely results of various courses of action; . . . [they] can shed light on the nature 
of the complex interlinkages between issues and the chain of events that might 
proceed from failure to take action or from instituting a particular policy; . . . 
[they] can help define the self-interests of a state or factions within it; . . . and 
[they] can help formulate policies, . . . including the introduction of policy 
alternatives, the selection of policies, and the building of national and 
international coalitions in support of the policies. (Haas 1992b: 15–16). 
 
Therefore, as a source of knowledge, epistemic communities can provide information to 
decision makers on highly complex and uncertain issue areas.  
It should be noted, however, that an epistemic community will not necessarily 
emerge in response to governmental demands for information. Instead, decision makers 
turn to a pre-existing, independent community. The pool of independent expertise on 
most subjects almost always exists and has the potential to become an epistemic 
community involved in influencing government decision makers, when decision makers 
solicit information.  The different examples explored in the existing literature verify this 
claim. Issues such as the management of whaling (Peterson 1992), the long-term food 
security problems (Hopkins 1992) or the health of the Mediterranean Sea (Haas 1989) 
had been identified and discussed by technical and scientific experts before they became 
prominent to decision makers. In the example of the long-term food security problem, 
 30 
the international food-aid epistemic community had been in existence for approximately 
20 years before the issue of achieving food security worldwide became prominent to 
decision makers (Hopkins 1992). Based on these examples, it can be argued that 
epistemic communities already exist, but they become more active when decision makers 
solicit information, which often occurs in times of uncertainty. Uncertainty therefore 
provides an opening for an epistemic community to become involved in the policy 
process and a subsequent opportunity to influence decision makers. As Haas surmises, 
―without the help of experts, they [governments] risk making choices that not only 
ignore the interlinkages with other issues, but also highly discount the uncertain future‖ 
(1992b: 13). 
 
Influence Mechanisms 
Drawing on insights from the epistemic community literature, it can be argued that 
epistemic communities represent networks of knowledge-based experts who offer 
knowledge, ways of understanding intricate issue areas, and policy prescriptions to 
decision makers faced with complex problems. According to Haas, members of an 
epistemic community are ―united by a belief in the truth of their model and by a 
commitment to translate this truth into public policy, in the conviction that human 
welfare will be enhanced as a result‖ (1990: 41). With their claims to authoritative 
knowledge, epistemic communities provide credible explanations of ―truth‖ in different 
issue areas. Members of an epistemic community conduct scientific research in the 
context of the given ―uncertain‖ issue area and translate their findings into advice for 
state decision makers, who in turn, use this information to formulate public policy. The 
question that subsequently arises is how do they exert their influence on decision makers 
and ultimately influence state decisions? 
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Adler and Haas argue that an epistemic community influences state decisions 
through the following four processes: policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy selection, 
and policy persistence (Adler and Haas 1992: 375–387). During policy innovation, 
members of an epistemic community decide the policy objectives and frame the issue (by 
relating it to state interests). This marks the first stages of exchanges between all 
members of the epistemic community. During policy diffusion, members of an epistemic 
community actively engage in information exchange and share ideas and policies on both 
a national and transnational level.41 Once members of an epistemic community have 
framed an issue and diffused their ideas within the community, they recommend certain 
policy suggestions to decision makers, who then participate in policy selection. The 
epistemic community recommends the policies it thinks decision makers should select. 
An epistemic community facilitates policy selection through its ability to present policy 
alternatives as well as policy recommendations. Through their authoritative knowledge in 
highly technical and complex issue areas, members of an epistemic community influence 
and persuade decision makers to subscribe to particular policy recommendations. Policy 
persistence, in which the continuation of the consensus of ideas, beliefs, and goals over 
time among the epistemic community members contributes to their credibility and 
authority, can determine how long an epistemic community remains influential. (Please 
note that these influence mechanisms are discussed in greater detail later in the chapter as 
a way in which to conceptualise the nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community‘s 
influencing means.)  
Based on my understanding and research on the epistemic community 
framework, Figure 2.1 puts forth one possible model illustrating how an epistemic 
community influences state decision makers. The different processes and exchanges an 
                                                 
41 Diffusion refers to the ―spread of expectations, values, and other types of ideas to other nations‖ (Adler 
1992: 104). Transnational refers to the ―interaction across national boundaries when at least one actor is a 
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epistemic community engages in which influences decision makers are denoted by (1) – 
(4) in the diagram, where (1) signifies policy innovation, (2) signifies policy diffusion, (3) 
signifies policy selection, and (4) signifies policy persistence. The dotted lines highlight 
the dual existence of an epistemic community acting on both a national and transnational 
level. Members of an epistemic community can be categorised into clusters of 
professions including scientists, academics, research analysts, and government officials. 
While there might be overlap across these clusters (e.g., a government official might have 
scientific training, a scientist might also be considered an academic, etc.), in this diagram, 
and indeed in my conceptualisation of epistemic community membership, ―scientists‖ 
refers to those working in research laboratories, ―academics‖ refers to those working in 
universities, ―research analysts‖ refer to those working in think tanks and research 
institutes, and ―government officials‖ refers to those working within a governmental 
bureaucratic institution (e.g., the Department of State, Department of Energy, 
Department of Defence, Foreign Ministries, etc). 
                                                                                                                                            
non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental 
organization‖ (Risse-Kappen 1995: 3). 
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Figure 2.1:  
Epistemic Community at Work42 
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42 Please note that the State N model only applies to understanding international policy coordination. If 
studies wish to analyse domestic/national policy coordination, there would only need to be one state (State 
A) depicted in the model.  
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Although Adler and Haas provide a framework to illustrate the actual processes 
and interactions of how epistemic communities influence state decisions, it has been 
rarely applied to the existing studies on epistemic communities.43 In fact, one of the very 
few studies that did exemplify the influence mechanisms framework was Adler‘s (1992) 
study of an arms control epistemic community. This epistemic community was 
significant in the emergence of nuclear arms control cooperation between the two 
superpowers at the height of the Cold War. Adler‘s case study provides evidence that a 
domestically developed idea created by a national group of experts (who, in this 
particular case, were chosen by the U.S. government to negotiate with the Soviets) 
resulted in the 1972 anti-ballistic missile (ABM) arms control treaty. 44  In the late 
1960s/early 1970s, the U.S. government was confronted with the complex and uncertain 
technical issue of vertical nuclear weapons proliferation. As a result, it sought advice 
from its domestic arms control expert community, which, in turn, framed the issue of 
how to avoid nuclear war as a national interest. Members of the arms control epistemic 
community had expertise in understanding the consequences of a nuclear war, including 
nuclear fallout and radiation.45 The idea of avoiding and understanding the consequences 
of nuclear war was subsequently diffused to fellow technical experts in both the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union, given the American epistemic community‘s transnational links. By the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, links had already been established amongst both the 
American and Soviet arms control community due to the emergence of the Pugwash 
Conferences on Science and World Affairs that had been working since 1955 to diminish 
the role of nuclear weapons in international politics.46 Common interests between two 
                                                 
43 The influence mechanism framework has only been applied by Adler (1992) and Verdun (1999). 
44 The ABM Treaty limits ABM systems used in defending areas against missile-delivered nuclear weapons. 
45 Nuclear fallout refers to the radioactive dust created when a nuclear weapon explodes. 
46 The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, founded in 1957, is an international 
organisation that brings together international influential scholars – particularly scientists – and public 
figures concerned with reducing the danger of armed conflict and seeking cooperative solutions for global 
problems. Barth has argued that scientists from the Soviet Union and the U.S. developed contacts through 
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hostile powers were discovered and emerged as a basis for cooperation; both nations 
feared the threat of nuclear war, and feared the consequences of a nuclear war. American 
and Soviet experts relayed their fears of a nuclear war with their Cold War ―enemy‖ to 
their respective state decision makers and provided policy recommendations, which 
included the framework of the ABM Treaty. Subsequently, because members of the 
epistemic community had access and ties to their respective state decision makers, the 
conclusion of the ABM Treaty could be realised.  
 
2.2 The Importance of Knowledge and Scientific Expertise in Policy Formulation 
 
An analysis of the epistemic community literature indicates that the role of knowledge 
and scientific expertise is arguably one of the most important factors in policy 
formulation (Haas 1992a).47 It was explained earlier that the increasingly complex and 
technical nature of the ever-widening range of issues on the international agenda 
confronts national policymakers with severe uncertainties (Haas 1992b). Due to their 
expertise in policy-relevant issue areas, epistemic communities are one possible provider 
of clarifying and ―making sense‖ of such uncertainties. 
Issue uncertainty and complexity can arise from a number of different factors 
including problem complexity, unfamiliarity of the issue area, disagreements over 
problem definitions, measuring and gathering of evidence, and offered solutions to the 
problems (Zito 2001a). It can be argued that uncertainty make decision makers aware of 
                                                                                                                                            
Pugwash. Furthermore, he argues that these scientists subscribe to the epistemic community framework 
because they shared four core beliefs: (1) that scientists could move the international arms control agenda 
outside of official government-to-government contacts; (2) that a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty 
was an important step towards more substantial arms control agreements; (3) that such a treaty could be 
adequately verified by seismic means; (4) that their partners from the other side of the Cold War divide 
shared the first three beliefs (2006: 184). 
47 While Haas‘ edited volume of International Organization is the seminal point of reference for research 
on epistemic communities, other works include: Haas 1989; 1990, Mendelson 1993, Hjorth 1994, Baark 
and Strahl 1995, Liftin 1995, Radaelli 1995, Raustiala 1997, Ringius 1997, Thomas 1997, Wright 1997, 
Betsill and Pielke 1998,  Verdun 1999, Toke 1999, Zito 2001a, Simon 2002, Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002, 
van Waarden and Drahos 2002, Antoniades 2003, Sauvé and Watts 2003, Howorth 2004, Jacobs and Page 
2005, van Daele 2005, Sharif 2006, Barth 2006, Trommer and Chari 2006, Mitchell et al. 2007, Dobusch 
and Quack 2008, Marier 2008, Dunlop 2010. 
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the limitations of their understanding of the issue area, and to the need of acquiring 
expertise. As a result, when decision makers are faced with uncertainty in niche issue 
areas – i.e., in highly technical and complex issue areas – demands for particular sorts of 
information arise. Members of an epistemic community with expertise in niche issue 
areas can meet these demands due to their extensive professional and practical 
experience in highly specialised technical issue areas.  
As an example of how knowledge in a niche issue area leads to policy 
formulation, Raustiala analysed an epistemic community‘s role in securing the protection 
of global biological diversity (biodiversity) through the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD). He writes, 
Biodiversity, like many environmental problems, is plagued by uncertainty. 
Uncertainty existed over the rate of biodiversity loss, its significance, and the 
proper policy response. Biologists do not know the order of magnitude of the 
number of species in existence, nor how rapidly they are disappearing. 
Nonetheless, there were many scientists very concerned with the rapid rate of 
habitat destruction—for which there was good evidence—and eager to see a 
stronger conservation regime in place. These concerns provided a scientific 
foundation for the emergence of the CBD (1997: 495). 
 
Members of this epistemic community comprised scientists, as well as key individuals 
from government (including decision makers), and the biological industry. Due to their 
scientific knowledge and their ties to state decision makers, members of the epistemic 
community were instrumental in negotiating and creating the CBD. By providing a causal 
understanding and interpretation of the problem and a set of policy prescriptions, 
members of the epistemic community played an influential role – through their 
knowledge and expertise – in persuading all UN member states to sign the treaty, thereby 
institutionalising their ideas as an international policy. 
 Based on the above, it can be argued that the epistemic community framework is 
a useful approach to trace the origins of nuclear non-proliferation agreements because it 
provides an interesting structure with which analyse the role of non-proliferation experts 
– i.e., scientists and knowledgeable professionals – in nuclear policymaking. In the next 
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section, the nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community will be conceptualised 
through an application of the epistemic community framework described above.  
 
2.3 Conceptualising the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Epistemic Community 
 
By drawing on insights from the existing epistemic community literature in order to 
better understand to what extent the non-proliferation experts behind the creation of 
ABACC and the CTR Program can be considered an epistemic community, this section 
assesses who these experts are, and how they emerged, operated, and influenced non-
proliferation policy formulation. 
 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Experts: An Epistemic Community? 
In this thesis, I employ the concept of epistemic community to refer to professionals 
who come from a wide variety of disciplines and backgrounds. 48  While these 
professionals include technical and scientific experts, they are broader than one specific 
discipline or profession. In other words, they are not synonymous for one group of 
professional experts; they encompass a wide range of experts including academics 
working at universities, scientists working in laboratories, policy analysts working in think 
tanks and/or government, and government officials, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
In line with the existing literature on epistemic communities, the experts involved 
in creating the policies behind ABACC and the CTR Program comprised ―a network of 
professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds‖ (Haas 1992b: 3). Each 
network comprised scientific/technical experts and government officials. These included 
representatives from national nuclear energy commissions, foreign policy analysts and 
academics, and officials charged with making nuclear policy.  
Since my usage of epistemic communities follows Haas‘ definition, it is important  
                                                 
48 Please note my usage of epistemic communities follows Haas‘ definition (1992b: 3) outlined earlier. 
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to reflect on how members of both non-proliferation epistemic communities shared the 
four conditions articulated by Haas (i.e., a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, 
causal beliefs, notions of validity, and a common policy enterprise). The existing 
epistemic community literature illustrates that the shared normative and principled beliefs 
and the common policy enterprise of the members of different epistemic communities 
were shared from the outset. They were articulated through frequent, informal contact 
between members of the community, and through discussions, arguments, and mutual 
criticisms that helped members of the community shape common concepts and create a 
common vocabulary (Haas 1989; 1992c, Adler 1992, Verdun 1999, Drake and Nicolaïdis 
1992, Peterson 1992). Similarly, the shared causal beliefs members of the different 
epistemic communities explored in the literature were derived from their expertise in 
niche issue areas (Haas 1992a).49 Regarding the shared notions of validity, most epistemic 
community studies indicate that these were based on scientifically proven tests (Haas 
1992a). 
In this study, it can be argued that the non-proliferation experts behind the 
creation of ABACC and the CTR Program comprised an epistemic community not only 
because of their authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge in a particular domain 
(nuclear weapons proliferation), but also because they shared the same set of normative, 
principled, and causal beliefs, notions of validity, and a common policy enterprise (to be 
discussed in further detail in Chapters Four–Seven). These shared conditions were 
articulated through frequent, informal contact between members of the community, 
which, in line with existing epistemic community studies, were gathered from interviews 
(with some members of the epistemic community) and verified by analysing publications, 
statements, testimonies, and other open-source documents.  
                                                 
49  For example, Haas explained that the ecological epistemic community that initiated a banning of 
chlorofluorocarbons believed in preserving the quality of the environment. According to Haas, their causal 
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The Emergence of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Epistemic Communities 
The theoretical framework of the epistemic community approach posits that when 
decision makers are faced with uncertainty and complexity (particularly regarding 
technical issues), they often demand particular sorts of scientific or technical information. 
Earlier, it was explained that epistemic communities are one possible provider of such 
information because they consist of experts who are capable of producing and providing 
this information due to their possession of policy-relevant knowledge (Haas 1992b). In 
the cases of ABACC and the CTR Program, both epistemic communities emerged 
during moments of uncertainty and complexity, albeit in different contexts. In the former 
case, Argentina and Brazil were uncertain about each other‘s unsafeguarded nuclear 
facilities.50 In the latter case, the U.S. and the Soviet Union/Russia were uncertain about 
the command, control, and safety of 27,000 Soviet nuclear weapons after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union in December 1991. With its dissolution, 15 new independent states 
emerged, including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine – the states which inherited 
nuclear weapons.
51
  
In the CTR Program case, unlike that of ABACC, decision makers did not solicit 
expertise. This empirical finding challenges the theoretical proposition that when 
decision makers are faced with an issue with which they are not familiar and in which 
they lack specialist knowledge, they will seek advice from an epistemic community (Haas 
1992a). Instead, in the CTR Program case, the epistemic community offered its 
suggestions  and advice to decision makers on how to assist the newly independent states  
                                                                                                                                            
beliefs was that the ―chlorine in CFC emissions upsets the natural ozone balance by reacting with and 
breaking down ozone molecules and hence depleting the thin layer of stratospheric ozone‖ (1992c: 189). 
50 During the 1950s–1980s, both nations had indigenously developed some aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle 
and possessed nuclear facilities that were not subject to regional or international safeguards (discussed 
further in Chapters Four and Five). 
51 It should be noted that the U.S. and Russia were equally uncertain about the nuclear intentions of the 
successor states since Kazakhstan and Ukraine toyed with the idea of maintaining their inherited nuclear 
weapons. Of the three new independent nuclear states (excluding Russia), Belarus consistently maintained 
its desire to be nuclear weapons free, mainly due to the 1984 Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident (discussed 
further in Chapters Six and Seven). 
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with the elimination or reduction of their inherited nuclear weapons. Even though 
decision makers in one case did solicit scientific and technical expertise (in relation to the 
technical complexity surrounding mutual safeguards and inspections), and decision 
makers in the other case did not solicit scientific and technical expertise, in both cases, 
members of the epistemic communities used their expertise in a niche issue area to help 
craft the implemented nuclear non-proliferation cooperative agreements of ABACC and 
the CTR Program. 
 
The Influence Mechanisms of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Epistemic 
Communities 
 
As mentioned above, Adler and Haas argue that an epistemic community influences state 
decisions through the following four processes: policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy 
selection, and policy persistence (Adler and Haas 1992: 375–387), illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
In this study, it is argued that these influence mechanisms are facilitated by the members 
of the nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community‘s knowledge and access to decision 
makers, which are considered in relation to the four influence mechanisms below. 
 
a) Policy Innovation 
Policy innovation, denoted by (1) in Figure 2.1, marks the first stages of exchanges 
between all members of the epistemic community. Epistemic community analysis 
emphasises the ways in which ―the carriers of ideas and expertise shape state interests 
and behaviour‖ (Raustiala 1997: 485). By being involved in the policy process from an 
early stage, an epistemic community can influence the way the policy process is 
conceived and the way in which the content of the roles of the actors involved is 
conceptualised (Antoniades 2003: 30–31). How decision makers respond to a problem 
often depends on the way the problem is framed (Allison and Zelikow 1998: 280). By 
identifying the nature of the issue area and framing the context in which new data and 
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ideas are interpreted, epistemic communities contribute to policy innovation by bounding 
the range of discourse and guiding decision makers in ways that clarify issues and resolve 
problems. Adler and Haas argue that through their participation in policy innovation, 
epistemic communities have a direct influence in the identification of national interests 
because of the reliance that decision makers unfamiliar with complex issues place on the 
ideas and knowledge of epistemic communities (1992: 375).  
One of the greatest strengths of an epistemic community is its ability to frame 
the issue as a national interest due to members‘ expert knowledge of and expertise in a 
policy-relevant niche issue area. For example, by depicting the world in terms of an 
international market, members of a Keynesian epistemic community expressed the 
possibilities of mutual gains and the need for coordinated action in order to manage the 
post-war economic situation (Ikenberry 1992). Hopkins‘ study on the food aid regime 
provided evidence that the epistemic community promoted the use of food aid in order 
to alleviate long-term food security problems (Hopkins 1992). In Drake and Nicolaïdis‘ 
study on the regulation of trade in services, the epistemic community had a direct 
influence in the identification of national interests by characterising a set of international 
services as ―trade‖ rather than a public monopoly (Drake and Nicolaïdis 1992). Adler 
analysed a U.S.-based epistemic community that framed the issue of superpower 
coordination around the theme of nuclear arms control, as previously described (Adler 
1992). Finally, in his study of pollution control, Haas (1992c) examined how the 
ecological epistemic community was able to alter perceptions and frame the context for 
collective responses in dealing with environmental pollution. The ecological epistemic 
community was successful in altering perceptions because it used scientific data to 
support its claims that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) were damaging the ozone layer. In all 
these examples, through the community members‘ technical and scientific expertise in 
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niche areas, the issues were framed to coincide with the national interest and thus remain 
on the policy agenda, by relating it to the state‘s interest.  
In line with the existing studies on epistemic communities, members from both 
the non-proliferation epistemic communities used their technical and scientific expertise 
to first raise awareness of the issue amongst decision makers, and second, help it remain 
on the policy agenda. The epistemic community behind the creation of ABACC used the 
issues of technological autonomy and the discriminatory nature of the international non-
proliferation regime to frame Argentinean and Brazilian cooperative nuclear policy. Their 
shared opposition to a perceived discriminatory non-proliferation regime evolved into a 
common nuclear policy, which included regional confidence-building measures, and 
culminated in the establishment of a common mutual nuclear safeguards/bilateral 
inspections regime. Similarly, the epistemic community behind the creation of the CTR 
Program used the issues of international security and the threat of further nuclear 
weapons proliferation to frame the CTR Program. 
 
b) Policy Diffusion 
During policy diffusion, denoted by (2) in Figure 2.1, members of an epistemic 
community spread their ideas and engage in information exchange across and within 
disciplines nationally and transnationally. In other words, the clusters of groupings in the 
substate level in State A communicate with the clusters of groupings in the substate level 
in State B, State N, etc. By communicating  with their colleagues in scientific bodies and 
other (international) organisations during conferences or via (joint) publications and 
other venues such as  Track II meetings, symposia and specialist meetings (e.g., Pugwash 
meetings), members of an epistemic community share their ideas and policy innovations. 
Epistemic communities can be used as channels to circulate new ideas from societies to 
governments, as well as from country to country (Haas 1992a).  
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Studies have demonstrated that the diffusion of new ideas (promoted through an 
epistemic community) can be an integral part of international policy coordination 
(Ikenberry 1992, Adler 1992, Haas 1989, 1990, 1992c, Drake and Nicolaïdis 1992, 
Peterson 1992, Hopkins 1992, Baark and Strahl 1995, Ringius 1997, Betsill and Pielke 
1998, Verdun 1999, Sharif 2006, Sauvé and Watts 2003, Dunlop 2010). Examples of 
diffusion described by the epistemic community literature include sharing and 
exchanging ideas between one country and another (Kapstein 1992, Adler 1992); 
exchanging ideas from a small number of key national actors to a much wider group 
eventually reaching the critical mass of governments required to undertake effective 
international coordination of policies (Haas 1992c, Adler 1992); and sharing a conceptual 
understanding (i.e., a shared idea) and creating a wide range of transnational links (Drake 
and Nicolaïdis 1992, Adler 1992). In both nuclear non-proliferation epistemic 
communities, members frequently participated in periodic meetings where they engaged 
in a mutual exchange of information, regular scientific, technical, and military 
consultative exchanges, and participated in discussions surrounding the nature of the 
mutual safeguards system (in the case of ABACC) and the nature of the technical and 
financial assistance programme (in the case of the CTR Program). 
Through diffusion, the scope of the epistemic community‘s influence may extend 
to the transnational level since the spread of ideas and information can cross national 
boundaries ―from community to government, and from country to country‖ (van 
Waarden and Drahos 2002: 929). This is because the transnational links allow members 
of an epistemic community to exert concurrent pressure on national decision makers to 
implement new international policies (Adler and Haas 1992: 378). The acceptance of 
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ideas (that are communicated and diffused by epistemic communities) by global partners 
can be used to concurrently pressure national governments to craft certain policies.52  
Evidence from the existing epistemic community literature suggests that the 
more transnational its membership, the more an epistemic community can directly 
contribute to international policy convergence. For example, Haas (1990) demonstrated 
how an epistemic community made up of scientists and representatives from countries 
surrounding the Mediterranean Sea facilitated international cooperation to reduce 
pollution in the Mediterranean Sea. Members of the epistemic community participated in 
many acts of policy diffusion including information exchange, the provision of draft 
proposals, conference participation, and monitoring and publicising national activities 
which resulted in the creation of 
Transnational and transgovernmental coalitions of individuals and groups 
holding similar views in the Mediterranean countries. Such coalitions would 
engineer or guide simultaneous and congruent action by their governments by 
identifying possibilities for mutual benefit that had not been previously 
recognised or by developing entirely new policy objectives (1990: 56). 
 
Further, Hopkins‘ (1992) study of the international food aid regime showed that 
an international epistemic community, comprised of members from major food donor 
states, played a major role in achieving food security worldwide. Through their relevant 
knowledge in a niche issue area (development economics, agricultural economics, food 
aid administration) conveyed through publications, speeches, and plenary government 
hearings, this epistemic community played an important role in fostering change in 
international food aid policy. Hjorth‘s (1994) study on Baltic Sea environmental 
cooperation demonstrated that the international environmental epistemic community 
involved had an influence on policy formulation and on the specification of measures 
through  the  diffusion  of their ideas and policies, which contributed to the development  
                                                 
52 This should not, however, suggest that members of an epistemic community cannot diffuse ideas and 
policies nationally. 
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of environmental cooperation amongst all Baltic Sea states. In these examples, since the 
epistemic community comprised members from many states, they were able to exert 
concurrent pressure on their respective national decision makers. 
 
c) Policy Selection 
Once members of an epistemic community have framed an issue and diffused their ideas 
within the community, they recommend certain policy suggestions to decision makers, 
who then participate in policy selection, denoted by (3) in Figure 2.1. However, as Adler 
and Haas argue, the extent of an epistemic community‘s role in policy selection depends 
on two factors: decision makers‘ unfamiliarity and uncertainty with policy issues, and the 
timing of policy choice (1992: 381–383). If there are no existing policies and decision 
makers are unfamiliar with an issue, decision makers are more likely to seek the assistance 
of an epistemic community. On the other hand, if decision makers are familiar with an 
issue, they may be less inclined to seek the advice of an epistemic community in policy 
selection. Even if national decision makers solicit the advice of an epistemic community 
to legitimise their policies, the epistemic community may be able to introduce ideas to 
the decision makers that influence policies later. If an epistemic community expresses 
ideas close to the political mainstream, it has a greater tendency to acquire influence than 
an epistemic community that expresses ideas further away from the mainstream (Adler 
1992, Hopkins 1992, Haas 1992c, Kapstein 1992, Verdun 1999). In the example of the 
role of an epistemic community in the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), 
Verdun (1999) explained that members of the epistemic community (the Delors 
Committee) shared the same set of normative and principled beliefs as the European 
Council. Both the epistemic community and the European Council agreed that further 
economic and monetary integration would be beneficial to members of the European 
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Union. As a result, the policy behind the EMU was drafted by the epistemic community, 
and implemented by the European Union. 
 The second factor in assessing an epistemic community‘s role in policy selection 
depends on timing (Adler and Haas 1992: 383). The existing literature demonstrates that 
it was much easier for decision makers to accept the ideas from an epistemic community 
after political, military, or economic conditions have changed or a crisis has occurred. 
For example, strategic parity facilitated the political selection of arms control ideas in 
both the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Adler 1992). Equally, the discrediting of isolationist 
economic policies following their failure in the 1930s participated in the acceptance of 
the epistemic community‘s ideas embodied in the Bretton Woods agreement (Ikenberry 
1992).  
One of the original and key findings in this research is the role of a policy broker 
(i.e., a key ―connector‖) in both cases that facilitated policy selection. In the ABACC case, 
the role of Argentina was especially important in terms of selecting the policy of mutual 
safeguards. Argentine representatives took on the role of policy ―broker‖ in taking and 
leading the initiative on a cooperative and collaborative joint nuclear partnership – steps 
that led to the establishment of ABACC. In the CTR Program case, David Hamburg‘s 
role within the epistemic community as the key ―connector‖ was instrumental, as he 
introduced the non-governmental experts to the government officials, thereby granting 
the experts access to decision makers.   
   
d) Policy Persistence 
Policy persistence, denoted by (4) in Figure 2.1, defines the creation of new international 
policies. During this phase, the continuation of consensus of ideas, beliefs, and goals 
over time among the epistemic community members contributes to their credibility and 
authority, can, as a result, determine how long an epistemic community remains 
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influential. Adler and Haas conclude, ―new ideas and information, once institutionalised, 
can gain the status of orthodoxy‖ (1992: 384). In the area of arms control, for example, 
Adler remarked that the American- Soviet arms control epistemic community affected 
International political processes and outcomes by binding present and future 
decision makers to a set of concepts and meanings that amount to a new 
interpretation of reality (1992: 106).  
 
Adler and Haas explain that the sources of collective learning in international 
relations can be found in the ―evolutionary processes characterised by the diffusion, 
selection, and persistence of political innovations‖ (1992: 385). This suggests that 
national decision makers absorb new meanings and interpretations of reality – often 
generated by epistemic communities – and ―therefore can change their interests and 
adjust their willingness to consider new courses of action‖ (1992: 385). Such learning 
entails more than the transmission and acquisition of information. It implies that 
decision makers should be amenable to accept new and innovative ways of resolving 
problems. 
With regards to policy persistence, in both cases it came from the countries‘ 
leaderships. In the case of ABACC, policy persistence came from the two presidents who 
implemented the policy behind ABACC in July 1991, leading to its establishment in 
December 1991 and continued operation to this day. Soon after the creation of ABACC, 
Argentina and Brazil integrated into the non-proliferation regime, signing safeguard 
agreements with the IAEA and signing both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. In 
the case of the CTR Program, policy persistence came from the U.S. Congress passing 
the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991. This act was subsequently signed into 
law by President George H. W. Bush on December 12, 1991, and over the following 
years came to be known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which is still in 
existence today. 
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As explained earlier, the epistemic community framework is a further model that 
explains patterns of cooperation and policy change in world politics. It analyses the 
impact of an epistemic community on states in international policy coordination and in 
international policy creation. Since an epistemic community can operate on a 
transnational level – which creates a venue for international policy coordination – more 
than one state at any given time is influenced to implement a policy. In fact, all existing 
studies on epistemic communities have emphasised the transnational component (Haas 
1992a).53 Notable examples of this include the food aid programme (Hopkins 1992) and 
the Med Plan (Haas 1990). In both examples, more than ten states were influenced to 
implement a policy because of the transnational component of the epistemic 
communities. The food aid programme and the Med Plan are examples of policy 
persistence because both initiatives became, and still are, existing international policies. 
As Hopkins surmised in his analysis of the food aid programme, ―Once shifts in food aid 
practices and principles have occurred, they have been largely irreversible‖ (1992: 249).  
Chapters Four–Seven will illustrate how both nuclear non-proliferation epistemic 
communities influenced government decision makers to implement their ideas as policy 
using Adler and Haas‘ influence mechanisms. In addition, these chapters will illustrate 
that these influence mechanisms were facilitated by the members of the nuclear non-
proliferation epistemic community‘s knowledge and access to decision makers. Through 
their knowledge and expertise in the area of nuclear (non) proliferation, both epistemic 
communities raised decision makers‘ awareness and interest in the issue, which over time 
evolved into a policy-implemented non-proliferation cooperative agreement.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
53  In addition to Haas‘ edited volume of International Organization, further research on epistemic 
communities has been conducted (please refer to Footnote 47).  
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2.4 Limitations to the Epistemic Community Framework 
Although the epistemic community framework has persuasively provided theoretically 
rich ways of conceptualising the process behind the creation of international policies, it 
has also attracted a number of criticisms. Inevitably, there are limitations that need to be 
taken into consideration when applying the epistemic community framework. The main 
criticism relates to the question surrounding the independent influence of epistemic 
communities (Sebenius 1992, Drake and Nicolaïdis 1992, Risse-Kappen 1994, Baark and 
Strahl 1995, Jacobsen 1995). In cases where epistemic communities were successful in 
influencing national decision makers to implement policies, membership of the epistemic 
community included decision makers. Since members of an epistemic community often 
occupy positions in niche advisory and regulatory bodies, they may have both direct and 
indirect ties to decision makers. When an epistemic community comprises 
representatives of government or international organisations or even decision makers 
themselves (as well as scientific/technical experts) – which is often the case – they are 
said to have direct ties to decision makers. Indirect ties, refers to members of the 
community not including decision makers but still having ties to them since the 
community is comprised of consultants, analysts, think tank researchers, from elite 
institutions which automatically grants them access to decision makers, allowing them to 
influence the policy process (Haas 1992a, Yee 1996, Antoniades 2003).54 Examples of 
members of epistemic communities being directly (rather than indirectly) involved in the 
policy process are more common in the existing literature. Such examples demonstrate 
that without the inclusion of a government official/representative, the influence of an 
epistemic community is much more limited.  
                                                 
54  It should be noted, that in some cases, epistemic community members were formerly part of 
government regulatory or advisory bodies (e.g., Environmental Protection Agency in the U.S.) thereby 
granting them access to decision makers. 
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A complex set of issues subsequently arises: if epistemic communities include 
government decision makers, how are epistemic communities independently influential 
in the policy process, especially since ―the level of an epistemic community‘s influence 
depends on the extent of its access to top policymakers‖ (Drake and Nicolaïdis 1992: 41)?  
Further, it has been argued that epistemic communities can be effective only if their 
demands are ―compatible with either a public opinion consensus … or the views of 
powerful players in Congress‖ (Risse-Kappen 1994: 211) and that ―active political 
positioning, and not the mere content of the knowledge, creates the epistemic 
community‘s influence‖ (Zito 2001b: 467). Evidence from the existing literature confirms 
that epistemic communities with ties to high-ranking policymakers were able to influence 
decision makers (Adler 1992, Hopkins 1992, Hjorth 1994, Baark and Strahl 1995, 
Raustiala 1997, Ringius 1997, Betsill and Pielke 1998, Verdun 1999, Zito 2001a, van 
Waarden and Drahos 2002, Barth 2006). For example, Zito‘s (2001a) analysis of a critical 
loads epistemic community demonstrated that the community‘s membership was 
comprised of experts from Northern European countries with the active backing of 
Dutch and Scandinavian policymakers. As such, members of the epistemic community 
were able to persuade European politicians to focus on ecological sustainability. 
Raustiala‘s (1997) analysis of an epistemic community‘s involvement in the Convention 
of Biological Diversity demonstrated that by working with key individuals from the 
biological industry and government, the epistemic community helped to initiate an 
international regulatory cooperative agreement on biological diversity.  
The response to such concern is that while membership of epistemic 
communities may comprise decision makers, it is important to note when decision makers 
join the community. Often, they become part of the epistemic community after the 
epistemic community has innovated the policies. Illustrating how and when epistemic 
community ideas get on the agenda and become viable alternatives is imperative. One 
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mechanism to illuminate influence would be to understand influence as ―a causal relation 
between the preferences of an actor regarding an outcome and the outcome itself‖ 
(Nagel 1975: 29). The actor would be the epistemic community, and the outcome, the 
implemented policy suggested by the epistemic community. Haas (1992b) maintains that 
in order to demonstrate epistemic community influence on decision makers, tracing the 
epistemic community‘s activities at various points in time is to be encouraged. In other 
words, tracing the lifetime of the implemented policy starting with when the idea was 
conceived and ending with when it became policy. In the cases explored in this thesis, 
while government officials comprised both non-proliferation epistemic communities, 
they did not get involved in the community until after the idea behind both non-
proliferation cooperative agreements had been conceived by the technical and scientific 
experts. In the case of ABACC, scientists had been engaging in the idea of a mutual 
inspections regime in the early 1980s, and over the subsequent years, decision makers 
warmed to this idea, leading to the institutionalisation of ABACC. In the case of the CTR 
Program, the non-governmental experts had been working on how to cope with the 
aftermath of a dissolving Soviet Union from August 1991, prior to the government 
officials‘ involvement in the drafting of the CTR legislation.   
It is clear that operationalising ―influence‖ is a key component of epistemic 
community framework analysis. In her study of the changes in Soviet foreign policy 
during the late 1980s that led to the end of the Cold War and the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, Mendelson (1993) develops a framework that determines the influence of 
epistemic community members on policy. She uses ―advice‖ as a means of measuring 
influence, separating it into two component elements: its scope and its quality (1993: 340–
341). The scope of advice refers to issue content: the types of issues experts are called 
upon to analyse, the type of technical capabilities the experts have, and to whom the 
experts are giving their analyses. The quality of advice has three elements: timing, the 
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function of the experts, and the access channels. Timing refers to the stage in the 
decision-making process the experts‘ advice is sought: ―Is advice provided before the 
―preliminary‖ decision or the ―final‖ decision?‖ (Mendelson 1993: 341). The function of 
the experts (which relates to timing) relates to the purpose for which advice is sought: 
―Are specialists initiating ideas or just mobilizing opinion?‖ (Mendelson 1993: 341). The 
access channels refer to who has more access to whom, and why? In order to fully 
appreciate the role of an epistemic community in the policy process, following 
Mendelson‘s framework might overcome criticisms of ―the epistemic community 
approach is a model of elites by elites and for elites‖ (Jacobsen 1995: 303).  
A third criticism surrounds the difficulty in finding a community of experts who 
sufficiently fulfil Haas‘s definitions and characteristics of epistemic communities 
(Sebenius 1992, Ikenberry 1992, Kapstein 1992, Radaelli 1995, Wright 1997). However, 
evidence from all of the epistemic communities identified in the existing literature 
persuasively illustrated that epistemic communities comprised scientists or technical 
experts and bureaucrats who shared normative, principled, and causal beliefs and a 
common policy project. Further, Haas maintains that identifying the beliefs of an 
epistemic community calls for ―a detailed study of materials such as the early publications 
of community members, testimonies before legislative bodies, speeches, biographical 
accounts, and interviews‖ (1992b: 35) before epistemic community members become 
involved in the policymaking process.  
 A further criticism of the epistemic community framework is that it assigns too 
much influence to experts at the expense of other actors (Toke 1999, Dunlop 2000, 
Jacobs and Page 2005). Critics argue that the epistemic community framework fails to 
take into account the multitude of actors, including interest groups and social 
movements, who, at various times, shape the norms of decision makers (Toke 1999, 
Dunlop 2000). Further, even if epistemic communities are important in the policy 
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process, they may not be the most influential group involved. Jacobs and Page (2005) 
find epistemic communities are not as influential in American foreign policymaking as 
other organisations are. The response to such criticism is that while the framework may 
not take into account simultaneous influence mechanisms, the method of process tracing 
allows the researcher to trace the epistemic community‘s activities and demonstrate its 
influence on decision makers at various points in time. This will allow ―identifying 
alternative credible outcomes that were foreclosed as a result of their influence, and 
exploring alternative explanations for the actions of decision makers‖ (Haas 1992b: 34). 
 A final criticism of the framework questions the connection between scientific 
knowledge and power (Litfin 1995, Finnemore 1994, Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002). 
Critics argue that the epistemic community framework does not explain what it is about 
scientific and specialised knowledge that makes the role of an epistemic community so 
powerful. Further, they question the claim that scientific/specialised knowledge is the 
main producer of convergent state policies. The response to such criticism is that 
knowledge alone might not be as powerful or as effective in influencing national decision 
makers as knowledge and access to decision makers. Through both its specialist 
knowledge and its ability to penetrate the government or relevant executive body, which 
it does through its access and ties to both policymakers and decision makers, an 
epistemic community is likely to have a direct impact on setting the agenda and on 
subsequent policy negotiations.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
Research on epistemic communities has shown that the increasing complexity and 
uncertainty of global problems has led decision makers to turn to new and different 
channels of advice, specifically to networks of knowledge-based experts from academia, 
think tanks, scientific institutions, national bureaucracies, and other places of 
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technical/issue-specific expertise. These experts – who often comprise epistemic 
communities – are able to ascertain the causes of international problems, the interests of 
states affected by those problems, and offer policy recommendations, policy alternatives, 
and likely solutions. In providing interpretations and solutions, members of the epistemic 
community become involved in states‘ decision-making processes. While epistemic 
communities help shape state preferences through the knowledge they possess, they can 
exert influence through the institutionalisation of their ideas on decision makers. It can 
therefore be argued that knowledge – coupled with access to decision makers – plays an 
important and decisive role in influencing state decisions and subsequently shaping state 
behaviour. The basis of an epistemic community – its membership and its source of 
authority – revolves around members‘ expertise and technical knowledge. From 
uncertainty to international policy coordination, members of an epistemic community 
use their authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge in a particular domain to 
influence state decisions. 
The theoretical framework discussed in this chapter indicates that it is possible to 
outline two principal ways through which epistemic communities may be understood to 
be influential in international policy creation. These are the importance of epistemic 
community members having knowledge and expertise in niche issue areas (e.g., in highly 
technical and complex issue areas), and access to decision makers. Since the most 
meaningful insights into the role of epistemic communities will emerge through empirical 
investigation, the task of determining the importance of these two components are left to 
Chapters Four–Seven. In the following chapter, the research approach applied in this 
thesis is introduced. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Research Approach:  
Utilising Case Studies to Explain the Role of Epistemic Communities  
in Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Formulation 
 
Having presented the analytical framework, this chapter introduces the research 
approach used in this study in order to empirically investigate the role of epistemic 
communities in nuclear non-proliferation policy formulation. It should be premised that 
the main aim of this thesis is to apply the epistemic community framework to two under-
studied cases of nuclear non-proliferation agreements: the Brazilian-Argentine Agency 
for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the Nunn-Lugar 
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. Using the epistemic community 
framework as an analytical tool, this thesis aims to trace the origins of the two 
agreements. The main research question this thesis aims to answer is: To what extent did 
an epistemic community influence the creation of ABACC and the CTR Program?  
 The chapter is structured in four parts. First, it begins by discussing the analytical 
framework of epistemic communities in relation to nuclear non-proliferation. Second, it 
explains the research approach used in this study, principally the case study method and 
process-tracing. Third, it presents in greater detail the logic of the case selection. Fourth, it 
outlines the methods used for both data collection and analysis. 
 
3.1 Epistemic Communities and Nuclear Non-Proliferation  
The existing non-proliferation explanations – extended deterrence, the nuclear non-
proliferation regime (specifically the NPT), the non-proliferation norm, and 
democratisation – provide convincing arguments that explain the large gap between the 
number of actual nuclear weapon states in relation to the number of capable nuclear 
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weapon states (see Figure 1.1, p. 4).55 However, as indicated in Chapter One, empirical 
evidence suggests that these explanations are not fully sufficient in understanding every 
case of nuclear non-proliferation adequately. 56  Therefore, in order to gain a more 
complete understanding of non-proliferation outcomes and to supplement existing 
arguments, there is a need to broaden explanations. Since little attention has been given 
to the role of non-proliferation experts (e.g., scientists, academics, and research analysts) 
within the existing non-proliferation explanations, this thesis applies the epistemic 
community framework as a way in which to consider the role of these experts in the non-
proliferation outcomes of the empirical anomalies.57 
The epistemic community approach is a useful avenue for broadening existing 
non-proliferation explanations to include more actors (including these experts) as key in 
understanding non-proliferation outcomes because it focuses on the role of a community 
of experts behind policy formulation (and subsequent implementation). Consequently, it 
provides a crucial insight into the link between actors and nuclear non-proliferation 
policy. This thesis therefore examines the role of an epistemic community in nuclear 
non-proliferation policy formulation. It assesses the importance of an epistemic 
community in the process behind the non-proliferation outcome of two different sets of 
the empirical anomalies by focusing on its role behind the creation of two non-
proliferation agreements: ABACC, which verified Argentina and Brazil‘s non nuclear 
weapon status, and the CTR Program, which facilitated the denuclearisation of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The process of where and from whom the ideas behind 
ABACC and the CTR Program came from is currently lacking within the existing 
                                                 
55 Figure 1.1 illustrates the potential versus actual nuclear weapons proliferation from 1945 to the present 
day. It shows that over the years, there were approximately 45 nuclear weapon capable states in relation to 
nine actual nuclear weapon states.  
56 Please note that these explanations were discussed in greater detail in Chapter One. 
57  My usage of epistemic communities follows Haas‘ definition of a ―network of professionals with 
recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue area‖ (1992b: 3).   
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literature. As such, the epistemic community framework provides an interesting and 
useful framework with which to analyse and trace the origins of both these nuclear non-
proliferation agreements.  
However, it should be noted that the epistemic community framework is not 
being used as an alternative non-proliferation explanation per se, but rather as an 
intervening mechanism in the non-proliferation process. In other words, this research 
examines the explanatory effect of an epistemic community in the non-proliferation 
policy process; the epistemic community framework is being used to trace the emergence 
of a particular non-proliferation agreement (e.g., ABACC and the CTR Program) that is 
necessary for understanding the eventual outcome of non-proliferation in the empirical 
anomalies. Therefore, the main focus of this research is to examine the role of a nuclear 
non-proliferation epistemic community in the creation of ABACC and the CTR Program. 
The main premise of this research is that epistemic communities have played a significant 
yet under-appreciated role in explaining the process behind Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine‘s eventual non-proliferation outcome. 
 
3.2 Research Approach  
In order to examine the role of a nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community behind 
the creation (and subsequent implementation) of ABACC and the CTR Program, this 
thesis uses a case study research design to produce an analytical narrative behind both 
cases and process tracing to trace (and, by extension, demonstrate) the influence 
mechanisms of the epistemic community over time.  
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The Case Study Method 
This thesis provides an in-depth empirical analysis of two explanatory case studies.58 The 
case study method entails an analytical narrative, paying close attention to a detailed 
investigation of events. The analytical narrative is motivated by a desire for an 
explanation of particular events or outcomes, rather than the elaboration of theory (Bates 
et al. 1998: 11). Since this thesis is exploring and examining the role of epistemic 
communities behind the creation of two nuclear non-proliferation agreements, an 
analytical narrative behind the two case studies explored in this thesis is constructed that 
explains how and why ABACC and the CTR Program were created. Yin remarks that 
―how‖ and ―why‖ questions are more appropriately addressed through the case study 
method since such questions deal with operational links which need to be traced over 
time, rather than with ―mere frequencies or incidences‖ (2003: 1). In addition, case study 
researchers are interested in finding the conditions under which specified outcomes 
occur and the mechanisms through which they occur (George and Bennett 2005: 31).  
Inevitably, there are limitations that need to be taken into consideration when 
relying on the case study method. The main criticism relates to the generalisability of the 
findings which emerge from the analysis of the case studies examined (Flyvbjerg 2006, 
Yin 2003, George and Bennett 2005). While one cannot generalise findings to a wider 
universe of cases on the basis of an individual case, this does not preclude its applicability 
to future cases where similar variables exist. At the very minimum, the process tracing in 
the case study research (discussed below) can identify patterns and processes that may at 
least potentially be generalisable to many other cases. For example, further empirical 
research on non-proliferation agreements can refine our understanding of the role of 
                                                 
58 The explanatory method uses theory to explain the causes and patterns of historical cases (van Evera 
1997: 92).  
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expertise and epistemic communities in non-proliferation and allow us to see how 
generalisable they are across other cases. 
 
Process-Tracing 
Process-tracing, which offers the possibility to uncover the steps by which causes affect 
outcomes, is a suitable method to execute case studies (George and Bennett 2005, 
Checkel 2006). Tarrow notes that the goal of process-tracing is to ―connect the phases of 
the policy process and enable the investigator to identify the reasons for the emergence 
of a particular decision through the dynamic of events‖ (1995: 472). Haas (1992b) 
maintains that in order to demonstrate epistemic community influence on decision 
makers, tracing the epistemic community‘s activities at various points in time is to be 
encouraged. Since this thesis is interested in exploring the role of epistemic communities 
behind the creation of nuclear non-proliferation agreements, it uses process tracing to 
trace the lifetime of the implemented policy (ABACC and the CTR Program) by starting 
with when the idea was conceived (and by whom) and ending with when it became 
implemented policy.  
When using the process-tracing method, researchers are encouraged to take 
equifinality – that is, the consideration of alternative paths through which the outcome 
could have occurred – into account (George and Bennet 2005: 222). In this study, while 
the emphasis is on an examination of the role of an epistemic community behind the 
creation of non-proliferation agreements, it does appreciate that other factors (e.g., 
transition to democracy, economic liberalism, and international factors, including the role 
of the U.S.) were also at play. Therefore, it does not discount the other causal factors that 
led to the countries‘ decisions not to proliferate, but it focuses on the role of an 
epistemic community in influencing the creation of non-proliferation policies in the non-
proliferation process.  
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3.3 Case Study Selection 
The cases selected for this study are two cooperative nuclear non-proliferation 
agreements: ABACC and the CTR Program. While it might appear that there is a 
difference between the two agreements given that Argentina and Brazil never became 
nuclear weapon states, whereas Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine relinquished their 
inherited nuclear weapons, it should be noted that both cases are examples of 
cooperative non-proliferation agreements. In Chapter One, the term non-proliferation 
was defined as preventing an increase in the number of countries possessing nuclear 
weapons. As such, the two cases present two different conceptualisations of non-
proliferation: on the one hand, an agreement that verified the non-nuclear weapon states 
of two countries that did not pursue a nuclear weapons programme in spite of their 
capability and widespread suspicion (e.g., Argentina and Brazil), and on the other hand, 
an agreement that facilitated the denuclearisation of three countries that inherited nuclear 
weapons, but decided to relinquish them (e.g., Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine).  
ABACC and the CTR Program are two examples of many cooperative nuclear 
non-proliferation agreements. Other notable examples include the NPT, nuclear weapon 
free zones (e.g., the Antarctic Treaty, the Tlatelolco Treaty, the Rarotonga Treaty, the 
Bangkok Treaty, the Pelindaba Treaty, the Semi-Palatinsk Treaty), the Agreed 
Framework (signed between the U.S. and North Korea in 1994), the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Treaty, the Fissile Material Cut-Off (FMCT) Treaty, the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Strategic 
Arms Reduction (START) Treaty I, II, and III. ABACC and the CTR Program were 
selected for this study for two reasons. First, an analysis into the creation and 
implementation of nuclear non-proliferation agreements is an under explored area within 
the international security field. With the exception of Adler‘s (1992) study on a nuclear 
arms control epistemic community that led to the creation and subsequent 
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implementation of the ABM Treaty, very little research has been conducted on the roles 
of epistemic communities in creating international security policies. By focusing on 
ABACC and the CTR Program, this study will add to the relatively under explored area 
of analysing how two nuclear non-proliferation agreements facilitated non-proliferation 
in the respective countries. Through an examination of the origins behind these 
agreements, this study can shed light on the applicability of the epistemic community 
framework to nuclear non-proliferation policymaking.  
A second reason for focusing on ABACC and the CTR Program is to 
supplement the existing explanations behind Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine‘s non-proliferation. In Chapter One, it was explained how and why the 
dominant non-proliferation explanations are not fully sufficient in understanding 
Argentina and Brazil‘s non-proliferation and Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine‘s 
denuclearisation. In applying the epistemic community framework, this study seeks to 
broaden existing non-proliferation explanations by focusing on the role of experts in 
formulating the two agreements that facilitated the non-proliferation outcomes. Since the 
existing literature lacks an analysis of how and from whom the policies behind ABACC 
and the CTR Program were created, this thesis investigates the process of how and why 
these agreements materialised and aided the non-proliferation process. The analysis of 
both cases suggests that considering the role played by epistemic communities in these 
cases broadens our understanding of the non-proliferation outcome. Furthermore, the 
analysis suggests that applying an epistemic community approach provides explanatory 
power heretofore lacking in explanations of these countries‘ non-proliferation outcomes. 
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ABACC 
The main objective of this case study analysis is to examine to what extent an Argentine 
and Brazilian nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community was influential in the 
creation of the mutual safeguards inspection systems policy, which led to the 
implementation of ABACC in 1991. It focuses particularly on the period 1980–1991; 
May 1980 marked the first nuclear cooperation agreement between Brazil and Argentina 
on the development and application of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and in July 
1991, Presidents Carlos Menem of Argentina and Fernando Collor of Brazil signed the 
Guadalajara Agreement, which created ABACC. ABACC is one of the most important 
factors in Argentina and Brazil‘s non-proliferation outcome since it established joint 
mutual inspections of both countries‘ nuclear facilities, which ultimately verified their 
non-nuclear weapon status.  
To date, no academic research has analysed the role of nuclear non-proliferation 
experts behind the policy which led to the creation of ABACC. There has, however, been 
some research conducted on the role of an epistemic community and of ideas in the 
Argentina-Brazil rapprochement, although none of these studies focus on the causal link 
between the epistemic community and the creation of ABACC (Barletta 2000, Alcañiz 
2004, Fabbri 2005). Barletta‘s (2000) thesis analyses how shared ideas shape political 
behaviour and how political actors build proliferation coalitions and attribute meaning to 
atomic energy from 1945–1994. Alcañiz‘s (2004) thesis argues that the Argentina and 
Brazil integration process was brought about by a group of  Argentine and Brazilian 
nuclear professionals from 1985–1991, but no information is provided on who these 
professionals were, how they influenced the integration process, and how they emerged. 
Fabbri‘s (2005) thesis provides an analytical framework for approaching the study of  
ideas and investigates the role of  ideas and institutions in the Argentina–Brazil 
rapprochement of  the 1980s from 1979–1991. While these are welcome theses in the 
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relatively underexplored case of  Argentina and Brazil‘s non-nuclearisation, none of  them 
explain three important and underexplored factors within the Argentina and Brazil 
nuclear story, which this thesis explores. First, how the epistemic community emerged; 
second, who comprised the epistemic community; and third, how the epistemic 
community influenced the creation of ABACC and were able to influence its subsequent 
implementation as policy.  
In this case study analysis, the empirical evidence suggests that the Argentine and 
Brazilian desire to pursue technological autonomy, coupled with their perceived 
discriminatory nature of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, created a 
shared sentiment between the two states, which enabled the former rivals to establish a 
nuclear partnership.59 The criticisms against the non-proliferation regime espoused by 
both Argentine and Brazilian diplomats in international non-proliferation and 
disarmament fora throughout the 1960s and 1970s forged the emergence of a 
transnational network of experts with shared beliefs. At the same time, scientists from 
both states engaged in joint research and technical projects. Throughout this period, 
Argentines and Brazilians both noticed that, in spite of their rivalry, they were reaching 
common ground in nuclear issues, especially regarding energy policy, non-proliferation, 
and nuclear disarmament. A common front against a common enemy (i.e., the non-
proliferation regime) began to emerge, heralding the beginnings of a nuclear relationship, 
culminating in the 1980 agreement. During  the 1980–1991 period, the evidence in this 
case study analysis suggests that members of the epistemic community used their 
knowledge and expertise in nuclear issues, coupled with their access to decision makers, 
to influence the creation of the policy, which led to ABACC. 
                                                 
59 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Argentina and Brazil resisted against the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime, particularly against the NPT, which they viewed as discriminatory. Chapter Four 
provides further detail on the two states‘ hostility towards the nuclear non-proliferation regime.   
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The analysis of this case study proceeds in two chapters. In the first chapter 
(Chapter Four), a historical overview of Argentina and Brazil‘s suspected nuclear 
weapons programmes from the mid 1960s is provided. In addition, the emergence of an 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community is analysed. In the 
second chapter (Chapter Five), the process of how Argentine and Brazilian non-
proliferation experts created the policy behind the mutual safeguards inspection regime 
(i.e., ABACC) and were able to influence its subsequent implementation as policy is 
analysed.  
 
The CTR Program 
The main objective of this case study analysis is to examine to what extent a U.S.-
Soviet/Russian nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community was influential in the 
creation of the policy which led to the CTR Program. It provides a historical overview 
relating to the genesis of the CTR Program by focusing on the period 1991–1996. In 
December 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed, resulting in the emergence of 15 new 
successor states, including Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine who collectively inherited 
approximately 6,350 nuclear weapons (Norris 1992: 25). By November 1996, through the 
CTR Program, all three states had denuclearised and had become non-nuclear weapon 
states. The CTR Program was a very important factor in the denuclearisation of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine because, inter alia, it provided financial and technical assistance 
to safely dismantle the inherited nuclear weapons. Consequently, in this case study, the 
importance of the CTR Program in relation to the denuclearisation of the three states is 
analysed. 
Similar to the case of ABACC, to date, no academic research has analysed the 
role of a nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community in the creation of the CTR 
Program. Few studies have, however, provided some background on the origins of the 
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CTR Program, although they do not focus on the causal link between the epistemic 
community and the creation of the CTR Program (Combs 1997, Nunn 1997, Carter and 
Perry 1999, Lugar 1999; 2001; 2005; 2008, Ellis 2001, Carter 2005, Bernstein and Wood 
2010). Moreover, none of the studies explain three important and underexplored factors 
behind the creation of the CTR Program, which this thesis explores. First, how the 
epistemic community emerged; second, who comprised the epistemic community; and 
third, how the epistemic community created the CTR Program and were able to 
influence its subsequent implementation as policy, facilitating the denuclearisation of the 
three states.  
 In this case study analysis, the empirical evidence suggests that after the failed 
20/21 August 1991 coup d‘état against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev – four 
months prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union – U.S. and Soviet non-proliferation 
experts (including academics, research analysts, and government officials) began to 
anticipate the unprecedented security threat of the possible overnight creation of four 
more nuclear weapon states (including Russia). Together, these experts began discussing 
ways in which the U.S. could manage and finance the dismantling of the newly created 
republics‘ nuclear arsenals. They understood that immediate action was needed in order 
to establish a ―cooperative threat reduction‖ programme. Such a programme would 
entail a cooperative threat reduction and disarmament effort that would reduce the global 
threat from weapons of mass destruction held in the former Soviet Union. Their vision 
was to move U.S. nuclear policy from one of deterrence and mutually assured 
destruction with the Soviet Union to a coordinated non-proliferation policy of 
international cooperation with the new states of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine (Felton 2002: 4, Aspin 1991b: 10). During the latter months of 1991, the 
evidence in this case study analysis suggests that members of the epistemic community 
used their knowledge and expertise in nuclear issues, coupled with their access to 
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decision makers, to influence the creation of the policy, which led to the CTR Program. 
After the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (the original CTR Program 
legislation) was signed into U.S. law in December 1991 by President George H. W. Bush, 
the empirical evidence in this case study analysis suggests that over the next five years, 
the  denuclearisation of the three states was made possible under the auspices of the 
CTR Program. 
The analysis of this case study proceeds in two chapters. In the first chapter 
(Chapter Six), the scope of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine‘s nuclear inheritance is 
analysed. Having understood the U.S. and Soviet/Russian fear of the prospect of living 
with three further nuclear weapon states, the chapter then analyses how the U.S.-
Soviet/Russian nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community emerged. In the second 
chapter (Chapter Seven), the process of American and Soviet/Russian non-proliferation 
experts created the CTR Program and were able to influence its subsequent 
implementation as policy is analysed. In addition, the importance of the CTR Program in 
relation to the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine is discussed. 
 
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis 
The methodology used in this study fits with the existing empirical research conducted 
on epistemic communities in that case studies are used and that data collection consisted 
of interviews with some members from both epistemic communities and an analysis of 
community members‘ publications (Haas 1992a).60 These interviews and analysis of their 
publications were very useful in understanding the role played by both epistemic 
communities in nuclear non-proliferation policy formulation. It should be noted, 
however,  that  the  data  collected  was   gathered   not   only   through   interviews   and  
                                                 
60 These included a detailed study of materials which comprised the early publications of community 
members, testimonies before legislative bodies, speeches, biographical accounts, and interviews, as 
suggested by Haas (1992b: 35).  
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publication analysis, but through an application of the triangulation technique, a strategy 
to cross-check findings and verify the events and behaviours under investigation by using 
a combination of primary and secondary sources, illustrated in Figure 3.1. (Davies 2001: 
73, Burns 2000: 390). 
Figure 3.1: 
Triangulation Sources61 
Interview Interview
Secondary 
Sourcesa
Conference Proceedings/ 
Congressional Hearings 
and Testimonies
Legislation/ 
Agreements
Articles written by 
(former) government 
officials
 
a = newspaper articles; websites (such as www.abacc.org); scholarly/policy 
articles/books  
 
The arrows in Figure 3.1 illustrate the way in which the data collected for this 
study was reconciled. For example, by starting with secondary sources (e.g., newspaper 
articles and scholarly/policy articles and books), the general overview of both cases was 
determined and the experts behind the policies were identified. Then, through the elite 
interviews conducted with government officials, academics, and scientists (some of 
whom  comprised  the  epistemic  community), further data was provided. (It should also 
be noted that interviews were done via snowballing sampling.) This data was then 
corroborated through an analysis of secondary sources and other primary sources 
                                                 
61 This diagram was taken from Davies 2001: 78 and was modified to fit the data collection undertaken in 
this study. 
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consulted including conference proceedings, congressional hearings, articles from 
government officials, and official statements from government officials, including texts 
of agreements and policies. Therefore, the data collection and analysis used for this study 
proceeded in two stages: background research and original research, which are 
considered in turn below. 
 
Background Research  
First, a great deal of background research was conducted to determine the general 
narrative of the case, including an understanding of who comprised the nuclear non-
proliferation epistemic community in both case studies. While fewer publications (both 
academic and policy) on ABACC and the CTR Program exist, there are many studies 
available on Argentina and Brazil‘s nuclear weapons aspirations and Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine‘s inherited nuclear weapon status. In addition, other readily available sources 
(e.g., newspaper articles) were consulted which helped to provide an overview of the 
cases. Newspaper articles from The Financial Times, The New York Times, and The 
Washington Post were consulted for both cases: from May 1980 – December 1991 for the 
ABACC case; and from August 1991 – December 1996 for the CTR Program.62 These 
publications were essential in examining the general outline and in determining, to some 
extent, who comprised the nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community in both case 
studies analysed in this study. 
 
Original Research 
Second, extensive original research was conducted to determine the role played by the 
epistemic community in both cases. These included elite interviews with individuals who 
comprised the nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community in the two cases, 
                                                 
62  These broadsheet newspapers were selected because they are widely accepted as English-language 
authoritative news sources.  
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conference proceedings, congressional hearings, journal articles from government 
officials (including op-eds written by former Argentine, Brazilian, U.S., Russian, 
Belarusian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian government officials from specific non-proliferation 
journals including Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Arms Control Today, and The Nonproliferation 
Review), and official documents (e.g., texts of joint declarations, legislation, etc.).  
The elite interviews for this study were conducted to better understand when, 
why, and from whom the ideas behind both policies were realised, how the experts knew 
one another, how often experts within the community met with one another on both a 
national and transnational level, and what access channels existed between the experts 
and state decision makers. These interviews helped establish to what extent the epistemic 
community influenced two principal points of investigation under study: first, the 
creation of the policies under review; and second, the influence on state decision makers 
to implement the policies they had crafted. All interviews conducted for this thesis were 
of a ―semistandardised‖ format, as there was ―the implementation of a number of 
predetermined questions and special topics‖ (Berg 2007: 95), but the interviews were not 
restricted to these questions alone. Furthermore, interviewees were allowed ―freedom to 
digress‖, which permits the interviewer to ―probe far beyond the answers‖ to the 
predetermined questions (Berg 2007: 95).63  
Interviews were conducted with knowledgeable academics, policymakers, 
scientists, and government officials (including diplomats) in Austria, Argentina, Brazil, 
Russia, Sweden, UK, and the U.S. (face-to-face, over the phone, via email) from June 
2008 to October 2009.  For the ABACC case, a total of 18 interviews were conducted, 
and for the CTR Program case, a total of 27 interviews were conducted. 64 All interviews 
were conducted in English, apart from one, which was conducted in Spanish.65 Most 
                                                 
63 Interview questions are provided in Appendix I.  
64 Details of interview collection are provided in Appendix II.  
65 This interview was conducted by a native Spanish speaker (Coromoto Power Febres).  
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interviews lasted about one hour, although they ranged from half an hour to four and a 
half hours in length. Due to the sensitivity of the subject being discussed, none of the 
interviews were recorded, with most interview subjects requesting confidentiality. Instead, 
detailed notes were taken throughout the interview.  
While elite interviewing has some limitations, there are also many benefits to 
consider, especially in terms of providing a very rich set of data. In some cases, especially 
where there are no written sources, interviews can be the only or main source of 
information. While written sources were available for this study, the interviews were very 
beneficial, since they provided a big contribution to this study‘s original empirical 
research. Even though the interviews were held many years after the events of interest 
had taken place, raising questions over the reliability of their statements (Tansey 2007: 
767), with the passage of time, a historical perspective brought further enlightenment and 
clarity to these individuals on their personal role and the community‘s role in these 
events. In addition, the elite interviews were an ideal source of data collection for this 
study; given that a state‘s nuclear policy is highly sensitive, with related decisions being 
confined to a relatively small number of decision makers. Consequently, most interview 
subjects requested confidentiality and for the purpose of consistency, all interview 
subjects have been anonymised.66  
Further original research – besides the elite interviews – was conducted, including 
accessing official documents (e.g., texts of joint declarations, legislation, etc.), conference 
proceedings, and testimonies from congressional hearings. Particularly relevant for the 
ABACC case were the ABACC website and transcripts from conference proceedings 
relating to the Argentinean and Brazilian rapprochement. 67  The ABACC website 
                                                 
66 The UCL Data Protection Registration Reference Number for this study is Z6364106/2010/03/15, 
Section: 19, Research. 
67 The ABACC website is: www.abacc.org. Conferences include: ―Latin American Nuclear Cooperation: 
Prospects and Challenges‖, Organised by The Nuclear Control Institute, Washington D.C., Montevideo, 
Uruguay, 11–13 October 1989 (the conference proceedings are collected in a book by Leventhal and 
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provided useful data into its background and creation. In addition, it lists the texts of all 
joint nuclear agreements and declarations in English, Spanish, and Portuguese. The 
conference proceedings, which included speeches from Argentine and Brazilian scientists 
and government officials, helped to identify who the key clusters of experts behind the 
creation of ABACC were and how the nuclear component facilitated the transformation 
of the Argentine-Brazilian relationship from one of rivalry to that of cooperation.  
Particularly relevant for the CTR Program was the U.S. House of Representatives, 
House Armed Services Committee, which has a list of hearings in the early 1990s on the 
CTR Program with testimonies from official and non-governmental witnesses. These 
hearings were accessed using LexisNexis Congressional, which provided a complete 
transcript of all hearings from the 1991–1996 period. They were crucial in identifying the 
key people in the nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community behind the CTR 
Program. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the research approach adopted for the purpose of this thesis, 
including the case study method, process-tracing, and elite interviewing. It reiterated the 
epistemic community as a framework to be investigated in analysing the chosen cases. 
The chapter also introduced the two case studies to be explored for the study of the role 
of epistemic communities in nuclear non-proliferation agreements. The epistemic 
community framework developed in the previous chapter is applied and examined in the 
proceeding case study analysis chapters (Chapters Four–Seven). 
                                                                                                                                            
Tanzer 1992); ―Argentina and Brazil: The Latin American Nuclear Rapprochement‖, the Nahel Soreq 
Seminar, sponsored by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Washington D.C., and 
the Shalheveth Freir Center for Peace, Science, and Technology (Israel), Israel, 16 May 1996; ―Regional 
Safeguards in Latin America: Implications for the Middle East?‖, the Cairo Seminar sponsored by the 
Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), Washington D.C., and the National Center for 
Middle East Studies (Egypt), Cairo, 27 October 1997; and ―Nuclear Rapprochement in Argentina and 
Brazil‖, workshop convened by the Center for International Security Affairs at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory and the Center for Global Security and Cooperation at Science Applications International 
Corporation (SAIC), SAIC Headquarters, McLean, Virginia, 21 and 22 October 1998. 
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Case Study One: From Nuclear Rivalry to Nuclear Cooperation: The Role of an 
Argentine and Brazilian Nuclear Non-Proliferation Epistemic Community in the 
Creation of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of 
Nuclear Materials (ABACC) 
 
 
Chapter Four 
 
Argentina and Brazil’s “Suspected” Nuclear Weapons Programme 
and the Emergence of an Epistemic Community  
 
―It is in the regional framework that nuclear proliferation takes on its 
most destabilizing and perverse dimension. It is in the regional context 
that senseless arms competition between neighbours feeds on itself, 
resulting in a weakening of global peace. That is why Argentina and Brazil 
decided to move toward the tightening of the linkages in our respective 
nuclear policies.‖ 
 
Guido Di Tella, Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs (1995) 
 
The following two chapters examine the role of an Argentine and Brazilian non-
proliferation epistemic community in the creation of the policy behind the Brazilian-
Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).68 ABACC 
is one of the key factors in the non-proliferation of Argentina and Brazil because it 
created a bi-national system of mutual inspections and verification of indigenous non-
safeguarded nuclear installations between the two states, confirming their non-nuclear 
weapon status. 69  An Argentine scientist remarked that ABACC is ―more than a 
safeguards agreement: it‘s a non-proliferation agreement between Argentina and Brazil‖ 
(Interview J). In the first chapter, historical background on Argentina and Brazil‘s 
suspected nuclear weapons programme is provided and the emergence of an Argentine 
and Brazilian nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community is analysed. In the second 
                                                 
68  The acronym for ABACC comes from both the Portuguese (Agéncia Brasileiro-Argentina de 
Contabilidade e Controle De Materiais Nucleares) and the Spanish (Agencia Brasileño-Argentina de 
Contabilidad y Control de Materiales Nucleares).  
69 It should be noted that this confidence-building measure of mutual inspections was proof to both 
Argentina and Brazil (as well as to the international community) that the other was not pursuing a nuclear 
weapons programme. However, in addition, it should be further noted that only when both states were 
fully integrated with the IAEA and had signed the NPT was the international community convinced that 
Argentina and Brazil did not want nuclear weapons. (I thank Dr. James E. Doyle from Los Alamos 
National Laboratory for pointing this out to me, 14 January 2010.) 
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chapter (Chapter Five), the process by which the epistemic community influenced the 
creation of the policy behind ABACC between 1980 and 1991 is examined. 
Argentina and Brazil were widely suspected by the international community – as 
well as by each other – to be pursuing a covert nuclear weapons programme for many 
reasons. First, both countries were longstanding regional rivals living under military 
leaderships and had consistently competed for regional hegemony. Even though the last 
time they had engaged in a bilateral armed conflict was 1825–28 (Schneider 1991: 35–36, 
Reiss 1995: 52, Sagan 1996/7: 61), the rivalry mainly had a distinct nuclear dimension 
with the potential of achieving a military dimension.70 Second, between the 1950s and 
1980s, both nations had indigenously developed some aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, 
and possessed nuclear facilities that were not subject to regional or international 
safeguards.71 Third, both nations refused to get involved in the international nuclear non-
proliferation regime by rejecting the NPT, full-scope IAEA safeguards, the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Tlatelolco Treaty. 72 These reasons fuelled widespread 
suspicion that the two countries were indeed intent on acquiring a nuclear weapons 
programme (Gamba-Stonehouse 1991, Stanley 1992, Redick, Carasales and Wrobel 1995, 
Barletta 2000, Paul 2000). 
                                                 
70 Some scholars argue that fear of war between the two nations had reached a high point in the 1960s and 
1970s, when leading military officials in both countries embraced ―zero-sum ‗geo-political‘ doctrines‖ 
(Knopf 2003: 201, Selcher 1985: 26–8, 39, Carasales 1992a: 47–8, Hurrell 1998: 230–34). However, neither 
state had ever seen each other as enemies, nor had they envisioned a nuclear war with one another (Reiss 
1995). 
71 The nuclear fuel cycle can be used to produce both weapons-grade fissile material and civilian nuclear 
energy. Both nations had built a uranium enrichment plant, and Argentina started work on a plant to 
reprocess plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. Appendix III illustrates the nuclear fuel cycle. 
72 There are many components to the nuclear non-proliferation regime including the NPT (a treaty that 
establishes norms and supply-side controls), the IAEA (an international organisation that implements rules 
and inspections), nuclear weapon free zones (areas throughout the world that are protected against the use, 
storage, and testing of nuclear weapons), and a number of multilateral export control agreements which 
control nuclear technology supplies (including the NSG and the Zangger Committee). Argentina and Brazil 
rejected most of these: For example, both nations refused to place their facilities related to producing 
uranium and plutonium fuel under full-scope IAEA safeguards (IAEA safeguards prevent diversion of 
nuclear fuel to military uses). In addition, they refused to become parties to the NSG and they rejected the 
Tlatelolco Treaty, a treaty marking the prohibition of nuclear weapons and establishing a nuclear weapon 
free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean. It came into force in 1969 in spite of Argentina‘s initial 
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However, contrary to these fears, the two former rivals did not become nuclear 
weapon states. Scholars have offered a number of reasons as to why Argentina and Brazil 
did not proliferate. These include both countries‘ transition to democracy in the mid 
1980s (Solingen 1994, Paul 2000, Levite 2002/3, Müller and Schmidt 2010), the pursuit 
of economic liberalisation in the mid-late 1980s (Solingen 1994), trust building through 
confidence building measures (Redick 1995, Reiss 1995, Wheeler 2009), and the 
psychology of the leadership (Hymans 2006).73 In fact, the end of Argentina and Brazil‘s 
rivalry was marked by a gradual nuclear rapprochement process, which can be traced 
back to the late 1960s/early 1970s.74 Even though this period marked an intense rivalry 
(particularly in the nuclear sphere), the development of a common position during the 
negotiations on the Tlatelolco Treaty in the mid 1960s and a shared hostility to the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime in the 1960s/1970s emerged between the 
two states, facilitating the process of nuclear cooperation.75 
It can be argued that the pivotal turning point in the Argentina-Brazil nuclear 
rapprochement was marked by the signing of the May 1980 Accord on Cooperation for 
the Development and Application for the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy – the two 
countries‘ first joint nuclear agreement. Over the next 11 years, the nuclear 
rapprochement was firmly grounded because by July 1991, the presidents of Argentina 
and Brazil signed the Guadalajara Agreement, which established the creation of ABACC. 
Interestingly, the creation of ABACC and how it verified Argentina and Brazil‘s non-
nuclear  weapon  status  has  been  overlooked  in the existing literature. Furthermore, its  
                                                                                                                                            
refusal to ratify it. Argentina eventually ratified it in 1994. (In 2002, all 33 nations of Latin America and the 
Caribbean had signed and ratified the treaty. For more on the Tlatelolco Treaty, see Redick 1981.) 
73 It should be noted that Hymans work analysed the psychological profile of Argentinean leaders facing 
decisions about whether to pursue nuclear weapons. 
74 The term ―rapprochement‖ refers to both Argentina and Brazil‘s bilateral relations and to their gradual 
integration into the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
75 In addition, scholars have remarked that the resolution of territorial disputes in the late 1970s helped 
influence the rapprochement (Redick 1995, Resende-Santos 2002, Kupchan 2010). 
 75 
significance relating to Argentina and Brazil‘s subsequent integration within the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime has been underestimated. While both nations were initially 
hostile to the non-proliferation regime, it is worth noting that after the creation of 
ABACC in 1991, Argentina and Brazil became fully integrated within the non-
proliferation regime by signing various international non-proliferation agreements, 
including the NPT.   
Consequently, the focus of this research is on the origins of ABACC. The 
analysis of this case study indicates that an Argentine and Brazilian epistemic community 
drove the thinking behind the mutual inspections and safeguards verification system that 
was subsequently implemented as ABACC. The creation of ABACC was a remarkable 
accomplishment given that the two nations had hitherto been embroiled in a century-
long rivalry. It is therefore quite significant that the one sensitive area in which they were 
competing, mistrusting, and suspicious, in fact, brought them closer together.  
The chapter is structured in five parts. The first section provides detailed 
information on Argentina and Brazil‘s suspected nuclear weapons programme (including 
the birth, motivations, and technical infrastructure of the programmes), in order to 
ascertain the extent of the international community‘s fears of a nuclear Argentina and 
Brazil. The second section analyses Argentina and Brazil‘s competition, focusing 
particularly on their nuclear rivalry. The third section explains the evolution of Argentina 
and Brazil‘s common position taken against the international nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. The fourth section discusses the extent to which their common anti-nuclear non-
proliferation regime position paved the way towards a nuclear partnership. The fifth 
section investigates to what extent their shared interests and similarities prompted the 
emergence of an Argentine and Brazilian nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community.  
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4.1 Argentina and Brazil’s Nuclear Programmes  
It is important to trace the development of Argentina and Brazil‘s nuclear programmes 
because  
Their competition to be number one in this crucial area led to an action-reaction 
pattern. [...] The similar and slightly parallel paths that characterised their early 
nuclear development later went in different technological directions and resulted 
in quite different outcomes (Adler 1987: 280). 
 
Both nations launched their nuclear programmes in the mid-1950s soon after U.S. 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower‘s ―Atoms for Peace‖ programme proposal. 76  This 
programme served as a catalyst for many nations seeking nuclear power. It was designed 
to control the spread of nuclear weapons technology by providing nuclear know-how to 
be used for peaceful purposes only. It made the prospects of science, medicine, and 
industrial development derived from the use of nuclear technologies extremely attractive 
to many nations.77 Under the programme, the U.S. supplied equipment and technical 
information to countries throughout the world. As an example, the U.S. provided 
technical information, training, and subsidies to encourage nuclear development in 
Argentina and Brazil (Barletta 2000: 99). With the help of the ―Atoms for Peace‖ 
programme, Argentina was able to train 200 scientists and build its first nuclear research 
reactor in 1958 – the very first reactor in South America (Adler 1987: 291, Hirdman et al. 
1972: 50); and Brazil was able to purchase several research reactors – its first one 
obtained in 1971 (Squassoni and Fite 2005: 16).  
The ―Atoms for Peace‖ programme deemed atomic energy as safe, inexpensive, 
and a readily available power supply of the future. Nuclear technologies came to 
symbolise both modern development and the prospect of a cheap and reliable source of 
energy  (e.g.,  nuclear  energy).  Since  Argentina  and  Brazil  were  two countries seeking  
                                                 
76 Eisenhower launched ―Atoms for Peace‖ before the United Nations in 1953. 
77 Between 1954 and 1958, the U.S. reached 22 bilateral agreements for nuclear cooperation (Barletta 2000: 
129).  
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economic development and technological autonomy, acquiring nuclear energy was an 
important step to assert themselves as ―modern nuclear‖ powers. Both countries‘ pursuit 
of an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle was driven by their desire to claim technological 
autonomy without having to rely on foreign sources of energy. Acquiring complete 
mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle was tantamount to ensuring their status as world players. 
As an example to illustrate the necessity of acquiring a nuclear fuel cycle, former 
Brazilian army minister General Leonídas Pires Gonçalves said, ―Countries that do not 
complete the nuclear fuel cycle by the 21st Century, will not be considered a world 
player‖ (quoted in Spector 1987: 202).   
 After Argentina and Brazil launched their nuclear programmes in the mid-1950s, 
there was initial enthusiasm among scientists, military officers, and government officials 
– all of whom accepted the need for a national nuclear programme. The prevailing view 
among scientists in Argentina and Brazil in the early 1950s was that nuclear energy 
represented a ―panacea for national improvement‖ (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 171). 
However, their justification was not based on a military/security rationale, but rather, as 
mentioned above, as a means to independent national development and economic 
advancement (Redick 1995: 46). Yet, in spite of the initial enthusiasm, nuclear activities 
remained modest in both countries throughout the 1950s and the early 1960s. Their main 
activities included educating and training experts, establishing nuclear physics research 
institutes and atomic energy commissions, buying and constructing research reactors, and 
initiating programmes based on natural uranium technology (Adler 1987: 280, Wrobel 
and Redick 1998: 172). Soon after, however, both countries invested heavily in building 
nuclear power reactors. In particular, investment went into efforts to master two highly 
sophisticated and essential technologies for the nuclear fuel cycle: uranium enrichment 
 78 
and plutonium reprocessing.78 Both nations mastered these components on a pilot scale 
at different times: Argentina in 1983; Brazil in 1987. These acts – coupled with their 
disregard for the international non-proliferation regime – fuelled international suspicions 
that the two nations were taking actions that could lead to a nuclear arms race.79 
 In spite of the widespread suspicion that Argentina and Brazil were pursuing 
nuclear weapons, representatives from both the Argentine and Brazilian governments – 
particularly Argentine – consistently denied any intention to develop a nuclear weapons 
programme. For example, in 1975, General Juan E. Guglialmelli, former director of  the 
Argentine Institute of  Strategic Studies and International Relations, wrote,  
Recently both a former foreign minister and the President of the CNEA [the 
National Atomic Energy Commission of Argentina] have declared that our 
country has no intention of building nuclear explosives (1976: 165).  
 
Five years later, Vice-Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, former President of  CNEA, said, 
―Argentina is not even thinking of  developing a nuclear explosive‖ (quoted in 
Schumacher 1981: 3) nor does it have ―any intention of  developing its nuclear 
technology for military purposes‖ (quoted in Pilat and Donnelly 1982: 13). In 1983, after 
announcing that Argentina had developed the technology to enrich uranium, he said that 
Argentina would use its new nuclear capacity only for ―peaceful ends‖ (quoted in 
Schumacher 1983: 1). In addition, he was adamant that Brazil was not producing nuclear 
weapons. He said, ―It would be impossible for Brazil to conduct a military programme‖ 
(quoted in Pilat and Donnelly 1982: 13). Oscar Camilión, former Argentine Ambassador 
to Brazil, stated that he never heard any consequential Argentine official say that the 
country needed nuclear weapons. He also reportedly told the Brazilian press that he had 
                                                 
78 Appendix III illustrates the nuclear fuel cycle and it shows how uranium enrichment and plutonium 
reprocessing are the crucial technological steps towards nuclear weapons production. 
79 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Argentina and Brazil were repeatedly considered ―threshold‖ states by 
the international community (especially the U.S., and often the IAEA) alongside India, Israel, Pakistan and 
South Africa, countries that indeed in later years became nuclear weapon states (Graham 1980, Koven and 
Graham 1981, Washington Post Editorial 1982; 1982a; 1985; 1985a, Fishlock 1982; 1984, Johns 1982, Miller 
1982, Halloran 1982; 1984, Benjamin 1983, Schumacher 1984, Hiatt 1984, Riding 1986, Albright 1989, 
Spector and Smith 1990). 
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―no doubt‖ of the peaceful intentions of the Brazilian programme (quoted in Hymans 
2006: 160).  
However, the message emanating from representatives of the Brazilian 
government was not quite as convincing. Ministers from the Brazilian armed forces did 
express the intent to develop nuclear weapons primarily as a symbol for attaining a great-
power status. For example, former navy minister Admiral Maximiano Fonseca stated in 
September 1986,  
If it was up to me to decide, I would make an atomic bomb and detonate it in 
front of international observers to demonstrate the extent of national technical 
know-how (quoted in Spector 1987: 206).  
 
A few years later, Brazilian Secretary of State for Science and Technology José 
Goldemberg publicly stated that he was ―convinced that the army would build nuclear 
explosives and would intend them to be nuclear weapons‖ (quoted in Albright 1997: 46). 
It was not until 1988 that the Brazilian government made it clear that it was not intent on 
pursuing nuclear weapons when the 1988 Brazilian Constitution added a requirement for 
the use of nuclear energy to be ―exclusively for peaceful purposes‖ (Lamazière and 
Jaguaribe 1992: 110). It assured that ―all nuclear activity in Brazil would only be allowed 
for peaceful purposes and upon Congressional approval‖ (Albright 1997: 44).80  
In spite of these declarations, the international community was still suspicious 
over Argentina and Brazil‘s nuclear intentions because of their attempts to acquire a 
nuclear fuel cycle and because of their increasing disdain towards the international non-
proliferation regime. Argentina and Brazil repeatedly insisted on their right to conduct 
peaceful nuclear explosions, refused to submit their sensitive facilities to IAEA 
safeguards, and continually opposed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT, all of which 
                                                 
80 In many of the interviews conducted for this research, representatives from Argentine and Brazilian 
governments consistently denied that their countries were working towards a nuclear weapons programme 
(Interview A, Interview B, Interview E, Interview F, Interview G, Interview H, Interview J, Interview L, 
Interview M, Interview O, and Interview S). See also Hymans 2001, the first study based on a review of 
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they viewed as violating their national interests and national sovereignty. In addition, 
both countries were led by the military and, as such, the involvement of the armed forces 
in both countries‘ nuclear affairs aroused further suspicion, particularly in Brazil.  
The Brazilian military worked on a secret ―parallel‖ programme. The ―parallel‖ 
refers to the programme running alongside the official programme (Wrobel 1996: 342). 
However, the intentions of the ―parallel‖ programme remain controversial. Some argue 
that the parallel programme was the Brazilian military‘s covert attempt at pursuing 
nuclear weapons (Spector and Smith 1990, Krasno 1992; 1994, Reiss 1995, Doyle 1997; 
2008, Barletta 1997), while others insist (particularly Brazilians) that the nuclear weapons 
argument was seriously flawed (Wrobel 1996, Lamazière and Jaguaribe 1992). According 
to Paulo S. Wrobel (a Brazilian diplomat), 
It was argued that if the armed forces were so deeply involved in nuclear 
research and development that certainly meant they were not interested solely in 
peaceful purposes. Despite its apparent logic, this argument is seriously flawed 
because it fails to consider the role played by the three branches of the armed 
forces in the development of science and technology in Brazil, at both research 
and production level. For historical reasons, the Brazilian military had long been 
deeply involved in the development of many areas of modern science and 
technology, including branches of engineering, telecommunications, nuclear, 
computing and aeronautics. Attributing a weaponry intention to the parallel 
nuclear programme simply because it was directed by navy officers revealed a 
lack of understanding of the historical role of the military in Brazil‘s technical 
and scientific development (1996: 342–43). 
 
However, another Brazilian diplomat, Marco Marzo (a former senior planning and 
evaluation officer at ABACC), explained that the military in Brazil was involved in every 
important development in Brazil (Marzo 1996: 2). This would undoubtedly include 
nuclear development in the parallel programme.81 
                                                                                                                                            
hundreds of previously secret Argentine nuclear policy documents, which confirms that Argentina‘s 
nuclear programme was not aimed at building nuclear weapons. 
81  Resende-Santos (2002: 106) notes that Brazil‘s nuclear energy programme was under the military‘s 
control, with overall supervision and planning by the powerful, military-dominated National Security 
Council (CSN), the highest organ of national security decision making. Further, he notes, that the nuclear 
research agency, the military-controlled National Commission on Nuclear Energy (CNEN), also 
coordinated the parallel nuclear programme. 
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Even though Argentina was also led by the military, the role of the Argentine 
military in nuclear development had always been minor. Ambassador Julio C. Carasales, a 
respected former Argentine diplomat, remarked, 
The armed forces never had nuclear programs or participated in nuclear 
research and development. The only reason usually given to substantiate such 
repeated assertions is that, for many years, the heads of the Argentine National 
Atomic Energy Commission were retired navy officers. But the Commission 
was never under the authority of the navy. It was always subject directly to the 
control of the executive and its personnel were overwhelmingly civilian, as were 
the Commission‘s board of directors (1995: 48, fn.20). 82   
 
In order to understand the context within which the nuclear rapprochement and 
an epistemic community emerged, it is important to analyse the birth, motivations, and 
the technical infrastructure of Argentina and Brazil‘s nuclear programmes, which are 
considered in turn below. 
  
Argentina’s Nuclear Programme   
a) Birth and Motivations 
By the late 1940s, Argentina was the most powerful (economically and politically) 
country in South America. It was in this context that the Argentine atomic energy project 
was born (Gamba-Stonehouse 1991: 230–231). In 1950, the pursuit of nuclear energy 
resonated well with President Juan D. Perón‘s (1946–1955) search for regional leadership 
and prestige (Spector and Smith 1990: 223–224). Ronald Richter, an Austrian physicist 
formerly employed in the Third Reich‘s nuclear programme, convinced Perón that he 
could take Argentina to the forefront of nuclear technology and at less cost than the 
investments made by the U.S. and the USSR (Poneman 1987: 174–175). Perón, keen to 
                                                 
82 This was corroborated by two Argentine diplomats. One remarked that nuclear issues in Argentina were 
―100% civilian‖ (Interview F). The other remarked that Argentina‘s nuclear programme ―was a civilian 
programme run by civilians‖ (Interview S). Carasales (1928–2000) was an active member of the Argentine 
Foreign Service and held many governmental positions, including sub secretary of the Foreign Affairs 
Ministry, ambassador to Denmark and to the Organization of American States (OAS), and Director of the 
Department of International Organizations and of the Institute of the National Foreign Service. He was 
also a permanent representative to the IAEA, and was head of the Argentine delegation to the UN 
Disarmament Conference in Geneva from 1981–1985. He wrote extensively on Argentina‘s nuclear issues, 
especially regarding the Argentine-Brazilian nuclear rapprochement. 
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demonstrate his country‘s technological prowess, recruited Richter as the director of a 
research facility on Huemel Island in northern Patagonia. In 1951, Perón announced that 
Richter had achieved a controlled thermonuclear fusion reaction. This was discounted by 
leading physicists around the world, and, as a result, Richter was exposed as a fraud, and 
he and his staff were consequently dismissed and the Huemel facility was dismantled 
(Poneman 1987: 175).  
 In spite of Richter squandering nearly $70 million, the incident did not inhibit 
Argentina‘s nuclear programme (Poneman 1987: 175). After Richter‘s dismissal, the 
programme was entrusted to the National Atomic Energy Commission (CNEA). 
Established on 31 May 1950 by President Perón, CNEA was an independent public 
agency directly linked to the president and set up to design and coordinate national 
policies for scientific and technological development (Fabbri 2005: 121). Under the 
leadership of Pedro Iraolagoitia and Oscar Quihillalt (CNEA‘s respective first and 
second Presidents), CNEA hired scientists and developed a high-quality management 
team that was separate from the Argentine government. In fact,  
CNEA became a nonpartisan organisation, enjoying continuity of leadership and 
political autonomy, consensus and insulation that allowed it to impose a 
programme and an ideology onto the political elites (Adler 1987: 280).  
 
CNEA was the one institution throughout Argentina that centralised all matters of 
nuclear development, from mining to reprocessing and from technical training to 
nuclear-plant building. Between 1950 and 1983, the leadership of  CNEA was held by the 
Navy and had only four presidents. With the return of  democratic rule to Argentina in 
1983, Alberto Constantini became the first civilian to head CNEA, replacing the 
respected Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, a staunch advocate of  nuclear development 
(Adler 1987: 293–294). 
 It can be argued that there were three main motivations to the Argentine nuclear 
programme which remained constant throughout Argentina‘s nuclear history, in spite of 
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the change in the country‘s leadership. These included Argentina‘s search for national 
pride and prestige, including its desire to be technologically superior, its aim to achieve 
nuclear technological autonomy in order to be self-sufficient in (nuclear) energy, and for 
reasons of national security. In fact, as an Argentine diplomat remarked in an interview, 
One of Argentina‘s priorities was the need to find a way for independent 
technological grow[th] through the export of technologies given our financial 
limitations and the level of development we had. We concentrated on this 
objective. Our competitors were too important for a country of our size. The 
need of the flag of non-proliferation was necessary to facilitate our entrance in 
the market. Our needs in sensitive technology, like enrichment, were related to 
be a reliable supplier of fuel given the limitations of the time. That was essential 
for the type of product we had. Our research reactor for export needed fuel 
with low enrichment. 
 
Brazil, actually, was not on our agenda. Only when we needed to present 
ourselves as a leading supplier of technology, the question of strengthening of 
bilateral mechanisms came to mind. It was not because of distrust, although it 
could have been the case if our thoughts were in a different dimension. Our 
priorities were of a commercial nature (Interview L). 
  
As noted earlier, the Argentine nuclear programme was initially grounded in the 
country‘s senior leaders‘ search for prestige and national pride. Working for the country‘s 
nuclear programme generated an overwhelming sense of pride. In the interviews 
conducted for this research, many interviewees remarked that scientists who worked on 
the programme were viewed as ―national heroes‖ and ―icons‖. 83  In fact, when the 
Argentine programme began to produce results, it was embraced as a ―national cause, a 
source of pride‖ (Adler 1987: 299). The nuclear programme had the overall support of 
society, with very little opposition to the programme, either on technological or 
environmental grounds (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 173). It is quite telling that, until the 
1980s, there were ―no ‗greens‘, anti-nuke movements, Pugwash-oriented physicists, and 
no fears of Three-Mile Islands or the ‗day after‘‖ in Argentina (Adler 1987: 299).84 
                                                 
83 Interview A, Interview F, Interview H, and Interview K.  
84 Montenegro (2007: 259) explains that from the beginning of the 1980s, the Argentinean antinuclear 
movement was born. Anti-nuclear movements in Argentina include the Fundacion para la Defensa fel 
Ambiente (FUNAM), the Movimiento Anti-nuclear del Chubut (MACH), and Tierralerta. He argues that 
these movements were strengthened by Greenpeace Argentina from 1988. 
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Working towards nuclear development was another motivation for the Argentine 
nuclear programme. Argentina‘s pursuit of an indigenous nuclear fuel cycle was driven by 
its desire to claim technological autonomy. Argentina had historically relied heavily on 
imported energy resources which raised concerns about dependence on foreign-supplied 
fuels for economic development. Until the mid-1960s, a combination of government 
policies and bureaucratic mismanagement caused Argentina‘s hitherto substantial oil 
production to lag, and nuclear energy as a source of electricity comprised a crucial 
component in Argentina‘s economic development strategy (Poneman 1984: 861). In 
addition, Argentina had abundant uranium reserves, and since it was concerned about the 
need to diversify and create new energy sources, nuclear energy was seen as the most 
natural resource to develop (Adler 1987: 299). Equally important were the spin-offs 
created from the nuclear programme, such as engineering and construction skills learned 
from building the nuclear infrastructure, and technologies developed for the nuclear 
industry that could be applied and used in other sectors of the economy to bolster 
development and boost economic growth (Poneman 1984: 861). 
The final motivation for Argentina‘s nuclear programme was related to its 
national security. Argentina had reasonably limited disputes with its neighbours and was 
not engaged in geopolitical disputes, apart from the traditional issues with the UK 
relating to the Malvinas/ Falklands Islands and territorial disagreements with Chile over 
Patagonia (Gamba-Stonehouse 1991: 231). But its primary security focus was Brazil, 
whose larger population, rapid modernisation, ties to the U.S., and nuclear programme 
evoked concern in some Argentine political and military circles. Some Argentines 
described Brazil as the país llave (―key country‖) of American influence on the continent 
(Waisman 1975: 286). Further, the emergence of the Brazilian nuclear programme 
provided a rationale for Argentina to pursue its own nuclear programme. Even though 
the last time both countries had engaged in a bilateral armed conflict was in 1828 
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(Schneider 1991: 35–36, Reiss 1995: 52, Sagan 1996/7: 61), the traditional Argentina-
Brazil rivalry coupled with the emergence of the Brazilian nuclear programme was 
enough reason for the Argentines to want to pursue a nuclear programme. 
 
b) Technical Infrastructure85 
Argentina possesses the oldest and most sophisticated nuclear energy programmes in 
South America (Reiss 1995: 46). It accomplished many ―firsts‖ in its pursuit of an 
indigenous nuclear fuel cycle: among its achievements, Argentina operated the region‘s 
first research reactor, electric power reactor, nuclear fuel fabrication facility, and 
plutonium extraction plant (Poneman 1984: 857). By 1953, CNEA had launched a 
nuclear research programme and had started mining uranium. In 1958, Argentina 
emerged as the first Latin American state to operate a nuclear research reactor (Gall 1976: 
155). By the 1960s, Argentina could build its own research reactors and had mastered 
nuclear fuel element processing (Doyle 2008: 311). Under the guidance of Dr. Oscar A. 
Quihillalt, CNEA‘s first President, who ruled for over 18 years (and saw eight Argentine 
presidents sworn in and then ousted),86 CNEA and the atomic programme grew into the 
most successful institution and national programme Argentina ever had: objectives were 
formulated and partially achieved, the science and technology infrastructure was built, 
human resources were nourished, the road towards autonomy was traced, research 
reactors and other atomic facilities were built, and Atucha I – the region‘s first power 
reactor – was almost completed (Adler 1987: 291).87 
 
 
 
                                                 
85 Appendix VI presents a diagram illustrating Argentina‘s nuclear infrastructure. 
86 Appendix IV lists the governments of Argentina and Brazil from 1946–1995. 
87 Atucha I was bought from the West German company Siemens A.G. (Redick 1975: 418). 
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Since a 1960 decree declared CNEA to be ―high national interest‖, Argentina‘s 
desire to achieve nuclear technological autonomy was fulfilled when, over the years, it 
developed an autonomous nuclear fuel cycle. Under the direction of CNEA, Argentina 
developed domestic reprocessing technology and uranium enrichment, which, as shown 
in Appendix III, are the main ingredients for both fabricating nuclear explosives and 
fuelling breeding reactors. As an Argentine diplomat explained, ―Argentina‘s nuclear 
programme was directed to acquire the know-how to all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle 
because we wanted to be capable of developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes‖ 
(Interview O). 
In 1978, the Argentine government announced its intention to construct a spent 
fuel reprocessing facility in Ezeiza (Reiss 1995: 47). This would be Argentina‘s main 
facility for reprocessing plutonium – a key element in both electricity production and 
nuclear weapons production.88 CNEA President Castro Madero asserted that plutonium 
extraction from spent fuel was necessary for three reasons. First, recycling plutonium in 
Argentina‘s existing reactors would reduce the requirement for uranium by 50 per cent. 
Second, plutonium production was an integral element in developing breeder reactor 
technology (which produces more fissionable material than it consumes, thereby posing a 
serious proliferation issue because it yields fissionable material that can be used in nuclear 
weapons). Third, in order to be competitive with other nuclear suppliers, Argentina 
needed to develop similar skills, which included plutonium recovery (Poneman 1984: 
865). However, the Ezeiza facility was shut down in 1990 due to economic constraints 
and political pressure from the U.S. (Redick 1996: 2). It had planned to be in operation 
by the early 1980s, providing Argentina with direct access to weapons-usable plutonium 
(Doyle 1997: 132).  
                                                 
88 Appendix III illustrates the nuclear fuel cycle. 
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Argentina also began the clandestine construction of an unsafeguarded gaseous 
diffusion plant at Pilcaniyeu in 1978. At this facility, uranium hexafluoride gas would be 
processed through porous membranes to separate the fissionable isotope uranium-235 
(U-235) from the nearly unfissionable uranium-238 (U-238) (Milhollin and Weeks 1991: 
27). The apparent motivation for the Argentines to begin construction of this facility was 
in response to Brazil‘s purchase of a complete nuclear fuel cycle from West Germany, 
discussed below (Reiss 1995: 47). This plant had been kept secret and was revealed only 
weeks before the inauguration of civilian president Raúl Alfonsín in 1983, when on 19 
November 1983, Rear Admiral Carlos Castro Madero, president of CNEA, announced 
that Argentina had developed the technology to make enriched uranium. Reiterating the 
self-sufficiency and developmental goals of Argentina, he said, ―This demonstrates the 
failure of the policies of the great powers of not providing technology to the countries 
that are on the road of development‖ (quoted in Schumacher 1983: 1). The 
announcement marked Argentina‘s final stage in completing the nuclear fuel cycle, 
making it nuclear independent. 89  Theoretically, the plant had the potential to enrich 
enough weapons grade uranium for four to six nuclear bombs per year (Spector and 
Smith 1990: 228). The secrecy surrounding both the Ezeiza and Pilcaniyeu plants and the 
lack of IAEA safeguards on both facilities aroused suspicions by the international 
community that Argentina was intent on pursuing a covert nuclear weapons programme. 
However, as articulated earlier, successive Argentine governments consistently denied 
any intention to develop a nuclear weapons programme.90 
Despite Argentina‘s progress in the nuclear field, its nuclear programme suffered 
several technical and financial setbacks. Maintenance problems at the Atucha I reactors 
                                                 
89 It should be noted that before CNEA publicly announced that it had mastered uranium enrichment, 
Argentine officials had briefed Brazilian authorities (Wrobel 1999: 143). 
90 Redick (1997: 14) notes that amongst the highest political level in Argentina, there was an understanding 
that development of nuclear weapons might ultimately impede the civil nuclear programme due to the 
inevitable strong reaction of foreign nations. 
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caused the power reactors to operate sporadically (Reiss 1995: 56). The Atucha II power 
station encountered funding constraints that delayed construction (Reiss 1995: 56, 
Spector and Smith 1990: 231). Plans for four more nuclear power stations were cancelled 
(Reiss 1995: 56). Construction at the Ezeiza plutonium extraction facility was postponed 
indefinitely in 1990 (Milhollin and Weeks 1991: 27, Spector and Smith 1990: 232). Finally, 
the Pilcaniyeu facility experienced technical problems and funding shortfalls (Reiss 1995: 
56).  
Argentina‘s success in developing a near-autonomous nuclear energy programme 
can be credited mainly to CNEA (Adler 1987: 280). Despite the fall of Perón and the 
subsequent change from military to civilian governments, CNEA continued to function 
in an organised manner and ―continued to seek without interruption the goal of energy 
self-sufficiency for Argentina based upon nuclear power‖ (Gamba-Stonehouse 1991: 
231). As an independent public agency, it did not have policy imposed from above, but 
instead, developed its own policies and then sold them to the highest political levels. This 
process remained intact throughout both military and civilian governments and allowed 
CNEA to develop a consistent policy without being affected by the many changing 
presidents and their advisors. This enabled CNEA to persist with its technological, 
industrial, and energy objectives and maintain a civilian nature of the nuclear programme 
(Adler 1987: 301). 
 
Brazil’s Nuclear Programme 
a) Birth and Motivations 
Brazil‘s interest in nuclear research can be traced back to the 1930s when initial studies 
on nuclear fission took place and when Brazilian scientists began experimenting with 
nuclear fission. However, their efforts began in earnest after Argentine President Perón 
made the false claim in 1951 that Argentine scientists had mastered thermonuclear fission 
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(discussed above). In response, Brazil created a nuclear research programme under 
Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas (CNP), the country‘s natural research council. With an 
abundance of uranium deposits and a more advanced industrial infrastructure than 
Argentina, Brazil was ready to develop an independent nuclear programme by the mid-
1950s. The National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) was created in 1956 under 
Brazil‘s President Juscelino Kubitschek.  
By 1959, planning began for a nuclear reactor to produce electricity, and up until 
1971, the Brazilian nuclear programme had been a modest effort. In 1972, the Brazilian 
government purchased a power reactor from the U.S. company Westinghouse, who 
would also supply the technology.91 Soon after, construction of an electric generating 
station began at Angra dos Reis to house the country‘s first power reactor – the 626 
megawatt Angra I.92 The deal was problematic from the start: Brazil sought a complete 
nuclear fuel cycle that included uranium enrichment and plutonium recovery technology 
in addition to the nuclear reactors (Myers 1984: 885). Yet, since Brazil was not a 
signatory to the NPT, the U.S. government prohibited U.S. companies from selling such 
technology to Brazil. As a result, the Brazilians engaged in negotiations with the West 
German company Kraftwerk Union (an affiliate of Siemens) to build several more 
nuclear power plants and for a complete nuclear fuel cycle (Krasno 1994: 429). 
 Marked as the ―nuclear deal of the century‖ (Guglialmelli 1975: 162), Brazil‘s 
June 1975 agreement with West Germany was a multibillion-dollar (US$10 billion) 
agreement, representing the first sale of a complete nuclear fuel cycle and one of the 
largest transfers of nuclear technology to a developing nation (Redick 1995: 7). The 
agreement enabled Brazil to purchase four nuclear 1350 megawatt pressurised water 
                                                 
91 In 1968, CNEN had decided to build a nuclear power plant, and in 1971, contracts were signed between 
Brazil and Westinghouse.  
92 Angra I began commercial operation in 1985. It has been an inconsistent producer of electricity that it 
was dubbed ―the Firefly‖ by environmentalists for its propensity to go offline (Squassoni and Fite 2005, fn 
5). 
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reactors, with the option for another four by 1990; the development of uranium 
processing, conversion, enrichment, and reprocessing facilities; a uranium prospecting 
venture; the construction of a plant to produce fuel elements and pilot plant for 
reprocessing nuclear fuel; the establishment of an engineering firm to handle key sections 
in the construction of the plants, and a plant to manufacture large components (Adler 
1987: 282).  
Similar to Argentina, there were three main motivations to the Brazilian nuclear 
programme that led to the deal with West Germany: achieving technological autonomy 
and nuclear independence, prestige, and the progress of Argentina‘s nuclear programme. 
As a former Brazilian senior planning and evaluation officer at ABACC observed,  
Both countries were motivated [for the nuclear programme] because neither had 
access to nuclear technologies. They needed this technology to produce 
electricity. For example, 95% of Brazil‘s electricity is generated from 
hydroelectric plants. Brazil doesn‘t have oil-fuelled power plants, and the only 
water resources are very far from populated areas. 
 
[…] To some extent, the developed countries forced Argentina and Brazil to 
undertake their domestic programmes. During the 1970s and 1980s, the nuclear 
programmes in the two countries had a difficult time getting needed 
technologies from foreign suppliers (Marzo 1997: 57). 
 
The policy of nuclear independence was pursued by the Brazilian government as 
a method to satisfy Brazil‘s growing electrical energy requirements. The oil crisis of 1973 
and the subsequent dramatic rise in oil prices in 1974 convinced the Brazilian 
government that they could no longer rely on expensive foreign oil, which constituted 80 
per cent of Brazilian consumption in 1974 (Redick 1975: 423). Brazil had also relied 
heavily on hydroelectric power but studies indicated that by 1985, the potential to expand 
hydroelectric capacity would be exhausted (Rosenbaum 1975: 262, Schneider 1976: 93). 
Nuclear energy therefore appeared as a relatively inexpensive and plentiful source of 
electrical energy to sustain economic growth. 
 Similar to Argentina, the Brazilian government believed that acquiring a nuclear 
programme would grant the country notable prestige and would boost the country‘s 
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standing within the international community. After signing the agreement with West 
Germany, Brazil‘s foreign minister remarked that Brazil had ―gained new technological 
and political status on the world scene with the nuclear agreement‖ (quoted in Howe 
1975: 2). In addition, the 1974 Indian detonation of a nuclear device may have also 
reinforced a long-standing Brazilian belief that nuclear programmes and international 
prestige were linked (Rosenbaum 1975: 261). 
 The final motivation for Brazil‘s nuclear programme was related to Argentina‘s 
progress in nuclear issues. Brazil was fearful of falling behind Argentina‘s 
accomplishments: by 1975, when Brazil had signed the agreement with West Germany, 
Argentina‘s Atucha I reactor had already started operating. In order to prevent further 
lagging behind Argentina and to remain as a viable regional competitor, Brazil needed a 
similar – if not more – sophisticated programme. The West German agreement 
represented such ambition and a desire to surpass Argentina in that the reactors received 
would be more advanced than those being constructed in Argentina (Rosenbaum 1975: 
261). Therefore, the West German deal would enable Brazil to overcome Argentina‘s 
lead in the nuclear field. In addition, the Brazilian government followed Argentina‘s 
nuclear programme progress closely and believed that Argentina intended to develop 
nuclear weapons. It believed that because the Argentines were developing nuclear 
weapons, Brazil should follow suit. The Brazilians feared that Argentina felt threatened 
by Brazil‘s size, wealth, and modernisation, and would use nuclear weapons to imbalance 
the power relationship between the two countries (Rosenbaum 1975: 267). 
 
b) Technical Infrastructure93 
Nuclebrás (the state-owned Brazilian Nuclear Corporation) and Kraftwerk Union (the 
nuclear branch of Siemens) jointly managed the 1975 West Germany and Brazil 
                                                 
93 Appendix VII presents a diagram illustrating Brazil‘s nuclear infrastructure. 
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agreement. In addition to nuclear reactors, West Germany was expected to provide a 
reactor   fuel    fabrication    plant,    a    pilot-scale   plutonium   extraction  facility, and a  
commercial-scale uranium enrichment plant that used Becker nozzle technology (an 
aerodynamic uranium enrichment method that separates U-235 from U-238) – all, with 
the exception of the reactors, to be located at the Resende complex (Spector and Smith 
1990: 261).  
The West German deal – particularly the uranium enrichment and plutonium 
recovery plants because of their potential use in a nuclear weapons programme – 
heightened proliferation fears amongst the international community and provoked a 
strong negative U.S. reaction, particularly in the aftermath of India‘s 1974 nuclear test 
(Rosenbaum 1975: 257). Although the U.S. was unable to prevent the deal entirely, it 
persuaded West Germany to require bilateral safeguards on the technology it transferred 
(Squassoni and Fite 2005: 16). In the end, the deal produced modest results compared to 
its original scope.94 This was in part due to the lack of authority and continuity that 
shaped Brazilian nuclear affairs. Unlike in Argentina, the administration of the Brazilian 
nuclear programme was neither sustained nor maintained by a centralised nuclear energy 
commission. CNEN, unlike CNEA, was not the central institution on nuclear affairs. 
Nuclear affairs were dominated by the armed forces. In addition, the 1975 agreement 
was imposed from above, keeping the scientific community outside of the policy-making 
process. In contrast to Argentina, where scientists were the core of CNEA and where 
policy was developed within CNEA, policy was not developed within CNEN amongst 
Brazilian scientists.95 Instead, in Brazil the powerful National Security Council (CSN) 
                                                 
94 Construction of Angra-2 and -3 fell behind schedule and over budget (Reiss 1995: 56). The Becker 
nozzle technology proved unworkable in practice (Squassoni and Fite 2005: 16). The Resende reprocessing 
plant was postponed indefinitely (Spector 1990: 243). Only Angra-2 was completed, which began operating 
in 2000 (Squassoni and Fite 2005: 16). 
95 Wrobel and Redick explain that in Argentina, the nuclear programme had the overall support of society 
with very little opposition. However, in Brazil, nuclear activities were very controversial and major 
decisions were sharply criticised by leading scientific organisations, in particular those led by nuclear 
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dominated the policy-making process. 96  The CSN was the highest organ of national 
security decision-making (comprising the president and heads of the armed forces) and it 
was firmly in control of most of the ―parallel‖ programme (Adler 1987: 320). 
The West German deal raised suspicions regarding Brazil‘s nuclear intentions, 
and it marked the birth of the secret ―parallel‖ programme (Krasno 1994: 430, Gall 1976). 
Brazil‘s nuclear programme was divided between a civilian-led IAEA-safeguarded 
programme and an indigenous unsafeguarded ―parallel‖ programme controlled by the 
military (Redick 1995: 6). The former was a publically acknowledged nuclear energy 
programme and up until 1988 was managed by the state-owned Nuclebrás. The latter 
was a secret programme controlled by the military and CNEN to acquire the means to 
produce weapons-usable fissile materials and enrich uranium for naval propulsion 
reactors (Spector and Smith 1990: 243, Doyle 1997: 134).97 The secret and autonomous 
parallel programme was created to develop the nuclear fuel cycle outside of international 
safeguards. Under the stewardship of the Brazilian Navy‘s Special Projects Coordinating 
Board (COPESP: Coordenadoria de Projetos Especiais), the programme initially focused 
on developing a small light-water reactor for submarine propulsion and an indigenous 
uranium-enrichment capability using centrifuges (Squassoni and Fite 2005: 16). The 
parallel programme had not been officially acknowledged until 1987, when President 
Sarney announced that Brazil had developed ultracentrifuge technology (Stanley 1992: 
199). In fact, in August 2005, Sarney publicly confirmed that during the 1970s and 1980s, 
                                                                                                                                            
physicists, particularly José Goldemberg from the University of São Paulo who later became Collor‘s 
Minister of Science and Technology (1998: 173, 180, fn 15). Paul also remarks on the opposition by leading 
nuclear scientists and in addition to Goldemberg, includes David Simin and Luiz Pinguelli Rosa (2000: 
108). 
96 In addition, the 1975 agreement created a major rift between Brazil and the U.S. as the U.S. strongly 
opposed the deal and launched a number of retaliatory measures against Brazil, including banning the 
export to Brazil of certain products. 
97 The secret ―parallel‖ programme was developed during the military regime (1964–1985) and continued 
into the administration of José Sarney (1985–1990), Brazil‘s first civilian president in 21 years (Krasno 
1994: 429). 
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the Brazilian military had sought to develop nuclear weapons ―to counter political and 
military competition from Argentina‖ (quoted in Squassoni and Fite 2005: 16). 
All three branches of the Brazilian military were involved in the parallel 
programme, each using different technologies for nuclear enrichment. The Navy‘s 
COPESP, in collaboration with the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (IPEN) in São 
Paulo, had developed a laboratory-scale gas centrifuge enrichment plant. The objective 
of  this programme was to produce naval propulsion fuel for submarines (Marzo 1997: 
34, Goldemberg 2006: 41). The Air Force investigated laser enrichment of uranium and 
breeder reactors at the Center for Aerospace Technology (CTA) in São José dos Campos 
near São Paulo. In addition, the air force began secretly to prepare deep wells for testing 
nuclear explosives in the distant state of Para in northern Brazil (Goldemberg and 
Feiveson 1994: 12). The Army developed a jet nozzle enrichment facility at Resende, 
near Rio de Janeiro, and gas graphite reactors at Centro Tecnológico do Exército 
(CETEX) in Guratiba, outside Rio de Janeiro, which could have been well-suited for the 
production of weapons-grade plutonium (Krasno 1994: 430–431). In addition, the Army 
was developing a research reactor and a small power reactor (Marzo 1997: 35). 
Due to the lack of IAEA safeguards on secret facilities (similar to the case of 
Argentina) and amid suspicions over the military‘s parallel programme, the international 
community assumed that Brazil was embarking on a covert nuclear weapons programme. 
Yet, as Lamazière and Jaguaribe (two Brazilian diplomats) made clear,  
At no stage was there a government directive to build nuclear weapons in Brazil. 
The sensitivity of the programme, the central role played by the armed forces, 
the absence of an internal safeguards system and the relative independence of 
several subprogrammes, however, were elements that gave room for speculation 
(1992: 111).98 
                                                 
98 At the time of writing their article in 1992, Georges Lamazière was an Adviser to the Secretary-General 
for Foreign Policy of the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil, and Roberto Jaguaribe was the Head of 
the Division of International Trade in Advanced Technology of the Ministry of External Relations of 
Brazil.  
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 Despite its ambitious goals, the Brazilian nuclear programme encountered 
problems. The Angra-1 reactor was prone to failure in that it became an unreliable 
source of electricity (Goldemberg and Feiveson 1994: 13). Construction of  Angra-2 and 
-3 fell behind schedule and over budget (Reiss 1995: 56). Due to the economic downturn 
in Brazil, President Sarney cancelled the purchase of  the remaining six reactors from 
West Germany (Spector and Smith 1990: 243). The Becker nozzle technology proved 
unworkable in practice (Squassoni and Fite 2005: 16). The Resende reprocessing plant 
was postponed indefinitely, and only the first stage of  the Resende uranium enrichment 
facility was scheduled for completion (Spector and Smith 1990: 243). The ―parallel‖ 
programme too was troubled in that the Aramar and IPEN facilities had produced 
miniscule quantities of  low-enriched uranium (Reiss 1995: 56).  
 
4.2 Nuclear Rivalry for Prestige  
Argentina and Brazil‘s competition for a leading role in Latin America has been noted in 
every study available on their nuclear rapprochement. As the two major industrial, 
economic, and military powers in the Southern Cone, their relationship has been marked 
by a strong rivalry. Argentina and Brazil‘s attempts to acquire the nuclear fuel cycle can 
therefore be viewed as yet another competition between the two longstanding rivals. 
Many interviewees remarked on the nature of the Argentine-Brazilian relationship calling 
it ―a competitive rivalry, and not an enmity‖. 99 As an Argentine diplomat remarked, 
―Argentina and Brazil were like two brothers: one wanted to be better than the other‖. In 
addition, the same diplomat mentioned that ―there was no real tension between 
Argentina and Brazil. Both were striving for technological and indigenous superiority‖ 
(Interview F).  
                                                 
99  This quote is attributed to Interview D. Other interviewees who remarked on the rivalry include 
Interview F, Interview G, Interview H, Interview L, and Interview S. 
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Historically, the Argentine-Brazilian rivalry was generally confined to political and 
economic issues (Courtney 1980: 241). In the political realm, tensions between both 
nations were shrouded in Perón‘s vision of unity among Latin America‘s Spanish-
speaking populations and in Argentina‘s pursuit of regional leadership (Courtney 1980: 
253). Their rivalry can be interpreted as a continuation of Spanish-Portuguese 
competition for the domination of Latin America during the colonial period (Stanley 
1992: 201). In the economic realm, Argentina and Brazil competed for regional raw 
materials, energy, and markets (Resende-Santos 2002: 95).  
As noted earlier, the rivalry was not military, yet it did develop a distinct nuclear 
dimension which could have achieved a military dimension. The fear of war between the 
two nations had reached a high point in the 1960s and 1970s, when leading military 
officials in both countries embraced ―zero-sum ‗geo-political‘ doctrines‖ (Knopf 2003: 
201, Selcher 1985: 26–8, 39, Carasales 1992a: 47–8, Hurrell 1998: 230–34). However, 
since neither side had ever seen each other as enemies, they had never envisioned a 
nuclear war with one another (Reiss 1995: 52). Their nuclear rivalry, therefore, was 
mainly status driven, with both sides claiming that if the rival country were to build the 
bomb, the other would follow suit (Stanley 1992: 201, Redick 1997: 13, Resende-Santos 
2002: 95). For example, an April 1980 Washington Post Editorial opined,  
The two nations have an intensely competitive relationship, and it is hard to 
believe that advances in one nation‘s nuclear program will not spur a matching 
response in the other‘s (6 April 1980: E6). 
 
Since both states were vying for regional leadership, whoever acquired the 
nuclear fuel cycle first would be the ―winner‖. While both sides were aware that each 
state wanted to acquire the fuel cycle, they were uncertain of the other‘s nuclear 
intentions: were the nuclear programmes for civilian or military purposes? In fact, as one 
Argentine scientist remarked, ―Both governments thought the other government was 
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acquiring the technology at least to have the materials to produce the bomb‖ (Interview 
H).  
Brazil‘s road to nuclear technological autonomy had the potential of being 
quicker and more productive than Argentina‘s. But Brazil‘s lack of ideological and 
political consensus and continuity regarding nuclear policy and the resulting institutional 
decentralisation hampered its efforts. Brazil lacked the consistency and continuation of a 
sole atomic energy commission seen in Argentina. In addition, Brazil often tried to play 
―catch-up‖ with its regional rival. For example, when Argentina announced the 
development of an indigenous method for enriching uranium, ―Brazil doubled its efforts 
to do likewise‖ (Adler 1987: 317). That is not to say that the rivalry was one-sided. It has 
been argued that Argentina began the Pilcaniyeu project and the construction of the 
Ezeiza reprocessing plant (thus obtaining the entire nuclear fuel cycle), as a direct 
response to Brazil‘s 1975 nuclear deal with West Germany (Spector and Smith 1990: 387). 
In fact, the then head of the Argentine Nuclear Energy Commission acknowledged to 
one Carter Administration non-proliferation aide that 
Argentina could not abandon the Ezeiza plant – the only plant that Argentina 
had publicly announced at the time – because of [italics are added for emphasis] 
the 1975 Brazilian deal‖ (Spector and Smith 1990: 387).  
 
By the end of the 1970s, the nuclear programmes in both Argentina and Brazil 
encountered many technical and financial obstacles, mainly due to the newly created 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Established after India‘s nuclear test in 1974, the NSG 
ensures that nuclear transfers for peaceful purposes are not diverted to unsafeguarded 
nuclear fuel cycle of nuclear explosive activities. India‘s test demonstrated that nuclear 
technology transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused. Argentina and Brazil 
viewed the NSG as an attempt by the ―major nuclear powers‖ to ―freeze‖ world power 
into two categories – the nuclear-weapon haves, and the nuclear-weapon have-nots – and 
to create a monopoly in nuclear technology so as to constrain technological development 
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in the non-nuclear-weapon countries (Goldemberg and Feiveson 1994: 12, Wrobel 1996: 
337, 341, Carasales 1999: 5). As a former Head of International Affairs for CNEA 
explained in an interview,  
All of this resulted in strong political pressure by western governments and the 
imposition of severe restrictions being put upon the transferring of technology, 
goods, equipment and services by nuclear providers. This affected Brazil and 
Argentina equally (Interview K). 
 
Interestingly, in spite of their competition within the nuclear sphere, throughout the 
1960s and 1970s, both states began to develop a common position and a shared hostility 
towards the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.  
 
4.3 The Evolution of a Common Position against the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Regime: “Disarmament of the Disarmed” 
 
Argentina and Brazil‘s objections to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime 
focused on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the NPT, and the NSG. Their main objection to 
these international non-proliferation agreements was that they were considered a 
violation of their national interests and national sovereignty. However, in spite of their 
rivalry, common ground was being reached in relation to these non-proliferation 
agreements since both nations found themselves to be in agreement over their objections 
to the non-proliferation regime. It can therefore be argued that the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
and the negotiations surrounding the NPT set the political context for the Argentine-
Brazilian nuclear rapprochement and agreements of 20 years later. These agreements 
proved to be very important to what emerged as a bilateral relationship between the two 
states. Redick notes (italics are added for emphasis), 
For the first time during the negotiations of the Latin American Treaty, these 
two suspicious rivals began to talk about these sensitive nuclear issues and develop 
common positions. The Tlatelolco negotiations became the first step in a long 
confidence-building process between Argentina and Brazil. The two countries 
were now on the same side of this nuclear policy issue. They saw themselves as 
pitted against the nonproliferation regime, which they viewed as insidiously 
trying to prevent the development of their nuclear programs. They viewed the 
nonproliferation regime as highly discriminatory. They viewed their shared interest 
as extending into common positions in opposition to the NPT, and this evolved 
 99 
into common support for each other's nuclear export policies. […] Their nuclear 
relationship deepened with parallel opposition to the NPT and the Nuclear 
Suppliers' Group, and in opposition to foreign efforts to prevent their access to 
sensitive technology. But then this traditional animosity became muted into a 
sense of shared victimization by the advanced nations (1996: 12–14).  
 
What occurred over time was the change from a largely reactive policy to a perceived and 
real foreign pressure to active, bilateral nuclear cooperation, which then led to eventual 
involvement within the nuclear non-proliferation regime.  
 
Treaty of Tlatelolco 
 
Argentina and Brazil‘s main opposition to the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco concerned the 
interpretation of the application of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs). This treaty 
established the Latin American nuclear weapon free zone, with all parties to the 
agreement committing to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful 
purposes. 100  PNEs were viewed as a transparent cover for a desire to build nuclear 
weapons (Hymans 2006: 161). Since PNEs release energy in an uncontrolled manner and 
possess characteristics that make them useful for warlike purposes, they can be 
misinterpreted as nuclear weapons. The only difference between a PNE and a nuclear 
weapon is their employment (Costanzo 1998: 111). As a result, in the view of certain 
governments (particularly the U.S., Mexico, and other Latin American states), the 
Tlatelolco Treaty prohibited the manufacture and use of PNEs (Aja Espil 1985: 76). 
Even though most Tlatelolco signatories shared the view that PNEs were not 
permitted under the Treaty, Argentina and Brazil insisted on maintaining the right to 
manufacture nuclear explosive devises for peaceful purposes. Argentina and Brazil 
wanted to leave open the possibility for the development of nuclear explosive devices 
(for peace or defence) should a national security need arise (Redick 1981: 121–122; 1995: 
                                                 
100 The creation of the treaty was a means to protect the region after the events of the 1962 Cuban Missile 
Crisis (Redick 1981: 109–110, Davies 2004: 57). 
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16–19). Both nations maintained their advocacy of PNEs until 1990, at which point, they 
jointly declared their support of a ban on all nuclear testing (Redick 1995: 17).101 
 
NPT 
 
Argentina and Brazil‘s vehement opposition towards the NPT can be best surmised by 
Argentine Foreign Minister Rear Admiral Oscar Montes‘ speech to the First Special 
Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in 1978. He said,   
From the beginning, we rejected the NPT because of its discriminatory 
character, since, for the first time in history, it legitimised a division of the world 
into two categories: countries which can do anything as regards nuclear affairs 
and countries which have their rights curtailed. (UN General Assembly, X 
Special Session, 5th plenary meeting, 26 May 1978, quoted in Carasales 1996: 
326). 
 
Argentina and Brazil found the treaty, on the one hand, unjust and discriminatory, and 
on the other hand, insufficient in providing appropriate security guarantees by nuclear 
weapon states to non nuclear weapon states. In their eyes, the NPT was seen as 
producing two classes of nations. The first class was comprised of the five recognised 
nuclear weapons states (NWS) who had the right to possess nuclear weapons, whose 
vertical proliferation was not prohibited, and whose nuclear activities were not 
safeguarded. The second class, the non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS), comprised all 
other nations that were prevented from obtaining them and whose nuclear activities were 
safeguarded. The nuclear weapons club represented the developed world and, as such, 
atomic energy and weapons were perceived as belonging to an unjust international order 
that was impeding the economic and technological development of the developing world. 
For Argentina and Brazil, both of whom viewed themselves as dependent on advanced 
industrialised countries and victims of an unjust international order, acquiring nuclear 
capabilities  would  bring  them  one step closer to having their ambitions as regional and  
                                                 
101 Today, Argentina and Brazil support a comprehensive test ban agreement and have rejected PNEs as 
part of their 1991 bilateral nuclear agreement (Redick 1995: 17). 
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global leaders realised as well as being self-sufficient. In fact, military officers, scientific 
advisors, diplomats and mid-rank government officials in both countries all shared the 
view that ―there existed a concerted international effort to deny less developed countries 
the means for economic improvement‖ (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 173). The Argentine 
and Brazilian view on non-proliferation was that  
Whereas non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a matter of universal concern, 
measures of disarmament must be consistent with the inalienable rights of all 
states to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology according to their 
priorities, interests and needs, including explosions for peaceful purposes (Aja 
Espil 1985: 76). 
 
Argentina and Brazil‘s disdain towards the NPT stemmed from their belief that 
the treaty was a continuation of an unjust international order designed to exploit 
developing countries.102 The most widely reiterated Argentine and Brazilian statement in 
relation to the NPT – ―disarmament of the disarmed‖ – was first articulated in 1968 by 
Argentine ambassador to the United Nations, José María Ruda: 
We realise that it is not easy to find final formulas in the treaty for problems that 
have been under discussion for three years; at the same time, however, the 
major nuclear powers should understand that the sacrifice to be made by the 
non-nuclear weapon countries under the system of the treaty is extremely high, 
without their receiving sufficient assurances that would hold out the prospects 
of a more promising future for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. Despite this advance in the field of horizontal non-proliferation, there 
is no indication at this time that would allow us to assume there will be a 
reduction in the arms race among those who possess the most weapons. 
Paradoxically, this treaty is for the disarmament of the disarmed (UN document 
A/C.I/PV./1572, quoted in Aja Espil 1985: 73–74).103 
 
The ―disarmament of the disarmed‖ label was arguably the defining statement made in 
relation to the NPT by Argentines because over 40 years later, it was used in an interview 
with an Argentine diplomat who explained,  
As Argentina considered the NPT a discriminatory treaty by creating two 
categories of states (NWS AND NNWS), convinced as we were and still are that 
no state should have nuclear weapons, we did not sign it [...] as we considered 
there was no reason why we should do something other states did not have the 
                                                 
102 Wrobel, a Brazilian diplomat, wrote that many nations have viewed the NPT ―as a way to freeze an 
unequal world order‖ (1996: 337). 
103 This was said in the 1968 UN debate on the NPT. In addition, Ambassador Ruda stated, ―Argentina 
could not accept remaining subject to a continuing dependence on the great powers for nuclear 
technology‖ (quoted in Serrano 1994: 236). 
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obligation to do.  […] We used to call the NPT regime one which demanded the 
disarmament of the disarmed, as in reality it was mainly directed to avoid 
that those who had no nuclear weapons could acquire them while those who 
had them kept their arsenals growing (Interview O). 
 
Brazil‘s official position towards the NPT was similar to that of Argentina. The 
attitude of many Brazilians regarding the NPT was summarised by J.A. de Araujo Castro, 
a prominent diplomat, in a speech at the Brazilian National War College: 
Brazil has sought to characterise what is now clearly looming as a firm and 
undisguised trend towards the freezing of world power. [...] The NPT [...] is the 
main instrument of this policy of freezing of World Power. [...] The Treaty [...] 
established distinctive categories of nations: one comprising weak and therefore 
non-adult and non-responsible countries. Contrary to all historical evidence, the 
Treaty starts from the premise that prudence and moderation are built-in 
features of power. It institutionalises inequality between nations and apparently 
accepts the premises that the strong countries will become even stronger and 
the weak will grow even weaker (quoted in Rosenbaum 1975: 268). 
 
One of the most comprehensive Brazilian statements on the NPT was outlined 
in a 1977 White Paper. In it, Brazilian President General Ernesto Geisel, outlined his 
country‘s main objections towards the Treaty: 
The NPT seeks to legitimise a distribution of power which is unacceptable, 
because it results from the stage at which States found themselves at the date of 
its signature, as regards the application of nuclear weapons technology. As a 
result of this stratification, the Treaty requires strict control by the IAEA over 
the dissemination of the peaceful uses of the atom while, in relation to the 
nuclear weapon countries, no barrier is erected to the vertical proliferation of 
nuclear armaments, as evidenced by the growth and sophistication of their 
nuclear weaponry. Additionally, as far as security is concerned, the NPT does 
not provide for any efficient system of protection for non-nuclear weapon 
countries. 
 
[…] 
 
The true sense of non-proliferation is to ban the diffusion of nuclear weapons, 
not the dissemination of nuclear technology for the benefit of Man. Given 
adequate controls, the access to the technology for the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy should not be subjected to discriminatory restrictions, whether between 
nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon countries or among non-nuclear 
weapon countries themselves (O Programa Nuclear Brasileño, 1977 quoted in 
Goldemberg 1985: 81–82). 
 
Based on the above, it is clear that Argentina and Brazil were hostile to the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. They felt marginalised from the nuclear-
weapons club and the international order, and wanted to become global powers. At that 
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time, power was synonymous with technological autonomy, which both nations desired 
to acquire. Against the backdrop of their intense nuclear rivalry, common positions taken 
against the non-proliferation regime began to emerge. It was in this context in which the 
shared interests between Argentina and Brazil surfaced.  
 
4.4 Reversing Course towards a Nuclear Partnership 
 
During the Tlatelolco and NPT negotiations (mid-late 1960s – mid 1970s), in spite of 
emerging common positions taken against the non-proliferation regime, both states still 
considered each other as rivals and competitors. Sharing beliefs and having common 
positions might have been acceptable, but discussing the issue of bilateral nuclear 
cooperation (the essence of ABACC) was most probably objectionable. That is not to say 
that the issue of nuclear cooperation was never raised during these early years. Retired 
Argentine General Juan Gugliamelli, an influential military strategist, repeatedly stressed 
nuclear consultation and technical cooperation in the military journal Estrategia in the late 
1960s and early 1970s (Redick 1981: 130).104 In fact, writing in 1976, he explained  
[It] Makes it worthwhile to reiterate now, and in more serious circumstances, the 
thesis that we advanced at the end of 1974: negotiate with Brazil, within global 
discussions, an agreement for information, consultation and eventual technical 
cooperation in the nuclear field (1976: 165). 
 
The unstable domestic situation in Argentina made progress difficult, but in 1976, at the 
20th IAEA General Assembly Conference in Rio de Janeiro, Brazilian officials reportedly 
accepted the idea of bilateral nuclear cooperation as ―a tentative but desirable future 
goal‖ (Redick 1981: 130). In addition, over the years, their nuclear policies converged 
into a common front against a common enemy (i.e., the non-proliferation regime), which 
was increasingly viewed as an imposed nuclear order threatening their independence and 
                                                 
104 Guglialmelli, editor of the highly influential Estrategia, an independent review of geopolitics, wrote that 
the need for a balance within the Southern Cone was secondary to the need for the two states to join 
together to break down the international structural obstacles to their development. In 1970, he wrote that 
Argentina should take at its ―basic thesis… that the national interests of both countries coincides in 
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development goals (Redick 1994: 5; 1995: 19, Reiss 1995: 53). These led to nuclear talks 
occurring between the two countries in January 1977, when the Argentine and Brazilian 
foreign ministers (Cesar Augusto Guzetti and Azeredo da Silveira, respectively) released a 
joint communiqué – their first – stressing the importance of nuclear policy cooperation 
and the initiation of systematic technological exchanges between the two countries‘ 
respective nuclear energy commissions (Redick 1981: 130; 1995: 20, Doyle 1999: 4, 
Davies 2004: 58).105  
This was a very important opening as it marked the origins of highly significant 
bilateral agreements, which established technological and political cooperation 
throughout the 1980s.106 In 1979, a treaty was signed which resolved the long-standing 
territorial disputes around the La Plata river basin.107 A year later, in May 1980, Brazil‘s 
military leader, General João Figueiredo, visited Buenos Aires – a hugely symbolic 
gesture, since he was the first Brazilian president to do so in 40 years – and signed 
agreements covering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and joint nuclear research and 
development plans.108 This was the first time that nuclear cooperation was on the agenda 
(Reiss 1995: 53). In an interview, a former Head of International Affairs for CNEA, 
explained, 
In this situation [Argentina and Brazil suspected of pursuing a nuclear arms 
race], what could have been a more logical conclusion by the two governments 
than to make their respective images in the nuclear field more transparent, 
demonstrating to the international community the lack of foundations behind 
accusations of the development of a nuclear arms race in amongst the 
establishment of a strong nexus of cooperation between both of them in this 
field and opening their respective nuclear installations at the same time? This is 
                                                                                                                                            
supporting their respective national development [efforts]. Both interests, before being contradictory, are 
coinciding‖ (quoted in Hymans 2006: 162). 
105  Serrano explains that Argentina‘s official statements condemning U.S. policies and stating publicly 
Argentina‘s interest in establishing a common front to resist U.S. opposition to the construction of 
enrichment plants were warmly received in Brasilia. These declarations were followed by the joint 
communiqué (1994: 251, fn 25). 
106 Appendix V details Argentina and Brazil‘s nuclear cooperation agreements and declarations. 
107 The 19 October 1979 agreement, signed between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, resolved the Corpus-
Itaipú dam dispute (1966–1979). The dispute was over the use of water resources and the construction of a 
hydroelectric dam on the Paraná River that flows from Brazil into Argentina (Redick 1995: 20). 
108 Interview D remarked that President Figueiredo went to Buenos Aires because his father had been in 
exile there many years before, and he wanted to visit the place where his father had been. 
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how the start of the ―Agreement of Cooperation between the Republic of 
Argentina and the Federal Republic of Brazil for the Development and 
Application of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy‖ was born, signed in Buenos 
Aires on 17 May 1980 (Interview K). 
 
By 1980, the issue of  nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil was established, 
paving the way towards their eventual rapprochement. It can be argued that their 
eventual nuclear rapprochement was guided, in part, by their shared hostility towards the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime. Moreover, their mutual antagonism 
towards the non-proliferation regime facilitated the process of nuclear cooperation, 
which helped to end their competitiveness. Under these conditions, from the 1960s to 
the early 1980s, an epistemic community began to develop.  
 
4.5 Shared Ideas and Similarities: The Emergence of an Argentine-Brazilian 
Epistemic Community 
 
While the analysis of this case study focuses on the role of an epistemic community 
behind the creation of ABACC from 1980–1991, it is important to reflect on the pre–
1980 period in order to understand how an epistemic community that was involved in 
the creation of ABACC emerged. Based on my understanding and research on the 
creation of ABACC, the epistemic community that was involved in the creation of 
ABACC was born out of an incipient epistemic community that had began to develop 
during the 1965–1980 period. That is not to say that the epistemic communities were one 
and the same. Rather, the incipient epistemic community had started to develop in the 
1965–1980 period based on Argentine and Brazilian common positions taken against the 
international nuclear non-proliferation regime, that by the 1980–1991 period, it had 
realigned in ways that made a process of cooperation, and by extension, ABACC, 
possible. 
During the 1965–1980 period, even though Argentina and Brazil were competing 
against each other, particularly in the nuclear realm, common ground was being reached 
in relation to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.  Their emerging nuclear 
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cooperation was bolstered by Argentina‘s quiet reaction and the U.S.‘s angered reaction 
to the West Germany-Brazil deal. Buenos Aires had not publicly criticised the deal when 
it was first announced; in fact, Argentine civilian officials and military officers had 
defended Brazil‘s right to acquire nuclear technology (Reiss 1995: 53). Such support 
reinforced Argentina‘s common cause with Brazil ―against the hierarchy of the global 
non-proliferation regime‖ (Reiss 1995: 54). As Redick, Carasales, and Wrobel explain, ―As 
U.S.-Brazilian relations worsened over nuclear relations, Argentine-Brazilian nuclear 
policy collaboration advanced‖ (1995: 110). 
Over the subsequent 20 years, these common positions evolved into a process of 
cooperation, in which mutual interests (e.g., regional confidence-building measures) were 
shared, eventually leading to the establishment of ABACC, the acceptance of full-scope 
IAEA safeguards, full membership in an amended Tlatelolco Treaty, and NPT 
ratification. The evidence from this case study analysis indicates that the process of 
cooperation, specifically the idea behind ABACC, was facilitated by an epistemic 
community that had realigned itself from that of the developing epistemic community 
from the 1965–1980 period. Consequently, it is important to reflect on how the 
developing epistemic community emerged. 
The emergence of an Argentine-Brazilian epistemic community can be traced 
back to the mid 1960s, when Argentine and Brazilian diplomats participated in many 
international organisations and in various negotiating fora (including the IAEA Board of 
Governors and the UN Conference on Disarmament). In these surroundings, Argentine 
and Brazilian diplomats found themselves on similar grounds regarding the non-
proliferation regime (Redick 1981; 1988; 1990, Alcañiz 2004, Hymans 2006). 109  In 
particular, the negotiations surrounding the Tlatelolco Treaty helped set the political 
                                                 
109 It should be noted that Argentina and Brazil appointed joint representatives to the IAEA in the late 
1950s (Serrano 1994: 241). 
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context for the emergence of an epistemic community. The Tlatelolco negotiations in the 
early 1960s encouraged the two nations to begin to discuss and develop common 
positions on sensitive nuclear issues. In these negotiations, the nuclear representatives of 
the two states increasingly found their positions aligned and contrary to the views of the 
majority of Latin American nations (Redick 1981: 105). Argentina and Brazil became 
united in working towards stiffening the ratification procedures and in developing a 
common position on peaceful nuclear explosives since 
The shared objective of the two countries became the mitigation of the more 
restrictive elements of Tlatelolco and preservation of the independence of their 
nuclear programs from regional or international constraints (Redick, Carasales, 
and Wrobel 1995: 110). 
 
For many years following the completion of  the Tlatelolco negotiations, these 
common positions were limited to a shared opposition to a ―perceived‖ unequal and 
discriminatory non-proliferation regime (Redick 1997: 12). Argentine and Brazilian 
diplomats jointly condemned the discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime. 
For example, the Brazilian opposition to the NPT was reconfirmed in a communication 
received in 1971 from the Brazilian Ambassador in Stockholm:  
Brazil considers the Treaty incompatible with the interests of her economic 
development and her national security. The restrictions that the Treaty imposes 
on the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes by the 
militarily ―non-nuclear‖ countries are unacceptable. The treaty does not provide 
any guarantee for the security of the non-nuclear countries against an attack or a 
threat of aggression with nuclear weapons, nor does it create any kind of actual 
engagement, on the part of the nuclear powers, that they will proceed to their 
own partial or total nuclear disarmament. To sum up, the treaty does not 
establish an acceptable balance between the rights and obligations of nuclear 
and non-nuclear countries. (Communication received from the Brazilian 
Ambassador, Stockholm, 11 June 1971, quoted in Hirdman et al. 1972: 49–50). 
 
Similar to the Brazilian position, a more explicit set of criticisms was set out by the 
Argentine government in April 1978: 
The NPT is an intrinsically discriminatory Treaty since it recognises different 
rights and obligations for signatory nations depending on whether, at the time of 
signature, they have demonstrated that they did or did not possess nuclear 
weaponry. It was the first time that a treaty had been drawn up which so 
explicitly contravened a basic principle of international co-existence, namely the 
legal equality of all states. Even more so, however, the treaty does not offer a 
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guarantee to non-nuclear weapon states that they will not be threatened or 
attacked by the nuclear weapon states, nor does it permit explosions of nuclear 
devices for peaceful purposes; these remain reserved for an ―elite‖ made up, as 
always, of the countries that possess nuclear weapons. Both these aspects 
accentuate the discriminatory nature of the Treaty. (Statement of the Argentine 
delegate to the VIIth General Conference of the Agency for the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), Mexico City, April 1981, 
quoted in Aja Espil 1985: 74).110 
 
Such proclamations fostered a shared understanding on nuclear development, which 
facilitated the emergence of a transnational network of professionals with shared 
normative and principled beliefs.  
In addition to participation in international non-proliferation and disarmament 
fora, Argentina and Brazil engaged in joint scientific and technical research from as early 
as the 1950s. Interview J – an Argentine scientist from Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear 
(Argentina‘s Nuclear Regulatory Authority) – remarked that Argentine and Brazilian 
nuclear cooperation ―has a long history, even before 1980‖, since there were interactions 
from scientists from both states involved in technical engagements. This joint research 
brought together scientists from different academic institutions in Argentina and Brazil 
and from CNEA and CNEN and acted as one of the first steps towards confidence-
building (Fabbri 2005: 109; 127). In addition, Interview J mentioned that there were 
interactions in Pugwash and other such international arenas.111 In fact, during the pre-
1980 period, there were six Pugwash meetings in which Argentine and Brazilian scientists 
were present.112 However, it is not clear what the nature of these interactions was since 
                                                 
110  Many interviewees remarked on the discriminatory nature of the NPT. For example, Interview J 
remarked that the NPT was discriminatory and that ―it didn‘t work for Argentina or for Argentinean law‖. 
Interview O explained, ―Argentina considered the NPT a discriminatory treaty [because] it created two 
categories of states, nuclear-weapon states, and non-nuclear-weapon states‖. Interview S said, ―Argentina 
and Brazil were anti-NPT because of its discriminatory policy, and not because they wanted the bomb. U.S. 
and Europe thought Argentina and Brazil wanted the bomb because neither country would sign the NPT‖. 
111  The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, founded in 1957, is an international 
organisation that brings together international influential scholars (particularly scientists) and public figures 
concerned with reducing the danger of armed conflict and seeking cooperative solutions for global 
problems. 
112 These meetings were held in (i) September 1968 (18th Pugwash Conference, ―Current Problems of Peace, 
Security & Development‖, held in Nice, France, where Professor C. M. Varsavsky, from Argentina, and 
Professor Rodrigues, from Brazil, attended); (ii) September 1970 (11th Pugwash Symposium, ―What Can 
Scientists Do for Development?‖ held in Stanford, CA, U.S.A. where Professor C. M. Varsavsky, from 
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Pugwash participants operate under the ―Chatham House Rule‖. 113  Yet, it could be 
argued that these interactions provided the basis for what was to become a developing 
epistemic community of scientists (which later expanded to include government officials) 
arguing in favour of bilateral nuclear cooperation. Even before the formal bilateral 
exchanges, many Argentine nuclear scientists and technicians who had left CNEA in the 
mid-1970s – due to low salaries, political persecution, and deteriorating working 
conditions – had gone to work in Brazil (Reiss 1995: 54, Albright 1997: 41).114  
Based on the above, it can be argued that shared similarities and shared ideas in 
relation to their nuclear programmes and the non-proliferation regime facilitated the 
emergence of an Argentine-Brazilian epistemic community. This is important to note 
because within the existing epistemic community literature, the consensus view has been 
that an epistemic community is more likely to emerge when decision makers are faced 
with uncertainty or complex policy issue areas and/or lack the expertise in a particular 
complex policy issue area (Haas 1992a). In addition, the literature indicates that if there is 
a change in government – i.e., if the state shifts from a dictatorship to a democracy, or if 
the state remains a democracy under the same ruling party, or if the state remains a 
                                                                                                                                            
Argentina, and Professor P. Kirschner, from Brazil, attended); (iii) August 1973 (18th Pugwash Symposium, 
―The Participation of Latin American Scientists in Development‖, held in Santa Maria del Mar, Peru, 
where Dr C. A. Mallmann, Professor E. Oteiza, Professor J. A. Sabato, from Argentina, and Professor O. 
Sala, Dr A. A. Leao, and Dr F. de Mendonca, from Brazil, attended); (iv) April 1974 (Workshop, ―Code of 
Conduct on Transfer of Technology‖, held in Geneva, Switzerland, where Professor J. A. Sabato, from 
Argentina, and Mr A. G. de Alencar, from Brazil, attended); (v) June 1978 (32nd Pugwash Symposium, 
―Social Values & Technological Choice in an International Context‖, held in Racine, WI, U.S.A., where Dr 
C. A. Mallmann, from Argentina, and Professor J. Goldemberg, from Brazil, attended); and (vi) July 1979 
(29th Pugwash Conference, ―Development and Security‖, held in Mexico City, Mexico, where Professor J. 
A. Sabato, from Argentina, Dr S. Schwartzmann, Professor U. D‘Ambrosio, and Professor M. Rocha-e-
Silva, from Brazil, attended) Pugwash 2007. 
113  Professor John Finney (UK Head of Pugwash) explained this in a face to face conversation, 15 
September 2009, London. The Chatham House Rule stipulates ―When a meeting, or part thereof, is held 
under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the information received, but neither the 
identity nor the affiliation of the speaker(s), nor that of any other participant, may be revealed‖ (1927, 
refined in 1992 and 2002: www.chathamhouse.org.uk/about/chathamhouserule/). 
114 Albright explained that he met scientists from Argentina who ―fled the Argentine dictatorship and took 
professorships at Brazilian universities. The Argentine military decimated the universities. Indeed, it‘s not 
well appreciated, but the Argentine Atomic Energy Commission in Argentina became a safe haven for 
some scientists during the worst periods of repression in Argentina‖ (1997: 41, Wrobel and Redick: 1998: 
174). Interview G explained that the scientific community were always against the military leaderships in 
Brazil and Argentina. ―The list those murdered or disappeared was mostly scientists.‖ 
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democracy under a different ruling party, or if the state suffers a change in national 
sovereignty – new governments might not have policy-making experience, and therefore 
might seek the advice of an epistemic community.  
However, that is not to say that in the case of Argentina and Brazil, moments of 
uncertainty and complexity were absent. Indeed, these two conditions were constantly 
present, but they were not the facilitators of the emergence. Throughout the 1950s–
1980s, Argentina and Brazil were faced with both uncertainties and with changes in 
government, as defined above. The uncertainties ranged from economic crises (including 
hyperinflation and massive unemployment), social crises (including human rights 
violations and disappearances of military/political opponents), and a possible nuclear 
crisis. These uncertainties were undoubtedly linked to the recurrent change in 
government, which are shown in Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix VIII. As the diagrams 
clarify, these changes (and subsequent uncertainties) were constant until the mid-1980s, 
when democracy was restored. However, against the backdrop of uncertainty and change 
in the Argentine and Brazilian governments, it can be argued that the similarities and 
shared ideas in relation to their nuclear programmes and the non-proliferation regime 
facilitated the emergence of an Argentine-Brazilian non-proliferation epistemic 
community.  
Argentina and Brazil‘s shared similarities included competing for economic and 
political leadership in the Southern Cone, living under military dictatorships, transitioning 
to civilian democracies (and the subsequent decreasing role of the military), deterioration 
of their economies, and the fact that they had both made similar progress in their civilian 
nuclear programmes, having both developed uranium enrichment capability. 115  These 
                                                 
115 Carasales (a former Argentine diplomat) argued that the most important similarity between the two 
nations was the presidential leadership. In a seminar on Argentina and Brazil‘s Rapprochement organised 
by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) and the Shalheveth Freir 
Center for Peace, Science, and Technology (Israel) held on May 16, 1996, he argued that the presidential 
leadership of both states was crucial ―in breaking with longstanding policies and starting with a new one‖ 
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factors might have been expected to foster competition, but instead, in the case of 
Argentina and Brazil, it appears to have created cooperation. This is because of the 
shared ideas the two countries had. These included the determination to acquire 
technological autonomy in order to ensure energy independence, the right to engage in 
peaceful nuclear explosions, and resisting against the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
These shared similarities and ideas paved the way for the two former rivals to establish a 
nuclear partnership. 
 
4.6 Conclusion   
 
This chapter has provided a detailed narrative in relation to Argentina and Brazil‘s 
suspected nuclear weapons programme. It analysed how their nuclear rivalry evolved into 
a common position taken against the international nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
Their mutual disdain towards the non-proliferation regime facilitated the process of 
nuclear cooperation. What is quite remarkable about the Argentine-Brazilian cooperation 
is the dates when it began. Their cooperation was initially developed during the 1965–
1980 period, when both countries had already been longstanding regional rivals and were 
under military rule, and were operating ambitious civil nuclear programmes that could 
have become military. During this period, common positions regarding the non-
proliferation regime were repeated, prompting the discovery of shared interests. It was 
under these conditions that an incipient epistemic community began to develop. The 
May 1980 Accord on Cooperation for the Development and Application for the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy marked the first important steps not only towards nuclear 
rapprochement, but also towards establishing the incipient epistemic community. This 
opening  strengthened  personal relationships, reduced suspicions and misunderstandings,  
                                                                                                                                            
(1996: 19). In addition, the leadership included active participation of key advisors, decision makers, and 
the fundamental role of both Foreign Ministries. 
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and built trust (Reiss 1995: 54). Most importantly though, it created the possibility for 
establishing an unprecedented bilateral nuclear inspections agency, which, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter, was conceived by an epistemic community. 
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Chapter Five 
 
Examining the Influence of the Argentine-Brazilian  
Epistemic Community in the Creation of ABACC 
 
 ―I participated in a private conversation between Presidents Collor 
(Brazil) and Menem (Argentina) in Iguaçu (in the border of the two 
countries) in which the Argentinean President expressed similar views to 
ours (that nuclear weapons would not add security to a country which 
was not threatened; to develop nuclear weapons would – and was already 
– creating difficulties for the import from the U.S. of large computers and 
other sophisticated equipment needed by industry; and nuclear weapons 
would […] divert resources from what was considered essential which 
was to promote the development of the country), opening the way to the 
agreement that led to the creation of ABACC.‖  
 
(Interview E) 
  
In this chapter, the process of how the policy behind ABACC was created is analysed. In 
particular, it investigates the role of an epistemic community in influencing its creation 
and its subsequent implementation as policy by Argentine and Brazilian decision makers. 
Since the first joint nuclear agreement of May 1980 to the policy which led to the 
creation of ABACC in July 1991, a total of ten nuclear cooperation agreements were 
signed between the two states.  A close analysis of all the agreements reveals six common 
elements that were always included. These comprised a reaffirmation of the exclusively 
peaceful character of the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear programmes; a strengthening of 
mutual confidence (seen through initiatives such as joint projects, exchange of 
information, and reciprocal visits to secret nuclear facilities); advancing the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy for the benefit of the population of both states; considering the 
potential for expanding cooperation in the nuclear field to other countries throughout 
Latin America; coordination of a common foreign policy in the nuclear energy sphere; 
and fostering concern for peace and security in the region (Carasales 1992: 76–77). It can 
be argued that these common elements – the shared normative, principled, and causal beliefs – 
facilitated closer nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil.  
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Between 1980 and 1991, a common nuclear policy between Argentina and Brazil 
(which included confidence-building measures) began to emerge. It was through the 
establishment of a common nuclear policy that the idea of a mutual nuclear safeguards 
and bilateral inspections regime developed. Based on my research and understanding of 
the case, this idea was conceived by an epistemic community that was born out of the 
developing epistemic community discussed in the previous chapter, and had realigned in 
ways that made ABACC possible. Further, the epistemic community was given greater 
legitimacy when the 1985 Joint Declaration of Nuclear Policy established an ad-hoc Joint 
Working Group on nuclear issues (JWG), which by 1988 had been institutionalised as a 
Permanent Committee on Nuclear Affairs. The JWG/PCNA – the institutionalised 
epistemic community – was comprised predominately of Argentine and Brazilian 
scientists (including representatives from CNEA and CNEN – the nuclear energy 
commissions in both states) and government officials (including representatives from the 
foreign ministries). These experts frequently participated in periodic meetings where they 
engaged in a mutual exchange of information, regular scientific, technical, and military 
consultative exchanges, and participated in discussions surrounding the nature of the 
mutual safeguards system. It can be argued that they, in part, helped to change the 
Argentine-Brazilian nuclear relationship from one of rivalry to that of cooperation. Over 
the years, they stressed the importance of a bilateral mutual inspections regime, which 
would verify Argentina and Brazil‘s non-nuclear weapon status. Their proposals were 
adopted and implemented by the presidents of both Argentina and Brazil (Menem and 
Collor, respectively), culminating in the establishment of ABACC in December 1991. 
Soon after the creation of ABACC, Argentina and Brazil integrated into the non-
proliferation regime, signing safeguard agreements with the IAEA, and signing both the 
Treaty of Tlateloloco and the NPT (illustrated in Table 5.1, p. 148). 
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The chapter is structured in three parts. The first section explains the evolution 
of the nuclear rapprochement throughout the 1980–1991 period. In addition, it focuses 
on the steps that led to the development of ABACC. The second section investigates to 
what extent an Argentine-Brazilian epistemic community facilitated the creation of 
ABACC. In this section, members of the epistemic community are defined, drawing on 
Haas‘ definition. The third section analyses the key influence mechanisms of the 
epistemic community, paying particular attention to the importance of the role of 
expertise and knowledge, and having access to decision makers. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion on recounting the importance of applying the epistemic community 
framework to an understanding of the creation behind ABACC.  
 
5.1 The Road to ABACC 
Based on my research and analysis, I argue that the creation of ABACC involved three 
distinct phases: (1) May 1980, (2) 1983–1989, and (3) 1990–1991. It is important to note 
that the 1980–1983 period was marked by a lull, given the broad international problems 
facing the two states. Argentina was preoccupied with the Malvinas/Falkland Islands 
War against the UK in 1982, and, at the same time, the Brazilian economy suffered a 
crisis. Phase one saw initial steps taken by the military governments of President Jorge 
Rafael Videla of Argentina and President Joâo Baptista de Oliveira Figeuiredo of Brazil 
in May 1980, when the Cooperative Agreement was signed between the two nations for 
the Development and Application of the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Phase two 
saw these steps pursued and strengthened by the countries‘ first democratic governments 
when President Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina and President José Sarney of Brazil signed 
five nuclear cooperation agreements. Phase three brought the initial May 1980 steps to 
full conclusion by President Carlos Menem of Argentina (elected in 1989) and President 
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Fernando Collor de Mello (elected in 1990) – the successors of Alfonsín and Sarney.116 
Presidents Menem and Collor adjusted previous nuclear policies to align them with 
broader foreign policy objectives (Reiss 1995: 67) and signed a further four nuclear 
cooperation agreements, including the Guadalajara Agreement (18 July 1991), which 
established ABACC.117  
 
May 1980 
As explained in the previous chapter, the overture of Argentina and Brazil‘s nuclear 
partnership can be traced back to January 1977, when the Argentine and Brazilian foreign 
ministers released their first joint communiqué. In it, they stressed the importance of 
nuclear policy cooperation and the initiation of systematic technological exchanges 
between the two countries‘ respective nuclear energy commissions (Redick 1981: 130; 
1995: 20, Doyle 1999: 4, Davies 2004: 58).118 This was followed by Brazilian General 
Figueiredo‘s visit to Buenos Aires in May 1980 whereby Argentina and Brazil signed their 
first nuclear agreement. The May 1980 agreement promoted the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy and encouraged joint nuclear research and development plans. It stated, 
The parties will pursue talks concerning situations of mutual interest which arise 
on the international scene in relation to the application of nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes with a view to coordinating their positions when this is 
desirable (Agreement on Cooperation for the Development and Application of 
the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, May 1980).119 
 
Further, the agreement helped to establish a common nuclear policy, which was defined 
as ―cooperation in the use of nuclear energy‖ and the ―development and application of 
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy‖ (May 1980 Agreement).  
                                                 
116 Appendix IV details Argentina and Brazil‘s governments from 1946–1995. 
117 Appendix V provides a complete list of Argentina and Brazil Nuclear Agreements from 1980–1991. 
118 The joint communiqué was a response to Brasilia‘s warm reception to Argentina‘s official statements 
condemning U.S. non-proliferation policies which opposed construction of enrichment plants (Serrano 
1994: 251, fn 5). 
119 Excerpts from the May 1980 agreement can be found in Redick 1981: 130–131; 1994: 3–4, Serrano 
1994: 238, Reiss 1995: 53. 
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In this accord, CNEA and CNEN reached agreement on a wide range of joint 
technical projects, including research and development on experimental and power 
reactors, exchange of nuclear materials, uranium prospecting, and the manufacture of 
fuel elements (Redick 1995: 53). It called for bilateral technical collaboration and joint 
ventures for the production of reactor components and fuel elements, with the aim of 
minimising dependence on western supplier countries (Paul 2000: 101). It is important to 
note that it was not an arms control agreement; instead, it called for ―technical-scientific 
collaboration in nuclear research over ten years for the full nuclear combustion cycle, as 
well as commercial sales of material and equipment‖ (Resende-Santos 2002: 116).  
The 1980 Agreement contemplated the creation of an organisation similar to the 
European Atomic Energy Community, EURATOM. 120  ―SUDATOM‖ would enable 
both parties to jointly demand full access to nuclear technology in international fora, to 
carry out research and development, and to resolve eventual differences through the 
provision of control mechanisms (Serrano 1994: 251, fn 27). Even though the agreement 
did not offer an inspection regime, it offered verbal assurances and some limited 
technical cooperation between their respective atomic energy authorities (Hymans 2006: 
161). It has been noted that through this agreement, ―both sides took the first tentative 
steps towards a rudimentary mutual inspection and verification regime‖ (Resende-Santos 
2002: 116).  It was the first of many joint nuclear cooperation agreements which 
facilitated the nuclear rapprochement. Upon signing this agreement, Argentine President 
Jorge Videla remarked, ―This should silence forever the legend that there is an arms race 
between Argentina and Brazil in the nuclear field‖ (quoted in Washington Post, 18 May 
1980: 13).  
                                                 
120 EURATOM was established on 25 March 1957. It was created to coordinate the former European 
Community‘s member states‘ research programmes for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was a system 
of nuclear controls and inspection. In addition, it was the only other major regional nuclear agreement of 
this type at that time. 
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As a result of the agreement, Argentina leased uranium concentrate to Brazil and 
sold zircalloy tubing for nuclear fuel elements. In exchange, Brazil supplied Argentina 
with a portion of the pressure vessel for its Atucha II nuclear power generator (Reiss 
1995: 53, fn 44). The stage was now set for Argentina and Brazil to continue cooperation 
on nuclear issues. However, even though the agreement did not put an end to the nuclear 
technology race, it did become  
The first major step towards a comprehensive nuclear regime based on 
proliferation restraint and mutual safeguards – a regime methodologically put 
together over the next decade (Resende-Santos 2002: 116). 
 
Whilst the pursuit of talks was encouraged in the agreement, talks were not pursued until 
1985 due to the more pressing agendas facing Argentina and Brazil, alluded to above.  
 
1983–1989 
During the 1983–1989 period, the process leading to nuclear rapprochement intensified, 
in part due to both countries‘ transition to democracy (Argentina in 1983, Brazil in 1985). 
The countries‘ first democratic governments (President Raúl Alfonsín of Argentina and 
President José Sarney of Brazil) strengthened their nuclear partnership and established a 
common nuclear policy with the signing of five nuclear cooperation agreements, which 
included the agreements creating the ad-hoc Joint Working Group on Nuclear Affairs 
(JWG) and its more permanent successor, the Permanent Committee on Nuclear Affairs 
(PCNA). Through these agreements, both presidents were keen to prove to each other 
and to the rest of the international community that their nuclear programmes were of a 
peaceful nature. It is important to note that during this period, official negotiations of a 
mutual safeguards inspection regime began (1987). 
With the defeat of the Malvinas/Falklands War, Argentina‘s military leadership 
ended and was replaced by the democratic election of President Alfonsín in 1983. During 
this period, Argentine and Brazilian scientists began calling for bilateral nuclear 
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cooperation and mutual inspections. For example, in November 1983, the Brazilian 
Physics Society (SBF) and the Argentine Physics Association (AFA) issued their first 
joint declaration which contained a paragraph asking both governments to exchange 
nuclear information and to establish mutual inspections of nuclear facilities. In addition, 
the declaration contained statements about opposing an arms race in South America and 
about the necessity for nuclear disarmament (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 176). For the first 
time, both physics societies began to share the view that some (bi)national control over 
their respective nuclear programmes was desirable, and that they should work together to 
establish this objective (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 176). In the following year, in 
November 1984, the two physics societies released a further joint declaration stating their 
opposition towards nuclear weapons, considering ―morally unacceptable the participation 
of physicists in the development of nuclear weapons‖ (quoted in Fabbri 2005: 175).121  
In late 1984, Argentine President Alfonsín decided to take advantage of the 
incoming civilian administration in Brazil by proposing discussions on nuclear issues. 
Discussions at the Foreign Minister level led to a meeting in February 1985 between 
President Alfonsín and Brazilian President-Elect Tancredo Neves, which resulted in the 
two Presidents agreeing to strengthen the 1980 accord to include eventual mutual 
inspection of each other‘s nuclear facilities (Redick 1988: 4). The death of Neves only 
temporarily slowed down the momentum for nuclear cooperation;  nine months later, in 
November 1985, newly appointed Brazilian President Sarney and President Alfonsín 
announced a Joint Declaration of Nuclear Policy. In this agreement, the common nuclear 
policy was defined as ―close cooperation in all the peaceful applications of nuclear energy 
                                                 
121 Official statements were circulated simultaneously by both societies in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires. 
This declaration was released in a meeting of the Latin American Federation of the Physics Societies 
(Federación Latino-Americana de Sociedades de Física) held in São Paulo, Brazil. The declaration was 
submitted jointly by the societies of Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico in favour of nuclear disarmament and 
mutual controls in Latin America and the Caribbean (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 176). 
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and of supplementing each other on issues that, reciprocally, they deem convenient to 
agree‖ (November 1985 Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy, Foz de Iguaçu).  
Further, the agreement called for the creation of a JWG on nuclear issues. This 
group was to be established  
Under the responsibility of the Brazilian and Argentine Chancelleries [i.e., the 
foreign ministries], membered by representatives of the respective Nuclear 
Commissions and companies, aimed at fostering the relations between both 
countries in this [nuclear] area, at promoting their technical and nuclear 
development of nuclear energy and at creating mechanisms that assure the 
preeminent interest of peace, security, and development of the region 
(November 1985 Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy, Iguaçu). 
 
The JWG included representatives from the nuclear energy commissions (including the 
presidents), government agencies (including the foreign ministries and disarmament 
officials), and prominent scientists. The JWG was divided into three subgroups 
concerned with the following policy areas: technical cooperation; foreign policy 
coordination to promote shared nuclear diplomacy in multilateral fora; and legal and 
technical requirements for cooperation, including patents, legal and political issues, and 
the design of mechanisms for mutual safeguards systems (Fabbri 2005: 147, Barletta 2000: 
165, fn9). In addition, arrangements were made for meetings between the representatives 
of the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear industries to run alongside the meetings of the 
JWG, and for such representatives to submit regular reports to the JWG (Fabbri 2005: 
147, Barletta 2000: 165, fn9).  
According to an Argentine representative from the JWG/PCNA, the JWG, 
which met every 120 days (as mandated in the agreement) was ―tasked to supervise the 
progress of the technical cooperation of the protocols that were in agreement, increase 
transparency mechanisms, help facilitate the joint visits, and create an accountable state 
system of control‖ (Interview J). The main activities of the working group were dialogue, 
information exchange, and consultation (Wrobel 1999: 142). At its first meeting in March 
1986, the JWG engaged in discussions over the necessity to work towards establishing a 
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joint inspection regime, but insisted that information derived from the inspections 
should be kept binationally and should not be shared with the IAEA (Redick 1988: 5–9).  
The 1985 Foz de Iguaçu agreement was followed by the 1986 Joint Declaration 
on Nuclear Policy signed in Brasilia. This declaration stressed the decision to increase 
reciprocal technical visits and consultations and continue to share information on nuclear 
technological developments and radiological security and protection. It also called for 
strengthening the coordination of policy positions before international fora to defend 
common interests and protect the region from the risk of nuclear weapons (Fabbri 2005: 
149). 
From 1987, the high-level Presidential and technical reciprocal visits to 
unsafeguarded and sensitive nuclear facilities began. Both the visits and the subsequent 
nuclear accords played a decisive role in assuring each other and the international 
community that their nuclear programmes were of a peaceful nature. It is important to 
note that all the presidential visits were followed by visits of specialised technical 
personnel, which represented another step towards nuclear transparency. In July 1987, 
the first of such visits occurred when President Sarney, accompanied by 15 officials from 
the Brazilian diplomatic and nuclear establishment, upon an invitation by President 
Alfonsín, was given an exclusive tour of Argentina‘s unsafeguarded Pilcaniyeu pilot 
uranium enrichment facility.122 Until then, Argentina had not publically admitted that this 
facility existed. 
The visit culminated with the Viedma joint declaration on nuclear policy, which 
emphasised Sarney‘s historical visit as promoting ―mutual confidence […] within the 
framework of the immovable commitment made by both nations to use nuclear energy 
exclusively for peaceful purposes‖ (July 1987 Joint Declaration, Viedma). Further, the 
                                                 
122 It should be noted that prior to this Presidential visit, in November 1986, Argentinean CNEA scientists 
were given a tour of Brazil‘s unsafeguarded gas centrifuge enrichment facility (IPEN), operated by the 
Brazilian navy at the University of São Paulo (Redick 1988: 7). 
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common nuclear policy was defined as ―(1) ending any secrecy surrounding their nuclear 
programmes and (2) continue to deepen their cooperation‖ (Joint Declaration on 
Nuclear Policy, Viedma). The joint statement served to reassure both the domestic and 
international community about the peaceful purposes of their nuclear programme. 
Argentine and Brazilian spokesmen described Sarney‘s first visit to Argentina‘s 
unsafeguarded Pilcaniyeu pilot uranium enrichment facility in July 1987 as part of an 
―action-reaction process‖ that would eventually make their nuclear programmes 
transparent to each other (Redick 1988: 7). Transparency and confidence building were 
arguably acquired on that first high-level visit because according to a Brazilian scientist, 
who was part of the delegation, 
To our surprise, when we went to the facility, we asked a lot of questions and 
the Argentines answered all of them. We visited the whole facility. They showed 
us more than plans. We could see at that time the factory where the diffusion 
barriers were manufactured. This technology is very secret. This step was very 
important for confidence building not only between the two countries in general 
but also among the technical people involved in nuclear activities (Marzo 1997: 
35). 
 
This was a very important accomplishment given that when the nuclear delegations of  
Argentina and Brazil met for the first time a couple of  years earlier during the JWG 
meetings, they were ―deeply suspicious‖ (Interview G). A Brazilian scientist who was part 
of  the nuclear delegation explained that when the Brazilian nuclear delegation asked the 
Argentines their questions, Brazil was ―shocked by Argentina‘s openness as information 
was given on top secret sites‖ (Interview G).  
In response to President Alfonsín‘s invitation to visit Argentina‘s enrichment 
plant, in April 1988 (nine months after Alfonsín‘s invitation), President Sarney invited 
Alfonsín to the navy-controlled Aramar uranium enrichment facility in the Iperó nuclear 
complex, São Paulo. Similar to the Pilcaniyeu pilot uranium enrichment facility in 
Argentina, the Aramar uranium enrichment facility had served as a secret nuclear 
installation (Marzo 1997: 36). As the first foreigner to visit the plant (Fabbri 2005: 150), 
 123 
this invitation was very symbolic. At this visit, a Brazilian scientist who was part of the 
delegation explained, 
At that time, the centrifuge machines were not concealed from the visitors. This 
is very important: the Quadripartite Agreement [of 1991] gives each country the 
right to protect technological secrets, and the centrifuges are now covered 
during inspections. But in 1988, the machines were uncovered. The Argentines 
visited the facility and they asked many questions. This was also a very 
important confidence building measure (Marzo 1997: 36). 
 
During this visit, the presidents released another declaration – the Iperó joint 
statement – which continued the process of building mutual trust and assuring each 
other and the international community that their nuclear programmes were of a peaceful 
nature. Furthermore, the Iperó joint statement announced the decision to turn the JWG 
into a PCNA, institutionalising the former ad-hoc joint working group into a permanent 
body (a high-level group) ―with the objective of undertaking and coordinating activities 
in the political, technical, and entrepreneurial areas of the nuclear sector‖ (1988 Joint 
Declaration on Nuclear Policy, Iperó).  
The PCNA would establish, 
A close political contact, the various joint projects and the fluent exchange of 
information, experiences, and technical visits, as a means to ensure the definite 
enhancement of the cooperation mechanisms in the nuclear field and their 
permanence as a result of the existence of solid bases of friendship and of a firm 
commitment towards peace and development (1988 Joint Declaration on 
Nuclear Policy, Iperó). 
 
Its set up was very similar to that of  the JWG: under the direction of  both foreign 
ministries, the PCNA included Argentine and Brazilian representatives from the foreign 
ministry (including the deputy ministers of  foreign affairs) and from the two national 
nuclear energy commissions (including the  presidents) and scientists. A former Brazilian 
member of  the PCNA mentioned, ―scientists – nuclear scientists – were in this 
committee‖ (Interview G). In addition, it was mandated to meet every 120 days, 
alternatively in Argentina and Brazil, in order to discuss topics of  mutual interest in the 
nuclear field (Iperó Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy, 8 April 1988). However, as an 
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Argentine representative from the PCNA remarked, between 1988 and 1991, the PCNA 
―worked very hectically: travelling every month to each country (staying for a week to ten 
days) sharing inventories‖ (Interview J). The main difference was that this was to be a 
permanent body to further the negotiations and propose directions.  
Diplomats and technical experts were tasked to explore all avenues for nuclear 
cooperation, including collaboration, safety measures, a data bank for information 
exchange, and application of safeguards to their nuclear activities (Wrobel and Redick 
1998: 169). The initial work of the PCNA was based on the presumption that full-scope 
IAEA safeguards should be avoided, given both countries‘ hostility to the international 
non-proliferation regime. The posture against ―intrusive‖ full-scope IAEA safeguards 
had widespread support among both foreign ministries and nuclear experts (Wrobel and 
Redick 1998: 169). In their eyes, international inspectors were deeply suspected of being 
spies for the more developed countries (Albright 1997: 48). A former Brazilian 
representative from the PCNA remarked that Argentina and Brazil ―did not want an 
international safeguards system‖ because ―government officials were thinking of bilateral 
relations, and not international safeguards (i.e., not the NPT)‖ (Interview G).  
President Sarney made the final of the Presidential visits to the Ezeiza nuclear 
facility near Buenos Aires in November 1988. Once again, another public declaration was 
released, repeating their commitment to pursue further dialogue and to increase 
cooperation on nuclear issues (1988 Ezeiza Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy). In the 
case of the Iperó and Ezeiza declarations, the texts were widely circulated at meetings of 
the IAEA, OPANAL, and other international fora addressing nuclear issues, to 
demonstrate the deep level of nuclear cooperation reached (Fabbri 2005: 149).123  
                                                 
123 OPANAL (Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas Nucleares en la América Latina y el Caribe) is 
the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, an international 
organisation which promotes nuclear disarmament. 
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It has been argued that these mutual visits to hitherto secret and unsafeguarded 
nuclear installations created an atmosphere of trust, ―a necessary precondition to on-site 
inspections of the respective nuclear activities‖ (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 168). In 
addition, they propelled further declarations encouraging deeper bilateral nuclear 
cooperation. In the words of a Brazilian diplomat, 
Opening the facility to the scrutiny of a delegation headed by the Brazilian 
president allowed both leaders to end secrets and mistrust, and announce a new 
policy based on openness in nuclear matters‖ (Wrobel 1999: 143).  
 
In addition, it is important to note that ―while the presidents were publicly meeting and 
announcing fresh joint initiatives, the diplomats and scientific experts worked behind the 
scenes to transform trust and confidence into concrete measures‖ (Wrobel and Redick 
1998: 168). The diplomats and scientific experts from the JWG/PCNA – i.e., the 
epistemic community – were arguably the leading force behind the process of bilateral 
nuclear cooperation. However, pressure for bilateral nuclear inspections was really the 
interest of a relatively small number of Argentine and Brazilian scientists and experts. 
According to Wrobel and Redick, 
Scientists played a valuable role in educating the public and influencing the 
leadership in both nations [...] to establish effective national, bilateral, regional, 
and international nuclear control mechanisms (1998: 166). 
 
While the issue of bilateral nuclear inspections never became a factor for the mobilisation 
of a great number of physicists in either state, a few prominent scientists called for 
mutual inspections at international conferences and in international non-proliferation 
journals. For example, Luis Pingueli Rosa, a prominent Brazilian scientist presented a 
paper in 1988 at a seminar in Rio de Janeiro.124According to a participant present at the 
seminar, 
Pingeuli‘s presentation included the following time line: 1990 – new national 
control systems; 1992 – bilateral inspections, 1993 – Tlatelolco would be signed; 
                                                 
124 This seminar was sponsored by the Brazilian Physics Society and the Washington D.C.-based Institute 
for Science and International Security (ISIS). 
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and 1995 – Brazil would sign the NPT. We all said, ―Luis, you‘re crazy‖ 
(Albright 1997: 48).  
 
Even though Argentine and Brazilian scientists were calling for mutual inspections five 
years prior to Pingueli‘s 1988 presentation – the SBF and AFA‘s November 1983 joint 
declaration asking both governments to establish mutual inspections – the idea of 
Argentina and Brazil participating in bilateral inspections even in 1988 was still 
unfathomable, especially from an international perspective. However, a year after 
Pingeuli‘s presentation, four Brazilian scientists, including Pingueli, writing in The Bulletin 
of Atomic Scientists argued, 
To ensure peaceful coexistence in Latin America, we scientists stress the 
importance of a clear, public, official rejection of nuclear weapons in Brazil and 
elsewhere. Especially in Brazil and Argentina, where enrichment and 
reprocessing technologies could make nuclear weapons possible, enrichment 
should proceed under conditions of full transparency and complete civilian control (italics 
are added for emphasis, de Castro et al. 1989: 25). 
 
In addition, in that same year, Argentine and Brazilian nuclear officials and 
scientists discussed ―prospects for reciprocal inspections, international safeguard 
arrangements, a test ban, and other measures‖ at a conference in Montevideo, 
Uruguay.125 At this conference, the idea of the bilateral control system was espoused by 
both Argentine and Brazilians as a way to assure the international community of their 
peaceful intentions (Levanthal and Tanzer 1992).  
 Based on the above, it can be argued that 1983–1989 agreements represented 
much progress towards the nuclear rapprochement. Advances were made towards full 
bilateral cooperation, including regular visits to each other‘s most sensitive and secretive 
nuclear facilities. In addition, some limited swaps of nuclear technology took place 
(Goldman 1991: 9). The next three years would be the most crucial in the nuclear 
rapprochement, since by 1991, ABACC had been established. 
                                                 
125 This conference – ―Latin American Nuclear Cooperation: Prospects and Challenges‖ – was organised 
by the Nuclear Control Institute, Washington D.C. It was held in Montevideo on 11–13 October 1989. 
The conference proceedings can be found in Levanthal and Tanzer 1992. 
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1990–1991 
The 1990–1991 period marked the definitive end to the nuclear rivalry because by July 
1991, the presidential decision to create a mutual safeguards inspection regime had been 
taken. During this period, both countries made efforts to begin to integrate with the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime by signing an agreement with the IAEA in the 
December 1991 Quadripartite Agreement, which established full-scope IAEA safeguards 
on all Argentine and Brazilian nuclear sites.126 Both countries underwent a change in the 
presidential leadership with the elections of President Carlos Menem of Argentina 
(elected in 1989), and President Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil (elected in 1990). 
Menem and Collor continued the nuclear legacy of their predecessors with the signing of 
four nuclear cooperation agreements, which included the decision to implement ABACC. 
The first of the four cooperation agreements signed during this period was in July 
1990. The Buenos Aires Joint Statement endorsed the previous nuclear cooperation 
accords and reiterated their countries‘ commitment to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. 
Continuing the confidence-building measures, new Brazilian President Collor invited the 
media along with his personal associates to a military installation in the Cachimbo area, in 
the heart of the Amazon rainforest, in September 1990. There, he closed a huge shaft 
(320-metre hole), which was allegedly built by the armed forces as a nuclear test site 
(Goldman 1991: 9). Scientists claimed that the hole could have been used to carry out a 
test explosion (Homewood 1990: 14). In an interview with the Washington Post soon after, 
Collor would not confirm who built the shaft: 
It‘s very difficult to know when, how, who was responsible. It is a very sensitive 
issue. . . . Times have changed. The important thing is that the shaft is being 
                                                 
126 The Quadripartite refers to Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the IAEA. Its complete title is ―Agreement 
of 13 December 1991 between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-
Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency for the Application of Safeguards‖. 
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covered up with concrete and that we are not going to enter into any nuclear 
adventure in Brazil. We are embarked on a profound re-evaluation of the entire 
nuclear program (Podesta 1990: 27). 
 
In that same month, President Collor gave a speech to the UN General Assembly in 
which he again stressed Brazil‘s peaceful intentions. In it, he announced that Brazil was 
radically changing its nuclear policy and had abandoned any attempt to build a nuclear 
weapons programme (Wrobel 1999: 144).  
Although Collor‘s symbolic gesture was well-received, it raised the question of 
how effective the reciprocal visits were if Brazil‘s military had been able to build a secret 
site even without the President‘s knowledge. This lent urgency to further negotiations, 
and both countries‘ foreign ministries and nuclear commissions managed to reach an 
agreement within two months, culminating in the November 1990 Foz de Iguaçu 
Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy. In this declaration, the two presidents formally 
renounced nuclear weapons, accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards, abandoned the 
option to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions, and approved a common system of 
accounting and control of nuclear materials and installations – the last of which was to be 
administered through ABACC. President Collor remarked, ―These initiatives will 
guarantee total mutual transparency of our nuclear programmes in the eyes of our 
peoples‖ (quoted in Homewood 1990: 14). For the first time, the two governments 
pledged to establish a mutual inspections regime, based on a common control system – 
known as the Common System for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(SCCC).127 Under this regime, the Brazilian nuclear energy commission would inspect 
facilities in Argentina, and the Argentine nuclear energy commission would inspect 
Brazilian nuclear energy facilities. It was described as ―a system of neighbours watching 
                                                 
127 The SCCC is a common system of accounting and control of nuclear materials and installations. In 
other words, both Argentina and Brazil have the same safeguards system (Marzo 1997: 60).The SCCC was 
formalised through INFCIRC/395, which was later signed in July 1991 and ratified in December 1991.  
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neighbours‖ (Marzo 1997: 36–37). On signing the declaration, President Menem 
remarked, 
Foz de Iguaçu [in 1985] was witness of the start of a process that has no 
antecedents: two countries, Brazil and Argentina, owners of relevant 
technologies in the nuclear field, decided to establish mechanisms for 
cooperation and for promoting confidence in such field, within the framework 
of a broader process of bilateral integration. Thus, our predecessors […] used 
the regional via in order to approach a problem recognised worldwide: the need 
to offer the region and the world control mechanisms that could be applied to 
the use of technologies that are highly important for development, although also 
susceptible to deviation to non-peaceful goals (Menem, quoted in Fabbri 2005: 
163–164). 
 
A Brazilian representative from the JWG/PCNA remarked that in 1990 alone, 
the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear delegation met 15 times in order to discuss the 
safeguards agreement. The representative explained that ―they wanted to build the same 
common system of safeguards‖ and ―that the objective was that Brazil should verify 
Argentina‘s facilities and vice-versa‖. In short, the representative remarked that the 
nuclear delegation noted in their meetings that there was a ―need for a common system 
and a need to establish a verification system‖ (Interview G). These were established in 
December 1990 with the Foz de Iguaçu Declaration. After the declaration, Argentina and 
Brazil exchanged lists of their facilities (―with a description of one-to-two lines‖) and an 
inventory of nuclear materials. This, in the representative‘s words, was what made it 
―formal‖. In addition, all the top-secret facilities were included, ―not just the ones under 
IAEA inspections‖. It can be argued that such frequent meetings and exchanges made a 
clear impact on subsequent Joint Declarations because after the 1990 Declaration, the 
July 1991 Guadalajara Accord (signed between Presidents Menem and Collor) called for 
initial inspections to be conducted and information exchanges in a 45-day period, 
continuing the frequent meetings. Such exchanges went ―according to schedule‖ 
(Goldman 1991: 9). According to an Argentine official, ―We have exchanged lists of 
installations and inventories of materials, and we are quite pleased at how smoothly this 
process has been effectuated‖ (quoted in Goldman 1991: 9). 
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In short, the July 1991 agreement formalised all the initiatives taken since the 
1985 Foz de Iguaçu Declaration, stressing that both parties agreed to abstain from 
carrying out the testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means of any 
nuclear explosive device. In addition, it established guidelines for inspections and 
accounting procedures for the nuclear programmes in both countries. In other words, 
the Guadalajara Accord established ABACC to implement the bilateral inspection system 
SCCC. 
 The final agreement signed in this period was the December 1991 Quadripartite 
Agreement, signed between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC, and the IAEA. This agreement 
established full-scope IAEA safeguards on all Argentine and Brazilian nuclear sites. It 
marked the first steps of Argentina and Brazil‘s involvement with the international 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
 
 Argentina and Brazil‘s historic transition from nuclear rivalry to nuclear 
rapprochement is all the more remarkable because it took place against the backdrop of a 
volatile political climate. Both countries were led by military leaderships in 1980, and by 
1985, democracy had been restored. Yet, during the 1980–1991 period, the leaderships of 
both countries changed (six times in the case of Argentina, and three times in the case of 
Brazil). In addition, the government type changed from military to democracy. In 
Argentina, during the military government, there were four different leaders (General 
Jorge Videla, 1976–1981; General Roberto Viola, 1981; General Leopoldo Galtiere, 
1981–1982; General Reynaldo Bignone, 1982–1983). Then, with the return to democracy, 
Argentina saw two different presidents from 1983–1991 (President Raúl Alfonsín, 1983–
1989 and President Carlos Menem, 1989–1995). Similarly, in Brazil, while there was only 
one military leader (General João Figueiredo, 1979–1985), with the transition to 
democracy, Brazil saw two different presidents (President José Sarney, 1985–1990 and 
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President Fernando Collor de Mello, 1990–1992).128 The nuclear rapprochement began in 
1980 with the first nuclear cooperation agreement and was furthered by Presidents 
Alfonsín and Sarney. By 1989, the Alfonsín and Sarney governments were on the verge 
of an economic disaster, with both countries experiencing hyper inflation rates and debt 
requirements (Goldman 1991: 9). The new administrations of Menem and Collor were 
also faced with severe economic difficulties, yet by continuing the nuclear legacy of 1980 
and the mid 1980s, the nuclear cooperation managed to progress, culminating in the 
establishment of ABACC in 1991. In the words of José Goldemberg, a former Brazilian 
Secretary of State for Science and Technology, ―the agreement ended a period in which 
Brazil conducted covert activities in military installations that could have led to the production 
of nuclear weapons. Argentina too had such aspirations‖ (italics are added for emphasis, 
2006: 41). A Brazilian diplomat remarked that the agreement behind ABACC ―was 
important politically for the two countries‖ because it ―broke a lot of misunderstandings‖ 
(Interview C). 
In a seminar held in Washington D.C. in 1998, Pedro Villagra-Delgado, an 
Argentine diplomat, explained that the road to ABACC started from establishing a 
common nuclear policy which evolved into a common system of nuclear safeguards and 
control (1998: 1). Upon close analysis of the nuclear agreements signed between 
Argentina and Brazil in the 1980–1991 period, it is clear that cooperation activities in the 
nuclear area gradually evolved to establish a mutual safeguards system. The common 
nuclear policy in the May 1980 agreement was defined as ―cooperation in the use of 
nuclear energy‖ and the ―development and application of the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy‖ (May 1980 agreement). Seven years later, in the 1987 Joint Declaration, the 
common nuclear policy was defined as ―ending any secrecy surrounding their nuclear 
programmes‖ (1987 Joint Declaration, Viedma). One mechanism to ―end secrecy‖ would 
                                                 
128 Appendix IV lists the governments of Argentina and Brazil from 1946–1995. 
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be through mutual inspections, the idea of which was heard from Argentine and 
Brazilian scientists throughout the 1983–1987 period, but was not included in the Joint 
Declarations until November 1990. Over the years, the Brazilian Physics Society (SBF) 
and the Argentine Physics Association (AFA) demanded the opening of nuclear facilities 
for mutual inspection, and called for bilateral nuclear cooperation on civilian oriented 
projects in the scientific, technological, and industrial fields, including medicine and 
engineering (Fabbri 2005: 175).  
 
5.2 The Experts behind ABACC 
 
Using Haas‘ definition of an epistemic community outlined in Chapter Two, it can be 
argued that the Argentine and Brazilian representatives from the JWF/PCNA comprised 
an epistemic community. Based on my understanding and research, these experts 
included both the scientific community (including representatives from CNEA and 
CNEN – the nuclear energy commissions in both states) and government/state officials 
(especially representatives from the foreign ministries).129 In an interview, an Argentine 
diplomat explained that the representatives from CNEA and CNEN were professional 
technicians and ―not political appointees‖ (Interview S). In addition, they had expertise in 
nuclear engineering and physics (Interviews I and J). The government officials – 
particularly from the Argentine side – were described as ―a group of intellectuals [that] 
had academic rather than diplomatic training in foreign affairs‖ (Barletta 2000: 146). Both 
clusters of groupings were equally important in the thinking behind the creation of 
ABACC and its subsequent establishment.  
As an Argentine diplomat explained,  
Crucial players leading up to the full opening of the nuclear programmes were 
the Argentinean and Brazilian (1) foreign ministers in the 1983–1991 period, (2) 
                                                 
129 Describing the Argentinean foreign policy decision making team, Barletta explained that ―a small and 
homogenous team comprised of President Raúl Alfonsín, Foreign Minister Dante Caputo, Vice Minister 
Jorge Sábato, and Vice Minister Raúl Alconada Sempé [were a] group of intellectuals [that] had academic 
rather than diplomatic training in foreign affairs‖ (Barletta 2000: 146). 
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negotiating team with the IAEA in 1990–1991; (3) technical/safeguards 
scientists from CNEA and CNEN; and (4) representatives from the foreign 
ministries (Interview O). 
 
Furthermore, the same diplomat surmised that ―scientists, nuclear experts, diplomats, 
and other relevant officials according with the competence of nuclear matters in each 
country‖ comprised the Argentine-Brazilian epistemic community leading to ABACC. 
A Brazilian diplomat made clear that a ―combination of political leadership and 
physicists‖ was behind the thought process of ABACC (Interview D). As many 
interviewees explained, ―the scientists offered the structure behind ABACC‖ (Interview 
A), ―ABACC was the idea of scientists‖ and ―the scientists played a very key role‖ in the 
establishment of ABACC (Interview D), yet the decision to create ABACC was, 
ultimately, ―a political decision‖ (Interview L), ―a government decision‖ (Interview J), 
and that the ―main impulse for opening up [the nuclear programmes] came from the 
highest authorities in government‖ (Interview O). In addition, according to an Argentine 
diplomat, ―there was an excellent communication between all sectors of both countries‖, 
―there were no closed segments just for scientists or diplomats‖, and that 
―communications among all those sectors were very fluid and interactive‖ (Interview O) 
Another Argentine diplomat remarked that ―the communication between our delegations 
was both among diplomats, and mixed, with scientists from the two countries‖ 
(Interview P). A former Brazilian ABACC inspector explained that the epistemic 
community was ―very influential and their role was fundamental‖ in the creation of 
ABACC (Interview G). Furthermore, he described two components behind the creation 
of ABACC:  
First, Brazilian and Argentine authorities were thinking of creating a mini 
EURATOM. The thinking was ―let‘s negotiate together, not separately, with the 
IAEA. We‘d be stronger‖. Second, Brazilian and Argentine authorities wanted 
to create an independent organisation as a kind of buffer just in case one 
country saw something in the other. In addition, this organisation should be 
independent from the two governments to avoid problems with the two 
countries.  
 
 134 
Another Brazilian diplomat focused on the  
Important role of the political leadership [particularly] Alfonsín and Sarney. […] 
The advisors [to the Presidents] knew that cooperation in the nuclear area could 
have a great symbolic value to become part and parcel of bilateral cooperation 
(Interview D). 
 
The scientific community in both states, particularly nuclear physicists and 
engineers, played an important role in actively promoting Argentine-Brazilian nuclear 
cooperation. In both states, scientists and their professional societies (e.g., the Brazilian 
Physics Society, SBF, the Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science, SBPC, and 
the Argentine Physics Association, AFA) promoted public discussions on the need for 
regional nuclear arms control. 130  In 1987, Naren Bali, president of the AFA, urged 
nuclear commission officials to open up facilities that were still off-limits (Graham 1987: 
A18). These professional scientific societies were key lobbying elements before the 
Argentine and Brazilian congresses and presidents. It can be inferred that their impact 
was felt because, according to a former Brazilian ABACC inspector, from 1987, the 
―Argentinean and Brazilian nuclear delegations began to develop their joint inspection 
programme between country and country, and amongst scientists and scientists‖ 
(Interview G), paving the way for the creation of ABACC.  
It is important to note, however, that the role of nuclear scientists and scientific 
organisations differed in both countries. In Argentina, a great number of nuclear 
physicists suffered political persecution during the most repressive years of military rule – 
in the mid-late 1960s and a decade later – and, as a result, many Argentine scientists did 
not openly question the established nuclear policies. On the other hand, in Brazil, 
political persecution was on a much smaller scale, and many nuclear scientists were 
strongly critical of the national nuclear programme, in particular the ―parallel‖, military-
                                                 
130 The Brazilian Physics Society is a translation from the Portuguese Sociedade Brasileira de Física (SBF), 
the Brazilian Society for the Advancement of Science is a translation from the Portugues Sociedade 
Brasileira para o Progresso da Ciência (SBPC), and the Argentine Physics Association is a translation from 
the Spanish Asociación Física Argentina (AFA), taken from Wrobel and Redick 1998: 174; 176. 
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led nuclear programme (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 174). For example, a vocal group of 
Brazilian scientists was the leading force behind the critical appraisal of the 1975 nuclear 
agreement with West Germany. The SBPC and SBF pressed for congressional scrutiny 
of, and public debate over, the nuclear deal. In the process, they sharply criticised the 
nuclear agreement as unnecessary and unduly costly. In addition, during the 1980s, as 
reports of secret military nuclear activities began to surface, the SBF tried to persuade 
Congress of the need to implement institutional mechanisms to control nuclear decision-
making and argued for specific constitutional guarantees against non-peaceful uses of 
nuclear energy. While the Brazilian Congress was unable to implement concrete measures 
of legislative control over the executive on nuclear matters, it did include in the new 1988 
constitution a paragraph which requires that nuclear activities in Brazil be pursued only 
for peaceful purposes (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 174–175). In an interview, a former 
Brazilian ABACC inspector explained that the SBPC ―formed the centre of the thinking 
in Brazil against the nuclear programme‖ (Interview G). 
On an official level, scientific exchanges took place between CNEA and CNEN, 
which contributed to mutual understanding, collegial respect, and acquaintance with each 
other‘s nuclear programmes (Redick 1997: 18). This type of information exchange – 
exchanging views, ideas, and work on common research projects and safeguards 
technologies – fostered shared understandings amongst members of the epistemic 
community. These included: all nuclear activities in both countries should be under 
civilian control; nuclear technologies should be used for peaceful purposes only; a mutual 
system of safeguards and inspections should be established to guarantee the peaceful 
intentions of their nuclear programmes; and the two countries unite against a 
discriminatory international order and against U.S.-led efforts to pressure Argentina and 
Brazil into joining the non-proliferation regime (Fabbri 2005: 174–175).  
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It can be argued that the statements emanating from Argentine and Brazilian 
scientists in 1983, calling for a mutual safeguards regime, contributed to the thinking 
behind an inspections regime. Seven years after publically calling for mutual safeguards, 
the November 1990 Foz de Iguaçu Declaration stressed for the first time the approval of 
the Common System for Accounting and Control and the ―first reciprocal inspections‖ 
(Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy, Foz de Iguaçu). The nuclear declarations seen 
throughout the 1980s therefore evolved from establishing a common nuclear policy to 
creating a common system of nuclear safeguards and control. Arguably, the later joint 
declarations institutionalised the idea of bilateral nuclear cooperation – the idea of which 
had originally come from Argentine and Brazilian scientific organisations. 
Moreover, the foreign ministries of both states worked hard to further the 
rapprochement and to convince decision makers that nuclear cooperation was desirable. 
As a former Brazilian representative from the PCNA remarked, they were ―the channels 
of communication‖ (Interview G). They were responsible for coordinating the JWG on 
nuclear issues and its successor the PCNA. In addition, negotiations for bilateral nuclear 
inspections were promoted at the Foreign Minister level (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 166). 
Furthermore, the foreign ministries invited all sectors from the nuclear field to engage in 
the process. For example, in Brazil, there were representatives from the Ministry of 
Science and Technology, from the private and public industrial sectors, from the nuclear 
energy commission, and from the different branches of the armed forces (Marzo 1997: 
54). In addition, the foreign ministries argued for a change in nuclear policy. In Argentina, 
since the military had been discredited by the Malvinas/Falklands War, the Argentine 
Foreign Ministry argued for an end to Argentina‘s political isolation. In Brazil, the 
Foreign Ministry was motivated to change Brazil‘s nuclear policy as part of a larger 
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foreign policy objective – to achieve global stature and leadership for Brazil, including a 
permanent membership on the UN Security Council (Redick 1997: 17).131  
Based on the above, it can be argued that the scientists had an equally important 
role as the government officials in that they were responsible for outlining the ways in 
which the mutual safeguards inspection regime could be created, from a scientific and 
technical perspective. Therefore, while government officials endorsed the idea behind 
ABACC and ultimately implemented it as policy, it was primarily the scientists who 
developed the entire concept and framework. The efforts by these individuals and 
organisations showed that ―knowledgeable and dedicated people and groups opposed to 
nuclear weapons production can make a significant contribution to stopping their 
country from ‗going nuclear‘‖ (Albright 1990: 16). 
 
5.3 How did an Argentine-Brazilian Epistemic Community Facilitate the Creation 
of ABACC and Influence its Implementation? 
 
Having explained who was behind ABACC, it is important to analyse how the theoretical 
framework of the epistemic community approach sheds light on the origins of ABACC. 
In this section, I examine how – notably through the role of knowledge and expertise 
and having access to decision makers – the Argentine-Brazilian epistemic community 
outlined above facilitated the creation of the ABACC and its subsequent implementation 
as policy.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the epistemic community framework has been 
used to empirically study the role and impact of ideas in International Relations in 
relation to the creation of new international policies (Haas 1992a). Adler and Haas argue 
                                                 
131  In addition to the foreign ministries, the finance ministries and the military of both nations also 
supported a change in nuclear policy: ―As the two countries moved towards democratic governments, 
there was a commitment to open previously closed and inefficient markets to foreign investment. Access 
to advanced western technology was viewed as essential to the modernisation process, and change in the 
nuclear policy was essential to facilitate that objective for both nations‖ (Redick 1997: 17). Over the years, 
the Argentine and Brazilian military increasingly viewed the idea of nuclear competition as illogical: ―The 
Falklands/Malvinas War encouraged [both] militaries to cooperate by demonstrating that both nations 
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that an epistemic community influences state decisions through the following four 
processes: policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy selection, and policy persistence 
(Adler and Haas: 375–387). Based on my understanding and research on the creation of 
ABACC Program and in using Adler and Haas‘ four influencing processes, Figure 5.1 
puts forth one possible model illustrating the role of an epistemic community in 
influencing the creation of ABACC and its subsequent implementation as policy by 
Argentine and Brazilian state decision makers. 
Figure 5.1: 
The Path Towards the Creation of ABACC 
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were vulnerable to external powers in the South Atlantic, where both countries shared geopolitical 
interests‖ (Redick 1997: 17–18).  
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There were four phases involved in innovating the idea of a mutual safeguards 
inspection regime (marked by 1 in Figure 5.1), all of which included the involvement of 
Argentine and Brazilian scientists and government officials. The first phase took place 
throughout the 1950s–1970s, when both Argentina and Brazil shared a desire to acquire 
nuclear technological autonomy. This desire fostered an inherent and mutual shared 
disdain towards the international non-proliferation regime throughout the 1970s, which 
marked the second phase. As explained in the previous chapter, both states viewed the 
regime as discriminatory, designed to exploit developing countries. The criticisms against 
the nuclear non-proliferation regime espoused by both Argentine and Brazilian diplomats 
in international fora fostered a shared understanding on nuclear development, which, in 
part, led to the May 1980 agreement. Throughout the 1980s, a common nuclear policy 
was developed, marking the third phase. Having established a common nuclear policy, 
the final phase was marked by the shared desire to establish a mutual safeguards regime. 
During the second stage, policy diffusion (marked by 2 in Figure 5.1), 
representatives from the JWG/PCNA participated in periodic meetings where they 
engaged in  mutual exchanges of information, regular scientific and technical consultative 
exchanges, and participated in discussions surrounding the nature of the mutual 
safeguards inspection regime. During this stage, many joint nuclear declarations were 
released, and the reciprocal visits (both presidential and technical) to nuclear installations, 
including the secret enrichment facilities at Pilcaniyeu in Argentina and Iperó in Brazil, 
took place. These activities provided a structural space to encourage diffusion.  
During the third stage, policy selection (marked by 3 in Figure 5.1), the role of 
Argentina was especially important since Argentine representatives took and led the 
initiative on a cooperative and collaborative joint nuclear partnership. After the two 
presidents signed the Guadalajara Agreement of July 1991, policy persistence, the final 
stage (marked by 4 in Figure 5.1), was marked by the subsequent implementation of the 
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policy behind ABACC. These influence mechanisms were facilitated by members of the 
epistemic community‘s knowledge and access to decision makers, which will be 
considered in turn below. 
 
a) The Role of Knowledge and Expertise 
An important stage of the epistemic community‘s influence in the creation of ABACC 
was the role of knowledge and expertise. According to an Argentine diplomat, 
On how to implement these new policies of openness [opening up nuclear 
facilities to the other for inspection], the ―epistemic community‖ played a key 
role by analysing different alternatives and eventually designing ABACC and the 
Quadripartite Safeguards Agreement, as well as the ratification of both the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco and NPT (Interview O).  
 
The experts behind ABACC – particularly the scientists – were crucial in designing the 
system of verification and mutual safeguards and inspections. As an Argentine diplomat 
remarked, ―the scientists were abundant in the delegation leading towards ABACC‖ 
(Interview A). This was corroborated by a Brazilian diplomat who said that scientists 
dealt specifically ―with the nuclear issue per se, i.e., the mutual inspections‖ (Interview D).  
Although they did not engage in scientific tests per se, the scientists involved in setting 
up the mutual inspections regime shared and disseminated collective knowledge through 
an intensive period of engagement and discussions through the JWG and PCNA. They 
used this knowledge in order to ―internally define criteria for weighing and validating 
knowledge in the domain of their expertise‖ (Haas 1992b: 3).  
In an interview, a former ABACC inspector (Interview G) explained that the 
―defined criteria‖ was the verification that both Argentine and Brazilian nuclear facilities 
were of a peaceful nature. This would be validated through the creation of a common 
system of safeguards and a verification system. These were both established in 
November 1990, under the Foz de Iguaçu Declaration, which created the common 
system for accounting and control of nuclear materials. After the Declaration, Argentina 
and Brazil exchanged their entire list of facilities (including descriptions of each facility) 
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and an inventory of nuclear materials, thereby validating that their nuclear programmes 
were of a peaceful nature (Interview G).  
A Brazilian diplomat explained that the idea of the mutual inspections regime was 
due to the ―crucial influence of the scientists‖. This was because through their knowledge 
and expertise, ―they knew how to do it‖ and ―they knew what to do‖ (Interview D). A 
former Brazilian representative of the PCNA explained that the scientists involved in the 
PCNA undertook a ―regional safeguards training [programme] in Rio in 1988‖ in order 
to share collective knowledge and expertise (Interview G). The same representative 
remarked that the scientists were influential in the creation of the mutual safeguards 
inspection regime because of ―their credibility‖ and their knowledge and expertise. An 
Argentine representative from the PCNA remarked that the expert technical groups 
within the PCNA ―shared inventories, learnt lessons, to try to make their systems 
compatible‖ (Interview J). An Argentine diplomat remarked that the scientists ―played a 
very important role from the technical point of view‖ in establishing ABACC (Interview 
L). 
Moreover, it can be argued that the experts‘ knowledge was diffused, particularly 
through communication, within the JWG/PCNA setting, denoted by (2) in Figure 5.1. 
Meeting every 120 days, alternating between venues in Argentina and Brazil (as mandated 
in the nuclear agreements), the JWG/PCNA exchanged technical information and 
assured each other that their respective nuclear programmes were only for peaceful 
purposes. In particular, they developed specific measures on notification and assistance 
in all areas of nuclear safety, exchanged information on security of nuclear installations, 
and began joint research and information exchange relating to safeguards (Redick 1988: 
5–9) – all of which required extensive knowledge and expertise. As a former Argentine 
Director of  Nuclear Affairs explained,  
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We had very frequent encounters with our Brazilian counterparts, and we even 
integrated a joint binational delegation to negotiate with the IAEA. Both 
national delegations were headed by diplomats with the technical support from 
the respective nuclear agencies (Interview P). 
 
The reciprocal visits, public declarations, institutionalising nuclear dialogue and 
cooperation through the PCNA all provided a structural space to encourage diffusion. 
These activities served as reassurance to the international community (as well as to each 
other) that the Argentine and Brazilian nuclear programmes were of a peaceful nature. In 
addition, they also served as a precursor to establishing the mutual safeguards inspection 
regime. Even though Solingen remarks that institutions cannot be credited with initiating 
cooperation in the Southern Cone (1998: 276–277), once the process of nuclear 
cooperation had begun, an institutional setting such as the PCNA played a crucial role in 
expounding knowledge and exchanging and sharing ideas and information. Over time, 
the regular technical and political exchanges under the remit of the PCNA contributed to 
the transformation of Argentina and Brazil‘s nuclear policy from one of cooperation to 
one of verification. Marco Marzo, a former Brazilian senior planning and evaluation 
officer at ABACC, observed this when he said: 
The way in which Argentina and Brazil came together in the nuclear field is 
astounding. […] If you said to me at that time, in 1984 or 1985, that there would 
be a rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil, that the Bilateral Agreement 
would be signed in ten years, I would have said that you were crazy. […] The 
first steps were very small steps. The rapprochement did not start with visits to 
secret enrichment plants. We started with small working groups in various areas 
[…] At the beginning, we never discussed secret facilities, enrichment, or 
reprocessing (1997: 33–34). 
 
In other words, the PCNA was responsible for turning ideas into concrete measures. It 
was also responsible for reciprocal visits, maintaining steady contacts at the political and 
technical levels, and consultation to increase mutual knowledge of each other‘s respective 
nuclear programmes (Fabbri 2005: 173). This was corroborated by an Argentine scientist 
who remarked that the PCNA ―helped facilitate the joint visits and increased 
transparency mechanisms‖ (Interview J). The constant attempts by diplomats, scientists, 
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and government officials to work on cooperative projects, and to maintain that 
commitment over a number of years was crucial in establishing the mutual safeguards 
inspection regime. As Wrobel and Redick conclude, 
An important factor in the establishment of ABACC was the great number of 
personal contacts made over many years between Argentine and Brazilian 
scientists, technicians, and other officials associated with the nuclear 
programmes. In particular, among the relatively small community of nuclear 
physicists, close personal relations evolved towards mutual trust and shared 
knowledge acquired from joint participation in bilateral or multilateral technical 
meetings. This helped end decades of long-held suspicions against foreign 
interference (1998: 177). 
 
The work carried out by the PCNA facilitated political support in favour of progress 
towards mutual and international inspections. When the political decision to establish 
ABACC was taken (denoted by (4) in Figure 5.1), two respected and experienced nuclear 
physicists, Jorge Coll from the CNEA representing Argentina, and Carlos Feu Alvim, a 
professor of physics, representing Brazil, became the director and deputy director, 
respectively, of ABACC (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 177). 
 
b) Access to Decision Makers 
The extent to which the experts had access to decision makers was arguably another 
crucial factor in the creation of ABACC. Earlier, it was explained how the JWG/PCNA 
was created through the 1985 and 1988 nuclear agreements agreed between the two 
presidents. Representatives from the foreign ministries and the scientific community of 
both countries were tasked to explore all avenues for nuclear cooperation. One of their 
main roles was to further negotiations and propose directions for further nuclear 
collaborative projects (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 169). Given that the JWG/PCNA were 
set up by the presidents, it can be assumed that those within the JWG/PCNA had access 
to decision makers. In fact, the Collor administration hired one key member from the 
JWG/PCNA – a scientist – to implement the mutual inspections regime. From 1990–
1992, Professor José Goldemberg was the Brazilian Minister of Science and Technology. 
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A nuclear physicist, Goldemberg was formerly the President of SBPC (1975–1979). He 
was a leading opponent of Brazil‘s parallel programme and sharply criticised the 
government‘s nuclear decisions throughout the 1970s (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 180, fn 
15, Paul 2000: 108). In fact, as a Brazilian former representative from the PCNA 
remarked, 
The President at the time, Fernando Collor, was a rather inquisitive mind and 
developed a good relationship with me asking frequently questions about 
Science and Technology (S&T). (Interview E). 
 
It can therefore be assumed that if one member from the JWG/PCNA had access to 
their country‘s president (in this case Brazil), other members of the JWG/PCNA could 
have also been granted access to the other country‘s president. 
 Based on the above, it can be argued that the role of Argentina (including that of 
President Sarney) was especially important in policy selection, denoted by (3) in Figure 
5.1. As explained in Chapter Two, the extent of an epistemic community‘s role in policy 
selection involves two factors: decision makers‘ unfamiliarity with policy issues and the 
timing of policy choice (Adler and Haas 1992: 381–383). In the case of ABACC, while it 
is not clear to what extent Argentine and Brazilian decision makers were familiar with the 
issue of mutual safeguards (from a scientific and technical perspective, rather than from 
an interest perspective), it is quite clear that the two countries‘ presidents closely followed 
the issue, given the frequent release of joint declarations stressing their countries‘ 
common nuclear policies. In addition, as explained earlier, the JWG/PCNA was set up 
through a presidential initiative. 
 The second factor in assessing an epistemic community‘s role in policy selection 
involves timing (Adler and Haas 1992: 383). It may be easier for decision makers to accept 
ideas and advice from epistemic communities after political, military, or economic 
conditions have changed (Adler and Haas 1992: 383). In the case of ABACC, timing was 
important, especially the transition to democracy. From 1985 – once both states were 
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democracies – there was a greater exchange of information, leading to nine Joint Nuclear 
Declarations. However, in terms of selecting the policy of mutual safeguards, the role of 
Argentina was especially important. Argentine representatives took on the role of policy 
―broker‖ in taking and leading the initiative on a cooperative and collaborative joint 
nuclear partnership – steps that led to the establishment of ABACC – denoted by (3) in 
Figure 5.1. In fact, according to Resende-Santos, who conducted extensive archival 
research in Brazil on Argentina and Brazil‘s emerging security cooperation, the initiative 
for a nuclear accord – i.e., that of May 1980 – originated with Argentina (2002: 116). He 
argues that Argentina‘s earliest official statement on nuclear cooperation was prepared in 
1978 by the Foreign Ministry‘s policy planning staff. The document urged 
Close monitoring of Brazil‘s nuclear programme for the purpose of adopting 
policies and measures necessary to neutralise or eliminate any real threat or 
potential threat to our country. At the same time, to study the possibilities of 
establishing cooperation rules or accords that could favour Argentina‘s nuclear 
programme (quoted in Resende-Santos 2002: 116–117).  
 
In an interview, an Argentine diplomat explained that, 
The first move towards ABACC [was] started by us when President Alfonsín 
met President Sarney. We invited them to our enrichment plant in Pilcaniyeu. 
From there on, we started a process of conversation towards the acceptance of 
full-scope safeguards with the IAEA. We started to be satisfied with the bilateral 
reciprocal visits to each other sensitive facilities. The evolution was part of a 
natural process where we both discovered the advantages of a bilateral 
mechanism (Interview L).  
 
This was corroborated by a former Head of International Affairs for CNEA, who 
explained,  
The idea to create ABACC was initially brought about from Argentinean 
technical nuclear authorities and was very well received by the Brazilians and by 
the respective diplomatic levels (Interview K). 
 
Earlier, it was explained that official negotiations of a mutual safeguards 
inspection regime began in 1987. However, the idea of a bilateral/common system of 
nuclear inspections was first put forward in 1985. Argentine President Alfonsín proposed 
to Brazilian President Sarney that they should negotiate a bilateral system of control of 
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nuclear materials and installations and a bilateral verification system of nuclear 
facilities.132 However, Brazil was not prepared to enter into negotiations at that time 
because the military was opposed to any form of control. In an interview, a Brazilian 
diplomat observed that Argentina was ―much more open to progress‖ and that President 
Alfonsín was more open to improve bilateral relations than President Sarney, because of 
the terrible defeat of the Malvinas/Falklands War and the abrupt end to the Argentine 
dictatorship (Interview D). As Sarney was an appointed president, he lacked the 
legitimacy and even the will to exert presidential control over the Brazilian nuclear 
programme (Wrobel and Redick 1998: 169). As a Brazilian representative of the PCNA 
explained in an interview, ―Brazil did not accept Argentina‘s proposal because Brazil 
wanted to cooperate and not be controlled‖ (Interview G). Nevertheless, soon after 
Alfonsín‘s proposal, the JWG was created in November 1985 to discuss nuclear issues. 
Three years later, its institutionalisation – as the PCNA – not only furthered nuclear 
negotiations but also facilitated the presidential and technical nuclear installation visits. 
The strength of the idea of bilateral inspections gradually emerged by these visits, by 
which time Brazil was more willing to participate in bilateral nuclear initiatives. It is 
important to note that the support for bilateral inspections grew in Brazil among the 
non-military sectors in part due to the Vargas Commission – an inter-ministerial 
committee composed of  government officials set up by the Brazilian government in 
September 1985 (Fabbri 2005: 148). The Commission carried out an internal review of  
Brazil‘s nuclear policy and in April 1986 it endorsed and recommended the idea of  the 
gradual establishment of  a mutual inspections system with Argentina to be pursued for 
Brazil‘s nuclear policy (Spector and Smith 1990: 225; 398 fn 26). 
  
  
                                                 
132 A Washington Post editorial remarks specifically that ―the initiative has come from Argentina‖ (March 
1985: A26). 
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5.4 Conclusion 
From the uncertainty over Argentina and Brazil‘s nuclear programmes to the creation of 
a mutual inspection safeguards regime, it can be argued that the role of an epistemic 
community is an important factor to consider in examining the creation of ABACC – a 
bilateral policy coordination effort, which verified the non-nuclear weapon status of 
Argentina and Brazil. In the process of creating ABACC, Argentina and Brazil embarked 
on a number of confidence building measures which provided assurances to each other 
and to the international community that neither country were pursuing nuclear weapons. 
From nuclear rivalry to nuclear cooperation, an epistemic community emerged and 
engaged. This community comprised a network of professionals with recognised 
expertise in the area of mutual safeguards and inspections that had access to decision 
makers.  
ABACC is the world‘s only bi-national safeguards agency responsible for 
verifying that the nuclear materials existing in both countries are being used exclusively 
for peaceful purposes. It is vested with the power to designate inspectors, carry out and 
evaluate inspections, and take legal action. It is made up of  an equal number of  
Argentines and Brazilians. Dr. Marco Marzo, a former ABACC Senior Planning and 
Evaluation Officer described everything in ABACC as ―symmetric, with a Brazilian and 
Argentine counterpart‖ (1997: 62). 
Today, Argentine and Brazilian nuclear physicists continue to conduct mutual 
inspections at nuclear facilities on a cross-national basis through ABACC. 133  These 
inspections include verification of inventories of nuclear materials, unannounced and 
                                                 
133 These inspectors render their services to ABACC only during the periods encompassed by the missions 
for which they are appointed. Brazilian inspectors verify the Argentine facilities, and Argentine inspectors 
verify the Brazilian facilities. According to ABACC‘s website, there are 86 Argentine and Brazilian 
inspectors, in exactly equal proportions. 
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short-notice inspections, and inspections carried out along with the IAEA (Paul 2000: 
103). In addition, their work is undertaken with the full support of both governments.134 
The international policy coordination outcome of the Argentine and Brazilian 
epistemic community‘s efforts in creating ABACC is six-fold. Since the establishment of 
ABACC in 1991, Argentina and Brazil have adhered to many international non-
proliferation norms and commitments, shown below in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1:  
Argentina and Brazil Nuclear Non-Proliferation Agreements 
 
Agreement Argentina Brazil 
 
Bilateral Agreements 
- SCCC 
- ABACC 
 
 
July 1991 
December 1991 
 
 
July 1991 
December 1991 
 
 
Quadripartite Agreement 
(full-scope IAEA safeguards) 
 
 
December 1991 
 
 
December 1991 
 
 
Treaty of Tlatelolco 
 
January 1994 
 
 
May 1994 
 
 
Nuclear Suppliers Group 
 
1994 
 
 
1996 
 
NPT 
 
 
February 1995 
 
September 1998 
 
While both nations were initially hostile to the non-proliferation regime, it is 
interesting to note that after their rapprochement, and after the institutionalisation of 
ABACC, Argentina and Brazil became fully integrated within the non-proliferation 
regime. First, they signed the Quadripartite Agreement between themselves, ABACC, 
and the IAEA; second, they signed Tlatelolco in 1994; third, they became signatories to 
                                                 
134  The structure of ABACC involves a Secretariat, which includes six sectors (four technical, one 
administrative, and one devoted to institutional relations). The Secretariat carries out day-to-day activities, 
and consists of technical and administrative officers and support staff (designated by the Commission). 
Each nationality takes turns in acting as ABACC‘s Secretary (Marzo 1997: 62). A Commission (the highest 
organisational level in ABACC) – made up of two representatives from Argentina and Brazil – supervises 
the Secretariat‘s performance.  
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the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and, lastly, they acceded to the NPT. Therefore, it can be 
argued that the creation of ABACC is an important factor to consider in explaining the 
non-proliferation of Argentina and Brazil. 
 
 150 
Case Study Two:  From the Uncertainty of Command, Control, and Safety of 
Soviet Nuclear Weapons to the Denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine: The Role of an American and Soviet/Russian Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Epistemic Community in the Creation of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat 
Reduction (CTR) Program 
 
Chapter Six 
 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine’s Nuclear Legacy: 
The Emergence of an Epistemic Community  
 
―As the Soviet Union began to break apart in 1991, mutual acquaintances 
on the Russian side, including some from the military, came to former 
Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia and me and pointed out the dangers of the 
dissolution of a nuclear superpower. The viability of their entire weapons 
custodial system was in doubt. Hundreds of tons of nuclear weapons 
material were spread across multiple sites in Russia and other former 
Soviet states.‖ 
 
Senator Richard Lugar (1999: 52) 
 
The following two chapters examine the role of an American-Soviet/Russian non-
proliferation epistemic community in the creation of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative 
Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.135 The CTR Program was a very important factor in 
the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine because, inter alia, it provided 
financial and technical assistance to safely dismantle their inherited nuclear weapons. In 
the first chapter, the scope of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine‘s inherited nuclear legacy 
is analysed, and the emergence of an American-Soviet/Russian nuclear non-proliferation 
epistemic community is discussed. In the second chapter (Chapter Seven), the process by 
which the epistemic community influenced the creation of the CTR Program is examined. 
 On 25 December, 1991, after close to seventy years, the Soviet Union ceased to 
exist  as  a  state  and  subject  of  international  law.  In  its place, 15 new successor states  
                                                 
135 In these chapters, the focus is on the creation of the CTR Program, rather than on its implementation 
with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Henceforth, the CTR Program refers to all the various 
programmes managed by the U.S. Departments of State, Energy, Defense, and Commerce, and their 
counterparts in the former Soviet Union. 
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emerged, 11 of which formed a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).136 Tens of 
thousands of nuclear warheads, substantial quantities of nuclear material that could be 
made into weapons and an extensive chemical and biological weapons-capable stockpile 
were inherited by some of the new and struggling states including Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.137 Command and control of nuclear weapons under the former 
Soviet order had virtually disappeared overnight, leading new Ukrainian President Leonid 
Kravchuk to comment, ―We don‘t know what we have‖ (quoted in Felton 2002: 4). The 
disintegration of the Soviet Union thus confronted the international community with an 
unprecedented security issue: the existence of four additional nuclear weapon states, 
three of which (the exception being Russia) had ―never had their finger on the nuclear 
button‖ (Ustiugov 1993: 34). 
During the Cold War, the number of the Soviet Union‘s nuclear weapon 
stockpile ranged between 33,000 to 45,000 (Norris and Kristensen 2006: 66).138 When the 
Soviet Union collapsed, substantial numbers of these weapons were located in the newly 
independent states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine: 825, 1,400, and 4,025, 
respectively  (Norris  1992:  25).139  In  addition,  many  of  these  were among the former  
                                                 
136 On 8 December 1991, the presidents of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus signed the Belavezha Accords, 
declaring the Soviet Union dissolved and subsequently establishing the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS). The Russian parliament ratified the accords four days later, formally voiding the 1922 Treaty 
on the Creation of the Soviet Union. On 21 December, the leaders of the other Soviet republics (with the 
exception of Georgia) signed the Alma-Ata Declaration, affirming the dissolution and acceding to the CIS. 
The Declaration stated that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would cease to exist at midnight, 
January 1, 1992. On 25 December, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as President and declared the office 
―extinct‖. On 26 December, the Council of Republics of the Supreme Soviet recognised the dissolution 
(Bernstein and Wood 2010: 14). The 15 successor states are: the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, 
Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The latter three countries were not part of the CIS. 
137  These states also inherited a substantial amount of delivery vehicles, including advanced missiles, 
bombers, and submarines (Felton 2002: 4). 
138 Please note these figures include strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Walker explains that ―strategic 
weapons can be delivered over long ranges by missiles or heavy bombers; tactical weapons have shorter 
ranges, and are mainly intended for use in battle, whether on land, at sea or in the air‖ (1992: 257).  
139 Norris quotes from the Natural Resources Defense Council. The precise number of Soviet nuclear 
weapons deployed in the newly independent states were regarded as state secrets. The numbers provided 
are the estimates of subject matter experts, including Norris and Arkin 1991, Norris 1992: 25, Walker 1992: 
260, de Andreis and Calogero 1995: 5. 
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Soviet Union‘s most advanced and powerful weapons. To put this into perspective, these 
countries became the third, fourth, and eighth largest nuclear powers in the world 
―overnight‖ (Lugar 2001: xiii). Furthermore, the total number of all nuclear weapons 
inherited was greater than those contained in China, France, and the UK combined 
(Nunn 2003: 16). However, by 1996, all nuclear warheads inherited from the Soviet 
Union were removed from the three states‘ territories, which resulted in their 
denuclearisation and in them becoming non-nuclear weapon states.140 The question that 
subsequently arises is why did these countries choose to denuclearise and relinquish their 
nuclear weapons?  
Scholars agree that the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine can 
be attributed to the high (economic and strategic) costs and low benefits attached to the 
maintenance of their inherited nuclear weapon arsenals, coupled with all three states 
wanting greater attention and financial assistance from the U.S. (Reiss 1995, Lepingwell 
1993a; 1993b, Shields and Potter 1997, Bertsch and Potter 1999, Stevens 2008). However, 
what has been neglected in these scholars‘ analyses is the process by which the three 
former Soviet Union states relinquished their nuclear weapons which, I argue was 
through the CTR Program. The main focus in this case study is therefore to examine the 
role of an epistemic community behind the creation of the CTR Program, since many 
scholars and policy analysts agree that its most important achievement has been the 
denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (Woolf 1996, Combs 1997, Duffy 
1997, Gottemoeller 1997, Orlov 1997, Potter & Shields 1997, Lugar 1999; 2001, Ellis 
2001, Newman 2001, Daughtry 2004, National Academies 2004). Furthermore, as a 
former Director of the U.S. National Academy of Sciences Committee on International 
Security and Arms Control remarked, the CTR Program ―provided incentives and 
                                                 
140 Kazakhstan became nuclear weapons free on 24 April 1995, followed by Ukraine on 1 June 1996, and 
Belarus on 27 November 1996 (SIPRI Yearbooks 1996; 1997). 
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mechanisms to allow the denuclearisation to happen‖ (Interview IV). Consequently, this 
analysis focuses on the creation of the CTR Program and on how this legislation 
facilitated the denuclearisation of the three former Soviet states. In this case study, the 
analysis indicates that an American-Soviet/Russian epistemic community drove the 
thinking behind the concept of the CTR Program, which proved to be a very important 
factor in the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.  
The chapter is structured in two parts. The first section provides detailed 
information on Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine‘s inherited nuclear weapons stockpile 
in order to ascertain the extent of the unprecedented international security issue. In the 
second section, the chapter analyses both the composition and the emergence of the 
American-Soviet/Russian nuclear non-proliferation epistemic community. The influence 
mechanisms of the epistemic community, i.e., how it influenced the creation of the CTR 
Program and its subsequent implementation as policy, and the importance of the CTR 
Program in the denuclearisation of the three former Soviet states are analysed in the 
proceeding chapter.  
6.1 Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine’s Inherited Nuclear Weapons 
As the Soviet Union was collapsing in December 1991, many uncertainties arose 
surrounding its future and that of the new independent republic states. The main 
uncertainty – from an international security perspective – centred on the 27,000 Soviet 
nuclear weapons (including Russia‘s share).141 The future of the command and control of 
these weapons, the thousands of trained nuclear scientists, the secret nuclear cities and 
laboratories, the nuclear production facilities, and missile assembly facilities that would 
be inherited by the Soviet successor states was uncertain.  
                                                 
141 In addition to the uncertainty relating to the fate of the 27,000 nuclear weapons, there were other 
concerns. These included food shortages, the lack of sufficient heating in the forthcoming cold winter 
months, intermittent electricity, an impending ―brain drain‖ crisis, the prospect of high unemployment, 
hoarding of food, rampant inflation, and an absence of governmental authority (Nichol 1992: 16). 
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Such an unprecedented event confronted the international community with many 
immediate and unanswerable questions including, who would control the weapons? 
Would the new nuclear states retain their inherited nuclear weapons? How would the 
international community cope with four more nuclear weapon states? How would the 
dismantling of the new republics‘ nuclear arsenals be financed and managed? How could 
the international community prohibit the development of illicit trade in nuclear weapons 
or fissile material and other components from the weapons?142  Considering the number 
of nuclear weapons at stake (illustrated in Table 6.1) and the overnight creation of three 
more nuclear weapon states, these questions required immediate attention. 
In order to understand the context within which the epistemic community 
emerged in addressing these questions, it is important to provide detail on what exactly 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited, which are considered in turn below.143 
 
                                                 
142 Potter (1993: 3) argues that in light of the economic crisis in the former Soviet republics and the 
possible emergence of a global nuclear black-market, the fear of illicit trade seemed genuine.  
143  Please note, the figures provided do not include the number of biological and chemical weapons 
inherited. Instead, they focus specifically on the number of inherited nuclear weapons.  
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Table 6.1: 
       Former Soviet Union Strategic and Tactical Nuclear Forces, December 1991144 
 
Republic Weapons Warheads 
   
BELARUS   
 ICBM 
 Tactical 
 81 
 
 81 
 1,120 
   
KAZAKHSTAN 
 ICBM 
 Bombers 
 Tactical 
 
 104 
 40 
 
 
 1,040 
 320 
 650 
     
RUSSIA 
 ICBM 
 Bombers 
 SLBM 
 Tactical 
 
 1,064 
 101 
 940 
 
 4,278 
 367 
 2,804 
 8,525 
   
UKRAINE 
 ICBM 
 Bombers 
 Tactical 
 
 176 
 21 
 
 1,240 
 168 
 2,605 
   
Total ICBM 1,425 6,639 
   
Total Bombers 162 855 
   
Total SLBM 
 
940 2,804 
Total Strategic Warheads  10,298 
   
Total Tactical Warheads  15,000a 
 
a Please note, this figure includes tactical nuclear warheads based in the other Soviet 
republics (Belarus, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia). 
 
Key: ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles; SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic 
Missiles; Tactical: warheads for ground forces, air defence forces, air forces, and navy. 
 
Source: For all figures apart from the tactical nuclear warheads: International Institute for 
Strategic Studies, 1992: 30–46. For tactical nuclear warheads: Walker 1992: 260, Norris 
and Arkin 1991, de Andreis and Calogero 1995: 5. Please note these figures are estimates 
(please see footnote 133 for further elaboration). 
 
                                                 
144 Strategic and tactical nuclear weapons are two types of nuclear weapons which describe the way the 
weapons are intended to be used (please see footnote 136 for further elaboration). 
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Belarus 
As Table 6.1 indicates, of the three newly independent states, Belarus inherited the least 
amount of nuclear weapons. Its inheritance share amounted to 4.5% of the entire nuclear 
stockpile (de Andreis and Calogero 1995: 5). In addition to the 81 SS–25 intercontinental 
ballistic missiles (ICBMs) equipped with single nuclear warheads, Belarus inherited over 
1,000 tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons (Cochran et al. 1989: 131–132, Walker 
1992: 260, Reiss 1995: 131, U.S. Congress 1994: 36). 
 
Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan‘s inheritance share amounted to 7.6% of the entire nuclear stockpile (de 
Andreis and Calogero 1995: 5). It inherited four missile bases, sites for in silo-launchers 
104 SS-18 ICBMs, each capable of carrying ten high-yield nuclear warheads, 40 nuclear 
capable long-range missiles, strategic offensive forces equipped with over 1,400 nuclear 
warheads, 320 nuclear-armed, bomber-launched cruise missiles, and 650 tactical nuclear 
weapons (Cochran et al. 1989: 127, U.S. Congress 1994: 36, Walker 1992: 260, de 
Andreis and Calogero 1995: 5). 
 
Ukraine 
Second to Russia‘s 65.6% inheritance share, Ukraine‘s inherited nuclear weapons 
amounted to a 16.1% share (de Andreis and Calogero 1995: 5). Ukraine‘s nuclear 
inherited legacy included 130 SS-19 ICBMs (carrying 6 warheads per missile) and 46 SS-
24 ICBMs (carrying 10 warheads per missile), 25 Bear H-16 long range strategic bombers 
(each equipped with 16 warheads mounted on air launched cruise missiles), 19 Blackjack 
bombers (each equipped with 12 nuclear tipped cruise missiles), 564 nuclear bombs and 
air-launched cruise missiles, and approximately 4,000 tactical nuclear weapons (Cochran 
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et al. 1989: 129–132, Norris and Arkin 1992: 48, Reiss 1995: 94, U.S. Congress 1994: 36, 
de Andreis and Calogero 1995: 5).  
 
 Considering the overwhelming number of nuclear weapons distributed across the 
three new independent republics and the overnight creation of three more nuclear 
weapon states (excluding Russia), it is clear that the international community was faced 
with an unprecedented international security issue. In total, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine inherited approximately 7,655 (out of 27,000) strategic and tactical nuclear 
weapons with various delivery systems (e.g., ICBMs, bombers, etc.). Their combined 
totals represented a 28.2% share of the entire former Soviet nuclear weapons arsenal (de 
Andreis and Calogero 1995: 5). The existence of three new nuclear states presented a 
challenge to international security – particularly to nuclear non-proliferation – especially 
since none of the states were bound by pre-existing Soviet arms control agreements that 
committed the Soviet Union to unilaterally reduce its nuclear weapons arsenal. The 
impending dissolution of the Soviet Union and what this meant from a nuclear 
proliferation perspective provided the context in which the epistemic community 
emerged.  
 
6.2 Denuclearising Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine: The Emergence of an 
American-Soviet/Russian Epistemic Community 
 
As will be discussed in greater detail below, shortly after the failed 20/21 August 1991 
coup d‘état against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev – four months prior to the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union – American and Soviet non-proliferation experts 
(including academics, research analysts, and government officials) had anticipated the 
unprecedented international security threat of the possibility of the overnight creation of 
three more nuclear weapon states. Between August and December 1991 (when the U.S. 
Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 – the precursor to the 
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CTR Program), common anxieties regarding the control, command, and safety of 27,000 
nuclear weapons were shared amongst like-minded American and Soviet/Russian experts. 
Within a five month period, these anxieties evolved into a technical and financial 
assistance package which would aid the denuclearisation of the three new nuclear 
weapon states. The assistance package culminated in the CTR Program, which paved the 
way for the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.  
The failed August 1991 coup provided the starting point for the emergence of 
the epistemic community that devised the CTR Program. A week after the attempted 
coup, the U.S. House Armed Services Committee heard a $1 billion humanitarian aid 
proposal for the Soviet Union by Les Aspin (D-WI). The proposed aid package would 
provide food and medicine for the Soviet people for the coming winter to prevent chaos. 
Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) joined forces with Aspin and modified the proposals into 
one initiative: the ill-fated Aspin-Nunn initiative. 145  Without any active White House 
support and having been presented during an anti-foreign policy and anti-foreign aid 
mood, the initiative was sharply criticised for providing assistance to the ―evil‖ empire of 
the Soviet Union. Consequently, Aspin and Nunn were forced to scrap their proposal.146 
It should be noted, however, that while Aspin and Nunn were working on their 
initiative, two research teams at the universities of Harvard and Stanford were collectively 
studying  the  impending  collapse of the Soviet Union and what this might mean for U.S.  
 
                                                 
145 Nunn agreed with Aspin‘s proposal provided that the money be used at the president‘s discretion for 
continued Soviet control over its nuclear, biological, and chemical arsenals, as well as for technical 
assistance relating to defence conversion efforts (Ellis 2001: 26).  
146 The First Gulf War had finished in early 1991, and six months later, the political climate had changed. 
As Lugar explained, ―The Bush administration was being criticised for being preoccupied with distant 
foreign policy matters at the expense of domestic well being. […] With the Gulf War won and the 
confrontational posture of the Cold War waning, the [U.S.] public was in a mood to deemphasise foreign 
assistance, military spending, and other costs of foreign policy in favour of domestic policy‖ (2005: 12). 
Tarnoff argued, ―A declining U.S. economy coupled with White House resistance to extending 
unemployment benefits helped to create this temporary impasse by stimulating public opposition to 
foreign aid‖ (1993: 8). 
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national security. Their research was part of a broad ―Cooperative Security‖ project, a 
collaborative effort between Harvard University, Stanford University, and the Brookings 
Institution funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York (under Dr. David 
Hamburg‘s presidency).  The research was being led by Dr. Ashton Carter (Harvard 
University), Dr. William Perry (Stanford University), and Dr. John Steinbruner 
(Brookings Institution). At the same time, four Soviet foreign policy experts (from both 
within and outside of government) went to Washington D.C. asking for U.S. assistance 
in storing and dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons, which prompted joint engagement on 
a cooperative research initiative. Consequently, these experts met with one another to 
discuss policies the U.S. could implement that would facilitate the control of the 27,000 
nuclear weapons. They believed that uncertainty over Soviet nuclear command and 
control and the threat of further proliferation had to be controlled through American 
assistance.  In addition, they agreed that command and control of the arsenal should be 
retained in Russia and that the other republics should not become nuclear weapon states. 
Furthermore, they agreed that curbing the spread of nuclear weapons was in the national 
security interest of the U.S. and indeed of the rest of the world (all to be discussed in 
greater detail below). By December 1991, U.S. policymakers presented the epistemic 
community‘s proposals to Congress, leading to the passage of the Soviet Nuclear Threat 
Reduction Act of 1991 – the initial CTR Program legislation.  
 
Who were the Experts behind the CTR Program? 
Using Haas‘ definition of an epistemic community outlined in Chapter Two, it can be 
argued that the non-proliferation experts behind the creation of the CTR Program 
comprised an epistemic community. These experts consisted of a network of 11 
American and Soviet/Russian professionals with recognised expertise and competence in 
security and defence issues (including nuclear proliferation), illustrated in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2:  
The Experts Involved in the Creation of the CTR Program147 
 
Expert Cluster U.S. Soviet Union/Russia 
 
Research Analyst/  
Foreign Policy Specialist 
 
Dr. John D. Steinbruner 
(Brookings Institution) 
 
Dr. Andrey A. Kokoshin  
(ISKAN: The Institute for the 
U.S.A and Canadian Studies at 
the Russian Academy of 
Sciences) 
 
Dr. Sergey M. Rogov 
(ISKAN: The Institute for the 
U.S.A and Canadian Studies at 
the Russian Academy of 
Sciences) 
 
 
Academics 
 
 
Dr. Ashton B. Carter  
(Harvard University) 
 
Dr. William J. Perry 
(Stanford University) 
 
 
N/A 
 
Government/State Officials 
 
 
Dr. Les Aspin (D-WI) 
 
Senator Richard G. Lugar  
(R-IN) 
 
Senator Sam Nunn (R-GA)  
 
Dr. Viktor Mikhailov  
(Deputy Minister of Atomic 
Energy and Industry, later 
Minatom) 
 
Aleksandr N. Yakovlev 
(Gorbachev‘s closest advisor; 
former member of the 
Presidential Council and 
Politburo; former head of 
IMEMO: the Institute of 
World Economy and 
International Relations) 
 
 
Funding Corporation 
 
Dr. David A. Hamburg  
(Carnegie Corporation of 
New York) 
 
 
N/A 
 
                                                 
147 It should be noted that the people listed here were those who conceived the assistance package to 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (i.e., the idea behind the CTR Program). They are not necessarily 
the people who implemented or worked on implementing the CTR Program with Russia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.  
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Based on my research and understanding of the case, the American contingent included 
government officials Dr. Les Aspin, Richard G. Lugar, and Sam Nunn; academics Dr. 
Ashton B. Carter and Dr. William J. Perry; research analyst Dr. John D. Steinbruner, and 
President of the Carnegie Corporation of New York (a funding foundation), Dr. David 
A. Hamburg. The Soviet experts‘ contingent comprised government officials Dr. Viktor 
Mikhailov and Aleksandr N. Yakovlev; and civilian defence research analysts Dr. Andrey 
A. Kokoshin and Dr. Sergey M. Rogov. Although the scientific community is not 
represented per se, it should be noted that there were scientists involved in the thinking 
behind the CTR Program.148 Furthermore, five of the experts came from a scientific 
background: Carter completed a Ph.D. in Theoretical Physics, Hamburg completed a 
M.D, Kokoshin completed a Masters degree in Engineering (in radioelectronics), 
Mikhailov completed a Ph.D. in Theoretical Physics, and Perry completed a Ph.D. in 
Mathematics. As Table 6.2 highlights, there were more Americans than Soviets/Russians 
(seven Americans; four Soviets/Russians). This was probably due to the fact that the 
Soviets themselves were more concerned and preoccupied with the dissolution of their 
Empire. Consequently, as will be discussed below, the American contingent worked 
tirelessly to provide U.S. government decision makers with policy recommendations in 
order to contain the nuclear proliferation threat and address the ―specific concerns about 
stability and central control‖ (Interview III).  
It can therefore be argued that, in line with the existing studies on epistemic 
communities, the experts involved in the creation of the CTR Program were comprised 
of   both   technical   specialists   (i.e.,   academics  and  foreign  policy  research analysts/ 
                                                 
148 According to Interview II (a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense), the scientists that were 
involved included Donald Kerr (former Fellow at Harvard‘s Belfer Center) and Charles Zraket (former 
Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory and co-author of ―Soviet Nuclear Fission‖, the seminal 
Harvard study which outlined policy proposals to safeguard the nuclear weapons arsenal of the 
disintegrating Soviet Union.) However, most interviewees explained that the scientists became more 
involved after the creation of the CTR Program in its implementation. 
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specialists) and government/state officials.  As two interviewees argued,  the ―Nunn-
Lugar idea came from academics‖ (Interview IX) and that ―non-governmental thinking 
under girded the thought process of CTR‖ (Interview XXII). These experts provided the 
intellectual impetus behind the CTR Program.149 According to Interview XXVI, all were 
involved and that ―not one person can take full credit for the initiative. We all knew it 
had to be done.‖ As will be discussed below, they believed that uncertainty over Soviet 
nuclear command and control and the threat of further proliferation had to be controlled 
through American assistance. (In the next chapter, their authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge is discussed in greater detail.) 
It should be noted, however, that the experts behind the creation of the CTR 
Program were responsible for devising the assistance package to Russia and the nuclear-
inheriting republics. They were not necessarily involved in implementing CTR with 
Russia and the other new republics. Since this thesis is interested in analysing the role of 
an epistemic community in the creation of nuclear non-proliferation agreements, the 
focus in this analysis is therefore specifically on the creation of the CTR Program, rather 
than on its implementation with Russia and the other nuclear-inherited states. However, 
several of those involved in the creation of the CTR Program later became officials in the 
first Clinton Administration, acquiring direct responsibility to implement the CTR 
Program as policy they had initially crafted. For example, Les Aspin would serve as 
Secretary of Defense (1993–1994); William Perry would become Deputy Secretary and 
later Secretary of Defense (1993–1994; 1994–1997, respectively); and Ashton Carter 
would serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy (1993–
1996). Carter established a new organisation within his nuclear security and counter-
proliferation office dedicated to assisting the former Soviet Union and coordinating 
                                                 
149 I am grateful to Interview XVIV who pointed out that members of an epistemic community should be 
considered an ―intellectual‖ community rather than an ―intelligence‖ community. 
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Nunn-Lugar CTR Program activities (Bernstein and Wood 2010: 11). Their 
appointments allowed the CTR Program to become institutionalised in the Department 
of Defense.  
 
How did they Emerge? 
 
―In the fall of 1991, we [the U.S.] began to realise that there was a growing 
danger that the Soviet Union could neither fulfil its obligations under START I 
nor provide safety and security for its nuclear arsenal.150 As events developed 
and the Soviet Union became first the CIS and then the Russian Federation, we 
in the U.S. had imperfect knowledge of what was going on, but realised that 
something must be done to insure that Soviet nuclear weapons were secure 
during a period of turmoil‖ (Interview I).  
 
In Chapter Two, it was argued that an analysis from the existing epistemic community 
literature suggested that when decision makers are faced with uncertainty or complex 
policy issue areas and/or lack the expertise in a particularly complex issue area, an 
epistemic community is likely to emerge. As the quote above (from a U.S. negotiator of 
the Nunn-Lugar/CTR Program) suggests, decision makers in the U.S. were faced with 
uncertainty as they had ―imperfect knowledge‖ vis-à-vis  the disintegrating Soviet Union 
and realised that something had to be done in order to safeguard the loose Soviet nuclear 
weapons. U.S. decision makers‘ uncertainty, therefore, provided the context within which 
the epistemic community emerged. With the impending dissolution of the Soviet Union, 
there were many uncertainties surrounding the future of the Soviet Union and the new 
independent republic states, particularly in relation to the command and control of 
27,000 Soviet nuclear weapons. Members of the epistemic community, using their 
expertise in nuclear (non) proliferation, sought to fill the ―imperfect knowledge‖ gap 
                                                 
150 The START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) was a Treaty signed between the U.S. and the 
USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms on July 31, 1991, five months before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Its entry into force was delayed due to the collapse of the USSR and 
awaiting an Annex that enforced the terms of the treaty upon Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. 
START I entered into force on 5 December 1994, by which time all 5 START parties (U.S., Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine) had ratified it. Dates of START I ratification in chronological order: 
Kazakhstan: 2 July 1992; U.S.: 1 October 1992; Russia: 4 November 1992 (the Duma refused to exchange 
START instruments of ratification until Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine acceded to the NPT); Belarus: 4 
February 1993; Ukraine: 5 December 1994. 
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facing the U.S. and offer policy suggestions in order to assist the newly independent 
states with the elimination of their inherited nuclear weapons.151  
There were four stages to the emergence of the epistemic community, which 
took place over a five month period (outlined in Table 6.3). The first stage was marked 
by the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union and Aspin‘s immediate reaction to the 
failed August coup. The second stage was marked by the ―Cooperative Security‖ 
initiative, an American-funded research project, which promoted an American-
Soviet/Russian cooperative approach to arms control. The third stage was marked by the 
visit of four Soviet research analysts (from in and out of government) to Washington 
D.C. asking the U.S. for assistance in storing and dismantling Soviet nuclear weapons. In 
the final stage, members of the epistemic community were brought together culminating 
in the drafting of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program. All four stages will be considered in 
further detail in turn below.  
 
a) The Ill-Fated Aspin and Nunn Initiative (August–November 1991) 
 
On 28 August, a week after the attempted coup, Les Aspin, chairman of the House 
Armed Services Committee (U.S. House of Representatives) proposed a $1 billion 
humanitarian aid proposal (to be taken from the FY92 Pentagon budget) for the Soviet 
Union to provide food and medicine for the Soviet people for the coming winter in 
order to prevent chaos (Aspin 1991a). In his proposal, Aspin (1991b: 4; 6) listed a 
number of uncertainties relating to the future of the Soviet Union, including economic, 
social, and nuclear control. Certain members of the U.S. Congress were worried that the 
disintegration of central authority in the Soviet Union could threaten the unified 
                                                 
151 Please note that this refers to late 1991 at the time when Congress passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat 
Reduction Act. Later on, the Clinton Administration not only sought the epistemic community‘s advice in 
implementing the CTR Program, it also brought in three members of the epistemic community as senior 
officials (Aspin, Perry, and Carter).  
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command and control of the country‘s nuclear arsenal. For example Lee Hamilton (D-
IN), a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee said,  
We have to be alert to any possibility that the nuclear weapons might be 
dispersed. (...) The central authority in control of those weapons is critical from 
our standpoint (quoted in Graham 1991: 2). 
 
Aspin called his proposal ―defence by different means, but defence nevertheless‖ 
and argued that it was in the U.S. national security interest to promote democracy and 
reform by preventing chaos in the Soviet Union.152 He tied this assistance programme 
directly to nuclear security when he remarked, ―During the Cold War, the threat was 
deliberate Soviet attack. Now, the bigger threat seems to be chaos in a nation with 30,000 
nuclear weapons‖ (quoted in Nunn and Lugar 1995: 140). To Aspin, investing what 
amounted to less than one-half of one percent of the defence budget to the cause of 
national (and international) security was one way in which to advance the U.S.‘ national 
security. He acknowledged, that given the uncertainties, it was,  
A whole different kind of threat […] a threat of the United States being 
obliterated by large numbers of Soviet weapons. What we‘re talking about now 
is Soviet weapons falling into hands of people who might use them as blackmail, 
who might use them as part of an attempt to establish independence for one 
republic or another (1991b: 10). 
 
Since it was a ―different‖ threat, a ―whole brand new program of dealing with 
that threat‖ was necessary (Aspin 1991b: 10). Over the next week, the Committee on 
Armed Services held three hearings to explore how the U.S. military might administer aid 
and how great a need for help existed.153 These  hearings  culminated in a White Paper by  
 
 
 
                                                 
152 In his proposal, Aspin argued, ―I would contend that it [his proposal] is essentially very much oriented 
towards national security. […] This money, spent in this way, is another way of spending defence. It‘s 
defence by another means, but it is defence nonetheless‖ (1991b: 9). 
153 The three hearings were: Hearing on Operation Project Comfort as a Possible Model for a Soviet Aid 
Effort (4 September 1991); Hearing on Assessing Needs in the Soviet Union (5 September 1991); Hearing 
on Distributing Humanitarian Aid (6 September 1991). All hearings are available in ―Preventing Chaos in 
the Former Soviet Union: The Debate on Providing Aid‖, 17 January 1992). 
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Table 6.3: 
The Origins of the CTR Program 
 
1991:  
  
 
STAGE ONE: 
 
- August 
 
 
 
20/21: Failed coup in Moscow 
 
28: Aspin presents his $1 billion humanitarian aid proposal 
  
- September 
 
12: Aspin‘s White Paper 
 
15: Nunn‘s op-ed in The Washington Post154 
 
Nunn and Aspin revise the package: Aspin-Nunn initiative 
 
  
STAGE TWO: 
 
- September–
November 
 
 
 
―Cooperative Security‖ Project (collaborative project between 
Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner, funded by Hamburg) 
 
 
STAGE THREE: 
 
- October 
 
 
 
24: Soviet visitors to Washington D.C., ask for U.S. assistance 
(Yakovlev, Rogov, Kokoshin, Mikhailov) 
 
  
STAGE FOUR: 
 
- November 
 
 
13: Aspin and Nunn scrap their proposal 
15: Meeting in Nunn‘s office with the Soviets (Yakovlev, 
Rogov, and Kokoshin) 
19: Meeting in Nunn‘s office bringing together experts 
21: Nunn and Lugar convene a bi-partisan meeting 
22: Nunn and Lugar‘s op-ed in The Washington Post155 
25: Senate votes 86–8 to provide $500 million to Soviet Union 
26: Public Law 228 (The ―Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act 
of 1991‖, the original CTR Program legislation) passed by the 
House of Representatives 
  
- December 12: The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 is signed 
into law by President George H. W. Bush 
 
                                                 
154 ―A Helping Hand, Not a Blank Check‖. 
155 ―Dismantling the Soviet Arsenal: We‘ve got to get involved‖. 
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Aspin in which he appealed for a ―comprehensive approach‖ that would include a 
programme dealing with anti-chaos humanitarian aid, nuclear threat control, and 
defences against the new nuclear threat (Aspin 1991c: 6). In the White Paper, Aspin 
highlighted the new kind of nuclear threat facing the United States emanating from an 
―uncertain‖ Soviet Union; that of accidental or unauthorised nuclear use made possible 
through the threat of nuclear blackmail and nuclear smuggling (Aspin 1991c: 4). 156 
However, not everyone agreed with his proposal. Secretary of Defense Richard B. 
Cheney referred to it as ―foolish‖ and President Bush stated, 
I‘m not going to cut into the muscle of defence of this country in a kind of an 
instant sense of budgetary gratification so that we can go over and help 
somebody when the needs aren‘t clear and when we have requirements that 
transcend historic concerns about the Soviet Union (quoted in Nunn and Lugar 
1995: 142).  
 
Senator Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, however 
shared Aspin‘s sense of urgency and wrote an op-ed in The Washington Post (1991a: C7), 
three days after Aspin‘s White Paper was published. In it, he encouraged the U.S. to help 
the Soviet Union and the republics dismantle their military-industrial complex through a 
variety of programmes as a way in which to enhance U.S. national security. Shortly after, 
Nunn and Aspin joined modified versions of their proposals into one initiative: the ill-
fated Nunn-Aspin initiative. As Nunn explained, 
Les Aspin and I decided to do something very unusual. We decided to try to put 
this humanitarian aid package and my concerns about weapons of mass 
destruction together in a conference initiative, even though nothing of this 
nature appeared in either the House or the Senate bill (1997: xvi). 
 
This bill proposed spending $1 billion (again to be taken from the Pentagon‘s 
budget) to provide emergency assistance to the Soviet Union, including food, medical aid, 
                                                 
156 ―Consider the possibility that a rebel group might gain control of a Soviet nuclear weapon, whether 
tactical or strategic. Might such a group either acquire an unsafeguarded weapon or gain access to the 
necessary codes through sympathetic contacts in the military? […] If civil war were to break out today, the 
security of the 12,000-plus tactical nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union – kept at hundreds of storage sites, 
many outside the Russian Republic – could be impossible to guarantee. In such a scenario, the possibility 
that the U.S. and other countries could be subject to nuclear blackmail by pariah leaders inside or outside 
the Soviet Union cannot be discounted‖ (Aspin 1991c: 6). 
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and technical assistance to safely transport, store, and dismantle its nuclear and chemical 
weapons. It also intended to provide assistance for conversion of Soviet military 
industries into civilian projects, environmental cleanup of sites contaminated by decades 
of Soviet weapons development, and occupational retraining and housing for 
decommissioned Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces officers (Schmitt 1991: 12, Hoagland 
1991: A21, Lancaster 1991: A1, Combs 1997: 42, Lugar 2005: 13). Both Nunn and Aspin 
argued that the ―investment would increase American security by helping prevent further 
instability in the Soviet Union‖ (quoted in Schmitt 1991: 12). Aspin argued,  
We‘re talking about the potential for chaos in a country with 30,000 nuclear 
weapons. It‘s clearly in our interest not to allow food and medicine shortages to 
trigger some kind of unrest (quoted in Schmitt 1991: 12). 
 
Described as a ―give away‖ and as ―foreign aid‖ for Russia, House and Senate 
Republicans opposed the initiative. Senator Alfonse M. D‘Amato (R-NY) complained 
that the U.S. ―cannot afford to play Santa Claus to the Soviet Union when Americans are 
hungry and jobless‖ (quoted in Dewar 1991: 18, Nichol 1992: 17). Representative Robert 
Dornan (R-CA) asserted that ―a billion dollars is a lot of money,‖ especially for ―the 
former ‗evil empire‘ that caused 46 years of [high] U.S. defence spending‖ (quoted in 
Ellis 2001: 26). The absence of active White House support coupled with an 
overwhelming anti-foreign policy and anti-foreign aid mood forced Nunn and Aspin to 
scrap this idea, which they did on November 13.157 While the Aspin-Nunn initiative 
ultimately failed, other non-proliferation experts (from the U.S. and the Soviet Union) 
were closely monitoring the disintegrating Soviet Union and exchanging ideas and 
information over the safety and security of the 27,000 nuclear weapons, discussed below. 
 
                                                 
157 It should be noted that on November 5, Harrison Wofford, a Democrat, won a formerly Republican-
held Senate seat in a special Pennsylvania Senate Race. Wofford won the election on the basis of an 
―America first‖ platform and in promising to ―take care of our own‖ (Lugar 2005: 13, Combs 1997: 43). 
Aspin‘s floor statement to the House Committee on Armed Services November 13, 1991 can be found in 
the ―Preventing Chaos in the Former Soviet Union‖ Report, January 17, 1992.  
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b) The “Cooperative Security” Research Initiative: “Soviet Nuclear 
Fission” (September–November 1991) 
 
During the same time that Aspin and Nunn were working on their $1 billion aid 
assistance package, two research teams at the universities of Harvard and Stanford were 
studying international security issues and how they might impact U.S. national security. 
Dr. Ashton Carter, Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at 
Harvard‘s Kennedy School of Government, was leading a research team that was 
analysing the control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in a disintegrating Soviet Union. Dr. 
William Perry, co-Director of the ―Preventive Defense Project‖ at Stanford‘s Center for 
International Security and Cooperation, was leading a research team that was analysing 
the giant military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union (Carter and Perry 1999: 71).158 
The Harvard and Stanford projects were parallel to another project being run at the 
Brookings Institution under the directorship of Dr. John D. Steinbruner. These projects 
were on a broader agenda they called ―Cooperative Security‖ which were funded by Dr. 
David Hamburg, President of the Carnegie Corporation of New York.159 
 According to Carter, ―By 1991, we were seeing something unaccustomed: the 
first-ever impending disintegration of a nuclear power‖ (2005: 1). Consequently, he and a 
team of Harvard researchers embarked upon a detailed study of such an unprecedented 
problem, which culminated in a study entitled ―Soviet Nuclear Fission: Control of the 
Nuclear Arsenal in a Disintegrating Soviet Union‖, published in November 1991. The 
study argued that the ―destiny of the 27,000 nuclear weapons on the territory of what is 
increasingly referred to as the ―former‖ Soviet Union is a paramount concern of our 
times‖ (Campbell et al. 1991: i–ii). Since the study predicted that the break-up of the 
                                                 
158 The ―Preventive Defense Project‖ was a research collaboration between Harvard‘s Kennedy School of 
Government and Stanford‘s Center for International Security and Arms Control (which later became the 
Center for International Security and Cooperation) headed by Carter and Perry respectively. 
159 The Brookings Institution, Harvard, and Stanford all shared a grant from the Carnegie Corporation on 
the ―Cooperative Security Project‖. The book that was written was entitled ―A New Concept of 
Cooperative Security‖, published in 1992. I am grateful to Interview VII for these details. 
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Soviet Union posed the biggest proliferation threat of the Atomic Age, it outlined a new 
form of ―arms control‖ that might prevent proliferation. The study suggested joint action 
by the two former Cold War enemies against the common danger of further proliferation 
(Campbell et al. 1991, Carter and Perry 1999: 71). In fact, as one interviewee remarked, 
―Rather than using confrontational methods that we [in the U.S.] had used in the past, 
we [realised that we] should use cooperative measures‖ (Interview XVI). 
The study‘s main conclusion was that political and economic instability in the 
Soviet Union could have serious consequences for the safety and security of the Soviet 
Union‘s nuclear arsenal, particularly if the Soviet Union divided into independent 
republics (Campbell et al. 1991). Furthermore, the main recommendation they made was 
that the U.S. government should create assistance programmes to the new nuclear states 
to make sure that the vast Soviet nuclear legacy was not abused (Campbell et al. 1991: 
117–129, Carter 2005: 1). Yet, by this point (November 1991), as Carter explained, ―We 
had the study but not yet the audience of people in power who shared our concern‖ 
(2005: 1).   
 
c) The Soviet Input Behind CTR (October–November 1991) 
In addition to Carter‘s study and the collaborative Cooperative Security project taking 
place between Harvard, Stanford, and the Brookings Institution, the importance of the 
Soviet input behind the thought process leading to the creation of the CTR Program 
cannot be overlooked or underestimated. As one interviewee explained, ―Russia was very 
involved. None of this would have happened without Russian involvement‖ (Interview 
XXII). 160 Furthermore, Interview XVI remarked, ―There were some discussions with 
Russians from the Russian National Academy of Sciences about these ideas‖. As Senator 
Lugar (R-IN) was to conclude years later, 
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Russian leaders requested our cooperation in securing and protecting Russia‘s 
nuclear arsenal and weapons-usable materials. This was the genesis of the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (1999: 52). 
 
Between the end of October and 15 November 1991, four Soviet visitors went to 
Washington D.C. to ask for U.S. assistance in storing and dismantling Soviet nuclear 
weapons. These visitors included Gorbachev emissary and senior advisor Aleksandr 
Yakovlev,161 civilian defence analysts Dr. Sergey Rogov and Dr. Andrey Kokoshin, and 
Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy and Industry Dr. Viktor Mikhailov (Oberdorfer 1991: 
C2, Nichol 1992: 1992). Rogov and Kokoshin both held senior positions in the Russian 
Academy of Sciences‘ Institute for the U.S.A. and Canadian Studies, a well-respected 
think tank/research institute in Moscow, and were well-known in Washington. Towards 
the end of October (circa 24 October), Mikhailov gave a presentation to the Senate Arms 
Control Observer Group detailing the ―loose nukes‖ problem. 162  He warned of the 
inadequate facilities and funds to store and dismantle the nuclear weapons, and asked the 
members of the Senate Arms Control Observer Group, ―Can you help? We [Soviet 
Union] need your help‖ (quoted in Oberdorfer 1991: 2, Nichol 1992: 18). 
A week after Mikhailov‘s briefing, several U.S. key senators – including Nunn 
and Lugar – heard from Yakovlev, Rogov, and Kokoshin that the dangers to democracy 
                                                                                                                                            
160 A number of interviewees remarked on the Soviet input dynamic, including Interview IX, Interview 
XII, Interview XV, Interview XVI, Interview XXIV, Interview XXVII. 
161  Mendelson explains that Yakovlev was Gorbachev‘s closest advisor and a former member of the 
Presidential Council and Politburo (1993: 340). In addition, he was a former head of IMEMO (Institute of 
World Economy and International Relations), another well-respected think tank/research institute in 
Moscow. 
162  Cambone explains that senators who participate in an observer group do not ―surrender the 
constitutional obligation of the Senate to provide its advice and consent to ratification. But they do take on 
the obligation to avoid using privileged information for partisan purpose in the course of the ratification 
process‖ (2000: 216). The Senate Arms Control Observer Group – a bipartisan working group – was one 
example of a Senate Observer Group. It was established by Ronald Reagan in January 1987. While senators 
in the arms control observer group do not participate in the actual (arms control) negotiations, they do 
provide a continuing important link between the Senate and the U.S. President‘s administration‘s 
negotiators, keeping the Senate informed regarding developments and progress in the negotiations, and 
periodically advising and consulting with the U.S. negotiators. From April 1999, it became known as the 
Senate‘s National Security Working Group (NSWG) which established a bipartisan working group to 
address national security threats and responses.  
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and stability were growing more serious by the day in the Soviet Union.163 Approximately 
two weeks later, on 15 November, Rogov and Kokoshin told a meeting in Nunn‘s office 
that power was slipping away from Gorbachev by the minute, and that in a ―worst case 
scenario‖, which they said was not implausible, nuclear weapons could become the focus 
of struggles for power among the Soviet republics. The senators were told: ―America has 
to wake up‖ (quoted in Oberdorfer 1991: 2). According to Oberdorfer, 
Despite the anti-foreign backlash in Congress, Lugar and Nunn agreed it was 
unthinkable to send no help and no signal of U.S. support at such a crucial 
moment in the Soviet Union. […] Lugar and Nunn agreed it was essential to 
pass at least a narrow, nuclear-related Soviet aid plan in the few days left before 
Congress recessed for the year (1991: 2). 
 
It was at this point when members of the epistemic community converged to draft the 
CTR legislation. 
 
d) Bringing the Experts Together (November–December 1991) 
Six days after the failed Aspin-Nunn legislation was withdrawn, Hamburg (President of 
the Carnegie Corporation of New York) invited Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner to join 
Senator Lugar – a member on the Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committee – at a 
meeting in Nunn‘s office.164 Lugar remarked, 
I had been following the progress of the Russian assistance issue [the failed 
Nunn-Aspin initiative], particularly as it related to the former Soviet Union‘s 
nuclear arsenal. I sought out Sam Nunn and indicated that I wanted to work 
with him in the Senate to produce a constructive result in the short time before 
Senate adjournment (2005: 14). 
 
By this time, however, Nunn and Lugar had already been working together on a non-
proliferation project for Hamburg (Nunn 1997: xvi). At this meeting, an informal 
exchange of ideas on the security of strategic weapons in the Soviet Union took place 
(Combs 1997: 43, Lugar 2005: 14, Carter and Perry 1999: 71).  
                                                 
163 These meetings were arranged by Tom Cochran and Christopher Paine at the (U.S.) Natural Resources 
Defense Council. I am grateful to Dr. Frank von Hippel for this information (email correspondence, 28 
September 2009). 
164 As previously noted, Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner were collectively working on a Carnegie-funded 
project relating to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
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After this meeting, Nunn and Lugar organised a breakfast meeting with ―15–20 
key senators‖ featuring a briefing by Carter on the findings from the Harvard study, Soviet 
Nuclear Fission (Nunn 1997: xvi). In the meeting, it became clear that Senators Nunn and 
Lugar and their staff members, Robert Bell, Ken Myers, and Richard Combs, had also 
been working on a similar scheme for joint action. As Combs reminisced, 
The Harvard study reinforced Senator Nunn‘s conviction that it was in the 
national security interests of the United States to assist the Soviet Union, which 
appeared to be on the brink of total collapse, to secure and control its vast 
stocks of weapons of mass destruction. Senator Lugar […] was also impressed 
by Carter‘s briefing and agreed to join Senator Nunn in a concerted effort to 
revive the key parts of the abortive Nunn-Aspin legislation (1991: 44). 
 
Further, according to Interview VII,  
Nunn was searching for policy tools to address the grave concerns he had about 
the WMD consequences of the Soviet dissolution, and found several appealing 
ideas in our Soviet Nuclear Fission project. I can say with confidence that Ash 
[Carter] did not attend that meeting with Nunn with the intent of pitching any 
particular program, and Nunn‘s interest certainly accelerated the pace of our 
effort and gave it sharper focus. 
 
After the meeting concluded, Carter, Bell, Myers, and Combs stayed behind to draft the 
legislation for the ―Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991‖, the formal name of 
the Nunn-Lugar Amendment. In an interview, someone who was involved in drafting 
the CTR legislation said that the main goal was the ―need to control the nuclear, 
biological, and chemical weapons‖ (Interview XI).   
 Two days after the meeting in Senator Nunn‘s office, Nunn and Lugar convened 
a bipartisan group of 16 senators at a working breakfast (Bernstein and Wood 2010: 7). 
Lugar recalls, 
Nine Democrats and seven Republicans met on November 21 for what became 
the first drafting session of the Nunn-Lugar Amendment. Sam and I sponsored 
subsequent meetings and made press appearances in support of an amendment 
that would provide up to $500 million in assistance to the states of the former 
Soviet Union for the safeguarding and dismantlement of their weapons of mass 
destruction stockpiles. As we pressed our colleagues, the long-term merits of 
our argument and the bipartisan atmosphere began to take hold. All this 
occurred with very little participation by the Bush Administration (2005: 14). 
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At this meeting, the topic was the Soviet Union and the safety of its nuclear weapons in 
which Carter repeated his briefing of the Harvard study from the previous two days and 
warned of the potential dangers of the Soviet nuclear arsenal as the state that had 
controlled it fell apart. Carter and his team suggested that the senators examine a set of 
policy recommendations outlined in the book; notably, that joint action by the two 
former Cold War enemies was needed against the common danger of further 
proliferation. Nunn and Lugar asked the senators to support legislation that would 
authorise the Pentagon to initiate U.S.-funded assistance to stem the ―loose nukes‖ 
problem of the former Soviet arsenal (Carter and Perry 1999: 72).165 It was reported that 
the aid plan was narrowed to helping the Soviet Union store and dismantle nuclear and 
chemical weapons, and that Nunn and others argued that it would be a bargain 
investment in stability to spend up to $500 million to eliminate thousands of them at the 
source (Oberdorfer 1991: C2). As Senator Lugar remarked,  
There was a remarkable consensus [among the senators] that we needed to […] 
work to initiate emergency legislation to deal with the nuclear dangers associated 
with the disintegration of the Soviet Union‖ (1991: 15).  
 
Recalling the opposition that had plagued the doomed Aspin-Nunn initiative, the 
two senators later stated, ―Once acquainted with Carter‘s analysis, these colleagues agreed 
that U.S. domestic political hostility to Soviet aid paled in comparison to the dangers in 
question‖ (Nunn and Lugar 1995: 144). At this meeting, Nunn and Lugar gathered 
support from the senators in attendance for a $500 million proposal to provide assistance 
for the safe transport, storage, destruction, and non-proliferation of Soviet weapons of 
mass destruction (Bernstein and Wood 2010: 7). 
The very next day, Nunn and Lugar called for U.S. assistance in the 
dismantlement of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in their first joint op-ed piece in The 
                                                 
165 Aspin defined loose nukes as ―nuclear weapons that get loose in the Soviet Union either because they‘re 
taken and used as blackmail, they‘re stolen, they‘re sold on the black market, they get caught in the 
crossfire of ethnic unrest or civil war – whatever happens‖ (1991d: 141).  
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Washington Post.166 In it, they highlighted both the opportunity ―for the greatest reduction 
of weapons of mass destruction in history‖ and the danger of an ―unprecedented 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and weapons know-how‖ 
(Nunn and Lugar 1991: A25). U.S. assistance to the Soviet Union was crucial and 
imperative in their endeavour because the dismantlement of the Soviet nuclear arsenal 
would protect U.S. national security interests. They wrote,  
Cooperation with Soviet authorities on destroying nuclear and chemical 
weapons should not be postponed. The benefits of responding are too great, the 
dangers of inaction too severe. We believe Congress must act now to authorise a 
program of cooperation with the Soviet Union and its republics on the 
destruction of these weapons. [...] We do not know of any better way to help the 
people of America than reducing the potential military threat that faces our 
nation (1991: A25).  
 
Finally, they stressed that this was not foreign aid, but rather a ―prudent investment to 
reduce a grave threat‖ (Nunn and Lugar 1991: A25). 
Three days later, the Senate held a debate on this issue with floor statements 
from Senators Nunn and Lugar, and Chairman Aspin.167 When presenting the assistance 
package to the Senate, Nunn explained, 
This is major legislation. I consider this amendment that we have just sent to the 
desk a very important amendment, perhaps as […] one of the most important 
amendments in terms of our national security, indeed the security of the world, 
that has been before this body in many years. […]We are on the verge of either 
having the greatest destruction of nuclear weapons in the history of the world or 
the greatest proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and scientific 
know-how on how to make these weapons, as well as chemical weapons, 
ballistic missiles, even biological weapons the world has ever seen (1991b: 10–
11).168 
 
The Senate voted 86–8 to provide $500 million from Pentagon funds to assist 
control  and  destruction  of Soviet nuclear weapons (Oberdorfer 1991: C2). $400 million  
                                                 
166  Their joint Washington Post article was called ―Dismantling the Soviet Arsenal: We‘ve got to get 
involved,‖ which appeared in the 21 November 1991 edition. 
167 Senator Carl Levin (Democrat from Michigan) and Senator David Boren (Democrat from Oklahoma) 
also gave statements.  
168 Lugar‘s address further enhanced the national security message conveyed by Nunn, as he said, ―This is 
not foreign aid; our amendment is part of a national security package.[…] The obvious advantage of 
substantial Soviet denuclearisation is that it would eliminate a major portion of the nuclear threat to United 
States security and survival, as well as that of its allies‖ (1991: 15). 
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was authorised for the dismantling of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and 
$100 million was authorised for transporting emergency food and medical aid (Kim 1992: 
12, Tarnoff 1993: 2). As Lugar noted, ―the wide margin of the vote itself was 
indispensable to the early acceptance of the program‖ (2005: 15). The House followed 
suit the next day, and on November 26, Public Law 228, the Conventional Forces in 
Europe Treaty Implement Act amendment entitled the ―Soviet Nuclear Threat 
Reduction Act‖ of 1991 authorising $500 million in aid to the Soviet Union was 
passed. 169  Two weeks later, on December 12, Nunn-Lugar was signed into law. 170 
According to the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, the CTR Program would 
be 
Limited to cooperation among the United States, the Soviet Union, its republics, 
and any successor entities to (1) destroy nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, 
and other weapons, (2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard weapons in 
connection with their destruction, and (3) establish verifiable safeguards against 
the proliferation of such weapons (P.L. 102–228, Section 212, 1991). 
 
 
The Experts’ Key Features  
Having explained who devised the CTR Program and how the experts came together, it 
is important to reflect on their characteristics in order to ascertain to what extent the 
experts can be considered an epistemic community. It can be argued that the non-
proliferation experts behind the creation of the CTR Program comprised an epistemic 
community not only because of their authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge in 
a  particular  domain  (nuclear  weapons  proliferation),  but  also because they shared the  
                                                 
169 The act began by stating, ―The Congress finds that Soviet President Gorbachev has requested Western 
help in dismantling nuclear weapons, and (that) President Bush has proposed U.S. cooperation on the 
storage, transportation, dismantling and destruction of Soviet nuclear weapons‖ (P.L.102–228, Section 212, 
1991). 
170 President Bush signed Public Law 102–229, the Dire Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act. Title 
III incorporated the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act (Nunn Lugar legislation). Section 108 authorised 
the President to establish a programme to assist Soviet weapons destruction. It provided for the transfer of 
up to $400 million from FY1992 Department of Defense operation and maintenance funds to assist the 
transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons 
capabilities in the former Soviet Union (Shuey and Davis 1993: 10). 
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same set of normative, principled, and causal beliefs, notions of validity, and a common 
policy enterprise. It was explained in Chapter Two that these two distinguishing features 
differentiate members of an epistemic community from members of other groups often 
involved in policy coordination (Haas 1992b: 19). Members of the non-proliferation 
epistemic community‘s authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge can be seen 
through their institutional affiliations, outlined in Table 6.2 above. How they used their 
knowledge and what the exact role of knowledge and expertise in the creation of the 
CTR Program will be discussed in further detail in the next chapter.  
The shared normative and principled beliefs held by members of the epistemic 
community were that the disintegrating Soviet Union and its subsequent new nuclear-
inherited republics would need U.S. technical and financial assistance in dismantling its 
nuclear arsenal. The non-proliferation experts believed that the provision of such 
assistance far outweighed the consequences of the Soviet Union and its republics being 
left on their own. For example, as mentioned above, Aspin and Nunn‘s $1billion 
humanitarian aid bid proposed to provide technical assistance to safely transport, store, 
and dismantle Soviet nuclear (and chemical) weapons; an investment that would 
―increase American security by helping prevent further instability in the Soviet Union‖ 
(quoted in Schmitt 1991: 12). From the Soviet perspective, Mikhailov‘s presentation to 
the Senate Arms Control Observer Group, alluded to above, warned of the inadequate 
facilities and funds to store and dismantle the prospective ―loose nukes‖, stating that the 
Soviet Union needed U.S. assistance. In addition, the authors of the Harvard study 
argued that U.S. assistance could be instrumental in ensuring that the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union would not result in several new nuclear weapons states in the region 
(Campbell et al. 1991: 119–126). In their 22 November 1991 Washington Post op-ed, Nunn 
and Lugar outlined that a U.S. assistance programme towards the newly independent 
states would be a ―prudent investment [as] we face the danger of an unprecedented 
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proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and weapons know-how‖ 
(1991: A25).  
The shared causal beliefs held by the epistemic community was the idea that if the 
Soviet nuclear arsenal residing outside of Russia was not dismantled, there might be 
further nuclear proliferation, resulting in an increasingly less-secure world. The attempted 
August coup and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union raised concerns 
amongst members of the epistemic community – particularly those working on the 
Cooperative Security project (e.g., Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner) – over the command, 
control, and safety of Soviet nuclear weapons. According to Nunn, the Harvard study 
―was a timely study [...] that outlined in an analytical, scholarly format the dangers of 
nuclear command, control, and safety in an unstable Soviet Union‖ (1997: xvi–xvii). 
Furthermore, shortly after Nunn and Lugar had been briefed on the Harvard study by 
Carter in mid November 1991, in an address to the U.S. Senate, Nunn explained  
Senator Lugar and I believe that the basic premise of the amendment [the Soviet 
Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991] is that the former Soviet Union, still a 
nuclear superpower, is coming apart at the seams. The danger of proliferation of 
existing weapons, weapons materials and weapons know-how is growing as both 
the Soviet economy and traditional Soviet control mechanisms lose effectiveness. 
Soviet leaders are anxious to destroy nuclear and chemical weapons and have 
asked our help. We should act now, and this amendment will allow us to do so 
(1991b: 11).  
 
The main concern was not that these nuclear weapons might be launched (either 
against the U.S. or in a civil war), but that political fragmentation could potentially 
increase the danger of proliferation in three ways. First, the successor states might keep 
the nuclear weapons located on their territory; second, in an unstable and poor post-
Soviet commonwealth of independent states, nuclear weapons might be sold for 
currency or provided by forces to ethnic or religious compatriots abroad; and third, the 
Soviet nuclear fuel infrastructure was highly dispersed. As central authority erodes, 
―control of nuclear material, technology, and expertise becomes challenging‖ (Goldman 
1992: 9). These dangers were clearly articulated in the Harvard study and in Lugar‘s 25 
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November 1991 address to the Senate in which he stated 
All three of these dangers warrant immediate consideration of the sources of 
United States influence to achieve preferred outcomes as the Soviet Empire 
dissolves and its nuclear weapons complex devolves to the successor states. 
Nonstrategic nuclear weapons within the former Soviet Union are a source of 
major concern because of their great number and variety and because they are 
more widely dispersed among the republics than strategic weapons. Moreover, 
the system of procedural and technical safeguards that has prevented 
unauthorized seizure or use of these weapons for over 40 years offers no 
guarantees in the face of widespread social disorder of the kind on the horizon 
in the Soviet Union. Thus, removal of these weapons to central storage and 
ultimately destroying them is of critical importance (1991: 14).171 
 
Months after the Harvard study was published, Hamburg outlined the nuclear 
danger of a disintegrating Soviet Union in his testimony before the U.S. Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, in which he stated, 
With the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the unified Soviet state, the 
nuclear danger has in some ways risen and we face challenges of a largely 
unprecedented nature. [...] As republics establish their independence and their 
separate armies, they could choose to keep portions of the arsenal including 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (1992: 415).  
 
Based on the Harvard study and on the testimonies of Nunn, Lugar, and Hamburg, it 
can be argued that their causal beliefs of not dismantling the Soviet nuclear arsenal would 
lead to further proliferation and other dangers increased the U.S. interest in prompt 
cooperation with Soviet authorities on all these issues.172  
 Although members of the epistemic community did not engage in scientific tests 
per se, they shared and disseminated collective knowledge through an intensive period of 
engagement and discussions (particularly throughout November 1991, illustrated in Table 
6.3). They used this knowledge in order to ―internally define criteria for weighing and 
validating  knowledge  in  the  domain  of  their  expertise‖ (Haas 1992b: 3).  The defined  
 
 
                                                 
171 It should be noted that these dangers were also articulated by Carter‘s 13 December 1991 statement 
before the Defense Policy Panel, House Armed Services Committee in which he outlined the main findings 
from the Harvard study (Carter 1991: 243). 
172 Other dangers included the dangers of a ―brain drain‖ of nuclear scientists to radical Third World 
regimes and the threat of food shortages during the winter (Nichol 1992: 16). 
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criteria were the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and the 
prevention of further nuclear proliferation. As a former U.S. Assistant Secretary of 
Defense explained,  
We took a broad approach to denuclearising Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 
We understood it wasn‘t only a technical thing. There was a cultural 
understanding. We [the U.S.] gave the countries an alternative to nuclear 
weapons for security. 
 
In a testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Carter 
outlined the ―broad approach‖ when he said,  
The CTR Program advances U.S. security interests. First, it speeds the 
dismantling of nuclear weapons in the four NIS [Newly Independent States] 
where they remain. It provides leverage to encourage these countries‘ decisions 
to dismantle and also speeds the actual process by providing assistance 
necessary to implement those decisions. […] Second, the CTR Program 
decreases the danger of the nuclear warheads and fissile material that remain in 
the NIS and represent a potential threat to the U.S. Third, […] the CTR 
Program decreased the long-term nuclear threat by reducing the capacity and 
economic pressures in the NIS to continue to produce weapons of mass 
destruction (1994: 2–3) 
 
Finally, the common policy enterprise was two-fold. First, it entailed the 
denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, and, second, it envisioned the 
prevention of further nuclear weapons proliferation. According to Interview XVI, 
Russia [and the U.S.] would not tolerate the three nuclear republics having 
control of the nuclear weapons. Getting the three to realise this was crucial and 
a key component to success. It was done through visiting, official diplomacy, 
declarations, and discussions between [the U.S.] and Ukraine, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan. These countries came to accept that they would be relocating the 
nuclear weapons back to Russia, and came to accept their NPT status [as non-
nuclear weapons states].  
 
In addition, Interview XII remarked, 
Both Russia and the U.S. were concerned about the three new nuclear weapon 
states for non-proliferation reasons. Both wanted to implement the START 
Treaty. Russia wanted to consolidate these weapons. They did not want Belarus, 
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan to have the nuclear weapon status. 
 
As Interview XVII concluded, ―CTR created a situation where the countries could agree 
to the denuclearising‖. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
Based on the above, it can be argued that the uncertainty surrounding both the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and the unknown fate of the command and control of 
the 27,000 Soviet nuclear weapons encouraged the emergence of an epistemic 
community. After the failed August 1991 coup, the likelihood of the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union became more prominent and the threat of more nuclear weapon states 
became more real. Consequently, American and Soviet/Russian experts from both 
within and outside of government began to worry about the prospect of the ―loose 
nukes‖ scattered around the former Soviet Union. Collectively, they agreed that 
providing U.S. technical and financial assistance to the former Soviet Union and its 
successor states in dismantling its nuclear arsenal was tantamount in curtailing nuclear 
proliferation. As will be discussed in the next chapter, these experts used their knowledge 
and expertise in the issue of nuclear non-proliferation and their ties to decision makers to 
influence Congress to pass an assistance programme to Russia and the new independent 
nuclear states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Once Congress passed this legislation 
– the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 (the original CTR Program legislation) 
– in December 1991, $400 million was allocated from the Department of Defense‘s 
budget to execute the safe and secure dismantling of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure. 
Over the next five years, the CTR Program legislation facilitated the denuclearisation of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Seven 
 
Examining the Influence of the American and Soviet/Russian Epistemic 
Community in the Creation of the CTR Program: The Importance of the  
CTR Program in the Denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine  
 
―We [the U.S.] face a period of uncertainty as Russia and other republics 
sort out possession of the weapons, and establish new structures and 
procedures for controlling and operating them. Another sobering thought: 
none of the governments of these new nuclear powers is yet bound by 
commitments made by the old Soviet Union.‖  
 
Robert M. Gates, former C.I.A. Director (1991: 180)173 
In this chapter, the process of how American and Soviet/Russian non-proliferation 
experts created the CTR Program and were able to influence its subsequent 
implementation as policy is analysed. In addition, the importance of the CTR Program in 
relation to the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine is discussed. As 
explained in the previous chapter, members of the epistemic community comprised a 
network of American and Soviet/Russian representatives from government bodies, 
academia, a funding corporation, and research institutes/think tanks. During a five 
month period (August–December 1991), these experts, aware that the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union would create an unprecedented international security threat, worked 
tirelessly to gain the attention of U.S. decision makers. Their efforts culminated in the 
passage of legislation that would enable the U.S. to provide financial and technical 
assistance to the new independent states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Over the 
months, the epistemic community stressed the importance of offering an assistance 
programme, which would facilitate the denuclearisation of the three states. The epistemic 
community‘s proposals were adopted and implemented by the U.S., culminating in the 
establishment of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991 – the original 
legislation behind the CTR Program – in December 1991. Once Congress passed the 
                                                 
173  Statement before the House Armed Services Committee, Defense Policy Panel, ―Hearing on the 
Situation in the Soviet Union‖, December 10, 1991. 
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CTR bill, $400 million was allocated from the Department of Defense‘s FY 1992 budget 
to begin the safe and secure dismantling of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure. Every year 
since then, new funds for each fiscal year were authorised for the continuation of the 
CTR Program. Between FY 1992 and FY 1996, Congress authorised almost $2.1 billion 
for the CTR Program (Ellis 2001: 29).174  
It is important to note that three months before the CTR Program was signed 
into law, the U.S. Congress refused to pass a $1billion humanitarian aid to the Soviet 
Union, proposed by Representative Les Aspin (D-WI) and Senator Sam Nunn (D-
GA).175 Described as a ―give away‖ and as ―foreign aid‖ for Russia, House and Senate 
Republicans opposed the initiative, forcing Nunn and Aspin to scrap their proposal. This 
begs the following question: how was Congress influenced to pass the Nunn-Lugar 
legislation in December 1991 three months after it strongly criticised Aspin‘s initial 
humanitarian aid package? I argue that an epistemic community, which emerged during 
the uncertainty surrounding the break-up of the Soviet Union, was able to persuade 
Congress that securing former Soviet nuclear weapons was in the U.S. national security 
interest, and indeed in the interest of international security and, as such, an assistance 
programme was necessary. Members of the epistemic community believed that the 
uncertainty over Soviet nuclear command and control and the threat of further 
proliferation had to be controlled through U.S. assistance.  
As newly nuclear-inherited states, it was not entirely clear what Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine planned to do with their inherited nuclear weapons, adding to 
                                                 
174 Ellis notes that of this $2.1 billion figure, Congress chose not to renew almost $330 million in transfer 
authority that expired at the end of FY 1994, and rescinded $20 million in FY 1995 funds (2001: 42, 
footnote 10).  
175 As explained in the previous chapter, the $1 billion proposed bill would provide emergency assistance to 
the Soviet Union, including food, medical aid, and technical assistance to safely transport, store, and 
dismantle its nuclear and chemical weapons. It also intended to provide assistance for conversion of Soviet 
military industries into civilian projects, environmental cleanup of sites contaminated by decades of Soviet 
weapons development, and occupational retraining and housing for decommissioned Soviet Strategic 
Rocket Forces officers (Schmitt 1991: 12, Hoagland 1991: A21, Lancaster 1991: A1, Lugar 2005: 13, 
Combs 1997: 42). 
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the uncertainty. Therefore, having an assistance programme in place to offer the three 
newly independent states financial and technical support was important. It can be argued 
that a newly created assistance programme – CTR – facilitated the denuclearisation of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine through four key dynamics. First, it played a role in 
adapting the pre-existing START Treaty. Second, it assisted in the creation of the Lisbon 
Protocol and the Trilateral Agreement.176 Third, it facilitated Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine‘s decision to ratify the NPT between 1993 and 1994. Fourth, it assisted the 
removal of all Soviet nuclear warheads from the three states in 1995–1996.177 Since this 
thesis stresses the importance of the CTR Program in the denuclearisation of the three 
states, this chapter first examines how the CTR Program came into existence and second, 
explores how the epistemic community influenced U.S. national decision makers to 
implement the CTR Program as policy. 
The chapter is structured in three parts. The first section examines the role of the 
American-Soviet/Russian epistemic community in the creation of the CTR Program. 
The second section analyses why the CTR Program was important in the 
denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine based on the four distinct 
dynamics highlighted above. The chapter concludes with a discussion on recounting the 
importance of applying the epistemic community framework to the creation of the CTR 
Program.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
176 The Lisbon Protocol was a follow-up to the START Treaty in which Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine 
pledged to become non-nuclear weapons states. Formerly known as the Protocol to the Treaty between the 
U.S.A. and the USSR on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, it was concluded on 
May 23, 1992.  The Trilateral Agreement was signed between the Presidents of the U.S., Russia, and 
Ukraine (Bill Clinton, Boris Yeltsin, and Leonid Kravchuck) in Moscow on 14 January 1994 in which 
Ukraine promised to eliminate all nuclear weapons in exchange for compensation and security guarantees. 
177 It should be noted that there were other CTR Program accomplishments, which are still in existence 
today, including helping improve fissile material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) procedures 
and technologies, and lab-to-lab exchanges. 
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7.1 How did an American-Soviet/Russian Epistemic Community Facilitate the 
Creation of the CTR Program and Influence its Implementation? 
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, many scholars and policy analysts agree that the 
most important achievement of the CTR Program was the denuclearisation of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (Woolf 1996, Combs 1997, Duffy 1997, Gottemoeller 1997, 
Orlov 1997, Potter & Shields 1997, Lugar 1999; 2001, Ellis 2001, Newman 2001, 
Daughtry 2004, National Academies 2004). This is because it provided technical and 
financial assistance – both of which were needed and requested from the three new 
nuclear republics. In this section, I examine how – notably through the role of 
knowledge and expertise and having access to decision makers – the American-
Soviet/Russian epistemic community facilitated the creation of the CTR Program and its 
subsequent implementation as policy.  
As discussed in Chapter Two, the epistemic community framework has been 
used to empirically study the role and impact of ideas in International Relations in 
relation to the creation of new international policies (Haas 1992a). Adler and Haas argue 
that an epistemic community influences state decisions through the following four 
processes: policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy selection, and policy persistence 
(Adler and Haas: 375–387). Based on my understanding and research on the creation of 
the CTR Program and in using Adler and Haas‘ four influencing processes, Figure 7.1 
puts forth one possible model illustrating how the American-Soviet/Russian epistemic 
community influenced U.S. state decision makers to implement the CTR Program as 
policy.  
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Figure 7.1: 
The Evolution of the CTR Program via the Epistemic Community 
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During the first stage, policy innovation (marked by 1 in Figure 7.1), members of 
the American-Soviet/Russian epistemic community used the issues of international 
security and the threat of further nuclear weapons proliferation to frame the CTR 
Program. During the second stage, policy diffusion (marked by 2 in Figure 7.1), members 
of the epistemic community participated in periodic meetings where they engaged in a 
mutual exchange of information, regular scientific and technical consultative exchanges, 
and participated in discussions surrounding the nature of the technical and financial 
assistance programme. During the third stage, policy selection (marked by 3 in Figure 
7.1), the roles of David Hamburg and Senators Nunn and Lugar were especially 
important since Hamburg connected the senators to the non-governmental experts (e.g., 
Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner), and the senators – having heard from the Soviet/Russian 
experts – presented the experts‘ proposals to the U.S. Congress. After the U.S. Congress 
passed the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, policy persistence, the final 
stage (marked by 4 in Figure 7.1), was marked by the subsequent implementation of the 
CTR Program. These influence mechanisms were facilitated by members of the epistemic 
community‘s knowledge and access to decision makers, which will be considered in turn 
below. 
 
a) The Role of Knowledge and Expertise 
The role of knowledge and expertise was arguably a crucial factor in the creation of the 
CTR Program. Members of the epistemic community used their authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge to frame the policy in terms of national security. Their 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge can be ascertained by their institutional 
affiliations and work experience. Dr. Les Aspin (D–WI), a member of the U.S. House of 
Representatives since 1971 and Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services 
from 1985–1993, was widely recognised as a leading authority in defence issues. Senator 
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Sam Nunn (D–GA), a member of the U.S. House of Representatives since 1968 and 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee from 1986–1995, had for decades 
been preoccupied with non-proliferation issues, especially regarding issues relating to 
managing nuclear risks.178 Similar to Nunn, Senator Richard Lugar (R–IN), was deeply 
engaged in international security and non-proliferation issues and concerned about 
developments in the Soviet Union. Widely respected in the foreign policy arena, Lugar 
was a senior Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Chairman between 
1985 and 1987), and therefore in a position to provide bipartisan leadership on the 
question of providing financial assistance to Moscow (Bernstein and Wood 1991: 6). Dr. 
Ashton B. Carter was a former Director of the Center for Science and International 
Affairs at Harvard‘s Kennedy School of Government and from 1991–1993, served as a 
member of the Defense Science Board (established in 1956), a committee of civilian 
experts appointed to advise the U.S. Department of Defense on scientific and technical 
matters. During the autumn of 1991, he was leading a research team at Harvard that were 
analysing the control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal in a disintegrating Soviet Union. Dr. 
William J. Perry was co-Director of the ―Preventive Defense Project‖ at Stanford‘s 
Center for International Security and Cooperation, who during the autumn of 1991 was 
leading a research team that were analysing the giant military-industrial complex of the 
Soviet Union (Carter and Perry 1999). The Harvard and Stanford projects were parallel 
to another project being run at the Brookings Institution under the directorship of Dr. 
John D. Steinbruner, a renowned foreign policy analyst and academic who was Director 
of the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings Institution from 1978–1996. 
These projects were on a broader agenda they called ―Cooperative Security‖ which were 
funded by Dr. David A. Hamburg, President of the Carnegie Corporation of New York 
                                                 
178 Bernstein and Wood (2010: 2) note that Nunn‘s discovery in the early 1970s of serious deficiencies in 
the security of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons based in Europe was a ―formative experience that left him 
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between 1983 and 1997, a renowned physician and scientist. Deputy Minister of Atomic 
Energy and Industry Dr. Viktor Mikhailov, a full member of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences, was a former director of the Institute of Strategic Stability of the Russian 
Federal Agency for Nuclear Power, and an expert advisor of the Russian Federal Nuclear 
Centre at the Research Institute of Experimental Physics. Gorbachev emissary and senior 
advisor Aleksandr N. Yakovlev, a Soviet politician and historian and member of the 
Politburo and Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was widely 
considered to be the intellectual force behind Gorbachev‘s reform programme of glasnost 
and perestroika (Myers 2005: B8, Steele 2005: 33). Dr. Andrey A. Kokoshin and Dr. Sergey 
M. Rogov both held senior positions in the Russian Academy of Sciences‘ Institute for 
the U.S.A. and Canadian Studies, a well-respected think tank/research institute in 
Moscow. 
 As explained in the previous chapter, soon after the failed August 1991 coup, 
Aspin (1991a) proposed a U.S. humanitarian assistance programme for the Soviet Union 
to provide food and medicine for the Soviet people for the coming winter in order to 
prevent chaos in the Soviet Union. Such chaos, he said, could 
Create a new kind of nuclear danger. Civil war in a country with 30,000 nuclear 
weapons is too grim a prospect to contemplate. And there are the additional 
possibilities of seizure of weapons by terrorists or sale of weapons on a nuclear 
black market (1991a: 2). 
 
He acknowledged, that given the uncertainties, it was,  
A whole different kind of threat […] a threat of the United States being 
obliterated by large numbers of Soviet weapons. What we‘re talking about now 
is Soviet weapons falling into hands of people who might use them as blackmail, 
who might use them as part of an attempt to establish independence for one 
republic or another (1991b: 10).179 
                                                                                                                                            
thoroughly shaken and committed to critically examining the safeguards that had – and had not – been in 
place to reduce the risks attending the deployment by both sides of many thousands of nuclear weapons‖. 
179 A few months later, Aspin explained that his assistance programme was not foreign aid, but defence 
spending. In a speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on 16 December 1991, he said, ―We 
continued to make the argument that this was not foreign aid; it was hard-headed, self-interested defense 
spending. Helping a hungry person is a good thing to do, but helping a hungry person who has a nuclear 
weapon is also in our national security interest‖ (1991e: 256). 
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Joining forces with Senator Nunn, Aspin proposed spending $1 billion to provide 
emergency assistance to the Soviet Union. In a Washington Post op-ed, Nunn (1991a) 
encouraged the U.S to help the Soviet Union and the republics dismantle their military-
industrial complex through a variety of programmes as a way in which to enhance U.S. 
national security. He concluded, 
This is not the time to issue blank checks; it is time for a helping hand. Any U.S. 
assistance to the peoples of the former Soviet Union, including humanitarian aid, 
should be carefully conceived and executed to improve their lives, to foster 
democracy and a market system and to reduce the threat to our security (1991a: 
C7). 
 
In defence of their proposal, Nunn argued, 
Today we have an opportunity to invest wisely in a modest program that could 
produce dramatic dividends. […] We also have the option of sitting on our 
hands and doing nothing, in the full knowledge that by doing so we will greatly 
magnify the threats against which future U.S. defense budgets and defense 
postures will have to respond for years to come‖ (quoted in Dewar 1991: A18).  
 
However, this initiative was strongly criticised ―from both left – we have our own 
homeless problem – and right – why should we help the Commies?‖ (Interview VII), 
forcing Aspin and Nunn to scrap their proposal. 
 At the same time however, the ―Cooperative Security‖ Project  was researching 
how to improve the security of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. The Harvard study concluded 
that the U.S., and indeed the rest of the world, were faced with three dangers in relation 
to the command and control of the disintegrating Soviet nuclear arsenal. It argued, 
[The control of the nuclear weapons being dispersed in whole or in part] would 
create the danger that the ultimate disposition of the Soviet arsenal among those 
structures will lack elements that have been necessary to assure its safe custody 
and international nuclear stability (ii; 35–47). 
 
Nuclear weapons, components of nuclear weapons, or intimate knowledge 
about nuclear weapons will fall into unauthorised hands through desertion or 
mutiny of military custodians, seizure by political groups or terrorists, sale, or 
smuggling (ii; 36–40). 
 
As nations and terrorist groups outside the Soviet Union seek to obtain nuclear 
weapons, fissionable material, or difficult-to-obtain weapon components from a 
chaotic Soviet weapons complex through theft or sale, or as weapons scientists 
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from the Soviet Union sell their knowledge to nations like Libya, North Korea, 
or Iran (ii–iii; 41–42). 
 
As shown in Chapter Six, the Harvard study and the wider ―Cooperative 
Security‖ Project was brought to the attention of Senators Nunn and Lugar. The study 
provided the ―knowledge‖ of the issue at hand and lent empirical and analytical weight to 
the argument Nunn (and to some extent Aspin) had been making earlier. Further, it 
validated the urgency Nunn attached to the need to adapt policy to confront the security 
dangers that political turmoil in the Soviet Union posed (Bernstein and Wood 2010: 6). 
The report provided substantial background information on the entire Soviet nuclear 
weapons enterprise, including the nuclear command and control system. As the authors 
noted,  
Dangers of the illicit diversion of key weapon-related technology do not end 
with the non-strategic and strategic deployments alone but extend to fissionable 
materials, components, delivery systems, and command and control systems 
(Campbell et al. 1991: iii). 
 
The point they made was clear; that the nuclear security and proliferation risks 
emanating from the disintegrating Soviet Union was complex. The challenge did not only 
involve the ―loose nukes‖ but also the safe protection of Soviet (and post-Soviet) nuclear 
weapons during a period of political transition. As Nunn remarked,  
This was a timely study, supported by the Carnegie Corporation, that outlined in 
an analytical, scholarly format the dangers of nuclear command, control, and 
safety in an unstable Soviet Union (1997: xvi–xvii).   
 
In addition, Senators Nunn and Lugar heard from the Soviet visitors to 
Washington (Mikhailov, Kokoshin, Rogov, and Yakovlev) that the Soviet Union needed 
U.S. assistance in safely securing and dismantling the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Through 
their knowledge and expertise, these experts reinforced the national security frame by 
shifting the discourse from humanitarian aid (initially proposed by Aspin and Nunn) to a 
national security imperative. Using the proposals suggested by the epistemic community, 
Senator Nunn explained to the U.S. Senate, 
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This is major legislation. I consider this amendment that we have just sent to the 
desk a very important amendment, perhaps as […] one of the most important 
amendments in terms of our national security, indeed the security of the world, 
that has been before this body in many years. 
 
We are on the verge of either having the greatest destruction of nuclear weapons 
in the history of the world or the greatest proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
nuclear materials, and scientific know-how on how to make these weapons, as 
well as chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, even biological weapons the world 
has ever seen. 
 
This legislation embodies a new approach to enhancing our national security.[…] 
I cannot think of a better way to help the American people than reducing the 
potential military threat that we will have to face in the years ahead – not just in 
the former Soviet Union but potentially around the world (1991b: 10–11; 13).  
  
Lugar‘s address further enhanced the national security message conveyed by Nunn, as he 
said, 
This is not foreign aid; our amendment is part of a national security package. 
 
The obvious advantage of substantial Soviet denuclearisation is that it would 
eliminate a major portion of the nuclear threat to United States security and 
survival, as well as that of its allies (1991: 15). 
 
Based on the above, it can be inferred that the failed Aspin-Nunn initiative, the 
―Cooperative Security‖ Project – particularly the Harvard study – and the Soviet visitors 
to Washington D.C., contributed to the creation of The Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction 
Act of 1991. Although the initial assistance programme proposed by Aspin and Nunn 
focused on humanitarian aid, the ―Cooperative Security‖ Project and the Soviet visitors 
to Washington D.C. asking for U.S. assistance, provided and reinforced the national 
security frame, thereby shifting the discourse from humanitarian aid to a national security 
imperative. The policy innovation, denoted by (1) in Figure 7.1., was the idea of 
providing technical and financial assistance to the former Soviet Union states to 
dismantle their inherited nuclear weapons. By framing the issues of preventing 
proliferation and assisting in the denuclearisation of the three new republics within the 
U.S. national security interest (and the implied interest of the entire international 
community), members of the epistemic community contributed to policy innovation. 
Aspin‘s original aid package was immediately denounced as ―foreign aid‖ in spite of his 
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claims that this package was ―defence by other means‖. Nunn and Lugar, in their op-ed 
and in their addresses to the Senate, clearly enunciated that offering assistance to the 
Soviet Union was not charity, but in the U.S. national security interest. By framing the 
issues in the (U.S./international) security interest, members of the epistemic community 
successfully guided decision makers by clarifying the issue of the command and control 
of the Soviet nuclear infrastructure and resolving the international security problem of 
further nuclear weapons proliferation.  
In addition, it can be argued that the experts behind the creation of the CTR 
Program used their policy relevant knowledge in the area of nuclear weapons 
proliferation in order to effectively frame the issue of securing former Soviet nuclear 
weapons in the U.S. national security interest. As two interviewees argued, the ―Nunn-
Lugar idea came from academics‖, and that ―non-governmental thinking undergirded the 
thought process of CTR‖ (Interviews I and V). Through the Harvard study, the overall 
―Cooperative Security‖ project, and Nunn and Lugar‘s extensive engagement with the 
issue, Aspin‘s failed ―broader humanitarian effort was morphed to a narrower national 
security initiative‖ (Interview VII). Moreover, it can be argued that the experts‘ 
knowledge was diffused, particularly through communication and publications: in 
addition to the Soviet visitors to Washington, the Harvard study, Nunn and Lugar‘s op-
eds, the ―Cooperative Security‖ Project, the November 1991 meetings convened by 
Nunn and Lugar (discussed in the previous chapter), the uncertainty over the command, 
control, and safety of Soviet nuclear weapons was the policy being diffused.  
It should be noted that there was greater diffusion activity in the U.S. than in the 
Soviet Union. Although the experts behind the creation of the CTR Program were 
mainly from the U.S. and diffusion mainly took place within the U.S., the Soviet/Russian 
component cannot be overlooked. Four of the 11 epistemic community members were 
Soviets/Russians (Kokoshin, Mikhailov, Rogov, and Yakovlev). Their visits to 
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Washington in October/November 1991 asking the U.S. for technical assistance played a 
part in the diffusion process, denoted by (2) in Figure 7.1.  It is quite possible that there 
was not as much engagement on the issue in the Soviet Union as there was in the U.S. 
because the Soviets were more concerned with the dissolution of their ―Empire‖. 
According to Vladimir A. Orlov, Director of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR 
Center), the CTR issue had never been debated publicly in Russia. Furthermore,  
No press release on the CTR Program has ever been published and distributed 
to the central media by Russian authorities. The only place in Moscow where 
interested journalists can find adequate information about CTR Program 
implementation is the U.S. Embassy, and only one newspaper, Kommersant Daily, 
provides more or less regular information about CTR developments. […] With a 
few exceptions, Russian NGOs and research centers generally have paid little 
attention in their research programs to CTR implementation in Russia (1997: 87; 
99).  
 
 
b) Access to Decision Makers 
The second important stage of the epistemic community‘s influence was marked by the 
non-proliferation experts‘ access to decision makers. According to Interview VII, 
Without the ready availability of the project‘s [Soviet Nuclear Fission] early findings 
and analytical support, Congress may not have had the content with which to fill 
its legislative response to a very real and dangerous problem, but without the 
wisdom and legislative skill of Nunn, Lugar, Aspin and others, we at CSIA 
[Harvard Center for Science and International Affairs] would certainly never 
have been bring our ideas into law or policy. And of course, without a platform 
of established prior relationships among the principal actors, these two elements 
may never have connected at all. 
 
After publishing the Harvard study, Carter remarked, ―We had the study but not 
yet the audience of people in power who shared our concern‖ (2005: 1). At that stage, 
the academics did not have direct access to government officials. The ―prior 
relationships‖ mentioned by Interview VII (a former Special Coordinator for 
Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of Defense) above therefore serve 
as a very important aspect in understanding the successful creation of the CTR Program. 
David Hamburg‘s role within the epistemic community as the key ―connector‖ was 
instrumental, as he provided access for the academics and analysts to government 
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officials. He introduced the non-governmental experts (Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner) to 
both Senators Nunn and Lugar at a pivotal meeting in mid November (discussed in the 
previous chapter), thereby granting the experts access to government officials and fusing 
knowledge with policy.  
Interviewees remarked on the importance of Hamburg in facilitating the CTR 
Program. Interview XVI described him as the ―principal instigator‖ of the meeting.  
According to Interview VII, ―This meeting connected Nunn and Lugar to Carter, Perry, 
and Steinbruner to brief Nunn and Lugar on ―Cooperative Security‖, a book that was 
being written by Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner‖. As Carter and Perry wrote in their 
memoirs of the birth of the Nunn-Lugar Program, 
Hamburg had a knack for bringing the right people together at the right time to 
work on the right problems, stimulating common thoughts and common action. 
Through the Carnegie Corporation of New York, a foundation devoted to peace 
and education, Hamburg and his associate Jane Wales had for many years 
supported exchanges and discussions between Soviet and American scholars 
and officials, even through the darkest days of the Cold War. We had 
participated in many Carnegie-sponsored meetings and had frequently met with 
Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar through these meetings (1999: 71). 
 
Furthermore, another interviewee stressed that Hamburg‘s ―personal 
relationships‖ and ―trust‖ were very important in connecting the non-governmental 
experts to Senators Nunn and Lugar (Interview XXV). It should be noted that the 
personal relationships were not only limited to the U.S. experts. Senators Nunn and 
Lugar had equally formed personal relationships with Soviet experts (both governmental 
and non-governmental) over the years. This can be seen from the Soviet visitors‘ trips to 
Washington (at meetings where Nunn and Lugar were present, discussed in the previous 
chapter) and from following statements from Nunn and Lugar: 
I also have had enough conversations with a number of people in the Soviet 
Union coming from different aspects and a number of people in the Russian 
Republic, including democratic reformers (Nunn 1991b: 23). 
 
As the Soviet Union began to break apart in 1991, mutual acquaintances on the 
Russian side, including some from the military, came to former Senator Sam 
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Nunn of Georgia and me and pointed out the dangers of the dissolution of a 
nuclear superpower (Lugar 1999: 52).180 
 
On 25 November 1991, Nunn and Lugar presented the assistance package to the 
Senate, using the expert advice offered from members of the epistemic community 
during the previous policy framing and innovation stages. The Senate voted 86–8 in 
favour of the bill and the next day, the House followed suit, authorising $500 million in 
aid to the Soviet Union. With the passing of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 
1991 by Congress, denoted by (4) in Figure 7.1., this act  was subsequently signed into 
law by President George H. W. Bush on December 12, 1991, and over the following 
years came to be known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which is still in 
existence today.181 
Based on the above, it can therefore be argued that the roles of David Hamburg 
and Senators Nunn and Lugar were especially important in policy selection, denoted by 
(3) in Figure 7.1. As explained in Chapter Two, the extent of an epistemic community‘s 
role in policy selection involves two factors: decision makers‘ unfamiliarity with policy 
issues and the timing of policy choice (Adler and Haas 1992: 381–383). In the case of the 
initial December 1991 CTR legislation, U.S. decision makers did not solicit advice from 
an epistemic community, but instead, the epistemic community, using their expertise in 
nuclear (non) proliferation, offered their suggestions in order to assist the newly 
independent states with the elimination or reduction of the nuclear weapons. The second 
factor in assessing an epistemic community‘s role in policy selection involves timing 
                                                 
180  It should also be noted that by the 1970s/1980s, the U.S.-Soviet relationship had evolved into a 
―special‖ relationship as nuclear superpowers. In the 1970s and 1980s, the two superpowers implemented 
many major bilateral and unilateral arms reduction treaties and agreements. These included the 1972 and 
1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I and II), the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) the 
1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Treaty (INF), the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces Treaty in Europe 
(CFE), and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction (START) Treaty.  
181 Please note the other accomplishments of the CTR Program have not been included in this analysis, due 
to this thesis‘ main research agenda of exploring the role of epistemic communities in creating cooperative 
nuclear non-proliferation agreements. Some of these accomplishments include: helping improve fissile 
material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) procedures and technologies, and lab-to-lab 
exchanges. 
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(Adler and Haas 1992: 383). It may be easier for decision makers to accept ideas and 
advice from epistemic communities after political, military, or economic conditions have 
changed (Adler and Haas 1992: 383). In the case of the CTR Program epistemic 
community, timing was important, especially the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The 
impending collapse of the Soviet Union prompted fears over the command and control 
of 27,000 Soviet ―loose nukes‖ amongst the members of the epistemic community. 
While the U.S. government did not initially solicit advice from the epistemic community, 
it is clear that the dissolution of the Soviet Union prompted government decision makers 
to take action. Soon after the August 1991 attempted coup while the Soviet Union was 
still in existence (albeit beginning to collapse), Aspin and Nunn‘s humanitarian aid 
proposal was immediately rejected. Yet, by December 1991, the Soviet Union had 
dissolved, prompting government decision makers to accept the epistemic community‘s 
proposals and implement a technical and financial assistance programme to the three 
new nuclear independent states. 
 
7.2 The Importance of the CTR Program in the Denuclearisation of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine 
 
Having analysed how the CTR Program came into existence, it is important to reflect on 
how it facilitated the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Initially, all 
three states had indicated that they wanted their inherited Soviet nuclear weapons 
removed, yet by late December 1991/Spring 1992, their position towards their inherited 
nuclear weapons changed. While Kazakhstan and Ukraine insisted on wanting to 
maintain the nuclear weapons, Belarus was the least contradictory since it had 
consistently maintained its desire to be nuclear weapon free.182 The CTR Program was 
therefore  able  to provide both a financial incentive and technical assistance for the three  
                                                 
182 This was mostly due to the April 1986 Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident (discussed below). 
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new republics to denuclearise. In addition, it prompted the signature of ―umbrella‖ 
agreements with the new republics, facilitated the creation of the Lisbon Protocol and 
the Trilateral Agreement, and played a part in each country‘s decision to ratify the NPT, 
culminating in their denuclearisation (illustrated in Table 7.1). 183 According to Gloria 
Duffy, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and Special Coordinator for CTR,  
CTR played a unique role in opening up communication and establishing a base 
for the relationship between the U.S. and the countries of the former Soviet 
Union. In the cases of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the Nunn-Lugar 
program negotiations and discussions were essentially the first in-depth direct 
channel of communication begun between these governments and Washington 
(1997: 26). 
 
 
Table 7.1:  
The CTR Program’s Accomplishments 
 
 
Umbrella Agreements: 
 
17 June 1992: U.S. & Russia 
22 October 1992: U.S. & Belarus 
25 October 1993: U.S. & Ukraine 
13 December 1993: U.S. & Kazakhstan 
 
 
Lisbon Protocol/START I: 
 
 
23 March 1992: Lisbon Protocol 
2 July 1992: Kazakhstan ratifies START I 
1 October 1992: U.S. ratifies START I 
4 November 1992: Russia ratifies START I 
4 February 1993: Belarus ratifies START I 
5 December 1994: Ukraine ratifies START I 
 
 
NPT Accession: 
 
 
22 July 1993: Belarus 
14 February 1994: Kazakhstan 
5 December 1994: Ukraine 
 
 
Removal of all nuclear weapons: 
 
 
24 April 1995: Kazakhstan 
1 June 1996: Ukraine 
27 November 1996: Belarus 
 
 
                                                 
183 Before each implementing CTR agreement could come into effect, ―umbrella‖ agreements had to be 
signed with each prospective recipient country. Ellis explains that ―the legal framework established by the 
umbrella agreements provided protection from customs fees, taxes, liabilities for the U.S. government, 
employees, contracting personnel, and so forth‖ (2001: 138, footnote 47). 
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Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine’s Position on Nuclear Weapons 
As explained earlier, as new independent nuclear successor states, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine were not bound by pre-existing Soviet arms control agreements that 
committed the Soviet Union to    unilaterally    reduce   its    nuclear    weapons   arsenal 
(e.g., the NPT and START I). Therefore, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were not 
under any legal obligation to renounce their nuclear weapons. In addition, as stated 
above, it was not entirely clear what Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine had each planned 
to do with their inherited nuclear weapons. On the one hand, they insisted on owning 
the nuclear weapons and, on the other hand, they insisted on wanting to become nuclear 
weapon-free.  
Initially, all three states had indicated that they wanted their inherited Soviet 
nuclear weapons removed in order to establish themselves as nuclear-weapons-free states 
(Miko and Goldman 1992: 8). Yet, by December 1991/Spring 1992, their position 
towards their inherited nuclear weapons changed. Russian President Boris Yeltsin 
announced on 16 December 1991 that control over the Soviet nuclear arsenal would be 
in the hands of the four nuclear republics and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief 
(quoted in Kim 1992: 15); Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev said on 17 December 
1991 that Kazakhstan would not  give up  all its  nuclear weapons if Russia maintained its 
nuclear weapons (quoted in Kim 1992: 15–16); and Serhiy Holovaty, a member of the 
Ukrainian parliament‘s commission for foreign affairs said on 7 January 1992, ―We would 
never give up the nuclear weapons now‖ (quoted in Skootsky 1995: 68). Such 
contradictory statements – discussed in greater detail below – did not reassure the 
international community‘s increasing anxieties regarding further nuclear proliferation.   
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a) Belarus 
Out of the three new nuclear republics, Belarus‘s position on nuclear weapons remained 
unchanged. It was the most motivated and consistent in wanting to eliminate its inherited 
nuclear weapons. In July 1990, the Belarusian Supreme Soviet adopted a declaration 
which established that Belarus would be a nuclear-free state (Reiss 1995: 129). Belarus‘ 
main objections to nuclear weapons stemmed from the April 1986 Chernobyl nuclear 
reactor accident, in which large parts of Belarus were badly contaminated with various 
levels of radioactivity (Interview XIV). In fact, at a meeting in Minsk, on 18 December 
1991, Belarusian President Stanislau Shushkevich told U.S. Secretary of State James 
Baker that the Belarusian public, having experienced the trauma of Chernobyl, ―it was 
essential to get all nuclear weapons off Belarus territory‖ (Baker 1995: 582).  
In addition, from a national security perspective, Belarusian leaders believed that 
the presence of nuclear weapons on their territory would invite nuclear attacks against 
their country if a war erupted in the region (Reiss 1995: 135). In fact, no one in a senior 
policymaking position advocated maintaining the nuclear weapons (Reiss 1995: 138). 
Further, President Shushkevich asked Baker for U.S. expertise in disabling and 
dismantling the nuclear weapons within Belarus (Baker 1995: 582). 
b) Kazakhstan 
Unlike Belarus, who was consistent in its desire to be a non-nuclear weapon state, 
Kazakhstan went backwards and forwards on the issue. On the one hand, it maintained 
its desire to become a non-nuclear weapon state, and on the other hand, it wanted to be 
considered a ―temporary‖ nuclear weapon state. In the words of a political commentator 
who followed Kazakhstani politics closely, ―Kazakhstan had never been a nuclear 
republic. It was merely a testing site‖ (Ustiugov 1993: 34). From 1949–1989, 466 nuclear 
explosions occurred at a site in Kazakhstan, near the city of Semipalatinsk. Of these 466 
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explosions, 26 were above ground, 90 were atmospheric, and 350 were underground 
(Kianitsa 1993: 37). 184  As a result of 40 years of nuclear testing, among the area‘s 
inhabitants, leukaemia became widespread and babies were born with neurological and 
physical defects (Conway 1994: 166). In light of Semipalatinsk‘s legacy, it was not 
surprising to hear Nursultan Nazarbayev – who would later become president of the 
independent republic of Kazakhstan – publicly voicing his opposition to the tests in 1989 
when he became First Secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party (Kianitsa 1993: 38). 
Two years later, as president of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev closed the site and demanded 
compensation for health problems caused by the nuclear testing (Copley 1994: 614). On 
17 December 1991, during U.S. Secretary of State Baker‘s visit to the country‘s capital, 
Alma Ata, Nazarbayev told Baker,  
If the international community recognises and accepts Kazakhstan, we will 
declare ourselves a non-nuclear state. This is the best way that our territorial 
integrity will be assured. That‘s what we require (quoted in Baker 1995: 581). 
 
What were surprising, however, were Alma Ata‘s subsequent announcements on 
nuclear weapons because by spring 1992, Nazarbayev‘s position appeared to have shift. 
He told a delegation from the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe that 
Kazakhstan ought to be considered a ―temporarily nuclear state‖ (quoted in Ustiugov 
1993: 35). The reasons why Kazakhstan wanted to initially retain the nuclear weapons 
were two-fold. First, it was afraid of a resurgent Russian imperialism and claimed that a 
nuclear deterrent might dissuade any provocation that might emanate from Moscow. 
Second, it claimed that without nuclear weapons, their country would become a weak 
and vulnerable state situated between two nuclear armed powers, Russia and China 
(Lepingwell 1993a: 59).  
  
                                                 
184 This site was chosen by the Soviet government in 1949 as the location for the research, development, 
and testing of nuclear weapons (Conway 1994: 166). 
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In addition to its contradictory nuclear posture, Kazakhstan reneged on its 
commitments to the Alma-Ata Agreement of 21 December 1991. This agreement was a 
declaration on joint measures on nuclear weapons signed by the Presidents of the four 
new nuclear republics: Yeltsin of Russia, Shushkevich of Belarus, Nazaerbayev of 
Kazakhstan, and Kravchuk of Ukraine. Upon signature, all nuclear-inheriting countries 
states agreed to the following four measures. First, that any use of nuclear weapons 
would occur only with their joint agreement; second, that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine would join the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states; third, that the parties to the 
agreement would not be the first to use nuclear weapons; and fourth, that Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine would withdraw all of the non-strategic nuclear forces (i.e., the 
tactical nuclear weapons) on their territories back to Russia by 1 July, 1992 (quoted in 
SIPRI 1992: 562, Ellis 2001: 6). 
 Kazakhstan refused to agree to Russia being the only one owner of the nuclear 
components of dismantled missiles and strategic nuclear forces (Ustiugov 1993: 35). It 
refused to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state (Lepingwell 1993b: 5), and it 
refused to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons located on its territory by the end of 
1994 (Reiss 1995: 141).185 Asked in May 1993 why it was taking so long to remove the 
nuclear weapons out of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev answered, 
Dismantlement and destruction of silo-based multiple-warhead missiles is a 
labour intensive process, which requires complicated technical decisions and 
considerable financial means not available in the republic at this time. This 
explains why Kazakhstan is behind schedule in transferring nuclear weapons out 
of Kazakhstan (quoted in Ustiugov 1993: 36). 
 
Similar to Belarus, Kazakhstan needed technical and financial assistance for the removal 
and destruction of its nuclear weapons. Through the CTR Program, such assistance was 
provided, after which Kazakhstan reverted to its initial anti-nuclear weapon stance. 
 
 
                                                 
185 Acceding to the NPT was a precondition for signing the START Treaty. 
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c) Ukraine 
Similar to Kazakhstan, Ukraine toyed with the idea of maintaining the inherited nuclear 
weapons and insisted on becoming a nuclear weapon-free state at the same time. During 
the first few months of Ukraine‘s new independence, a broad spectrum of views emerged 
on nuclear policy, ranging from a real desire to become a nuclear weapon state to a 
passionate aversion to all things nuclear, resulting from the Chernobyl disaster (Keeny 
1992: 2). In fact, out of the three new nuclear republics, Ukraine changed its mind so 
often about the former Soviet nuclear weapons on its soil that it not only ―confused the 
rest of the world, but also itself‖ (Kiselyov 1993: 7).  
Initially, Ukraine was intent on relinquishing its nuclear weapons immediately. 
Soon after the August 1991 coup, Ukraine announced that it intended to be nuclear 
weapons-free, having suffered the Chernobyl disaster (Kiselyov 1993: 7). In October 
1991, the Ukrainian parliament adopted a declaration ―On the Nuclear Status of 
Ukraine‖ in which it stated that the nuclear weapons based on Ukrainian territory were 
temporary and that Ukraine intended to completely eliminate the nuclear weapons and 
components from its territory. Further, when Ukrainian President Kravchuk hosted U.S. 
Secretary of State Baker in Kiev on 17 December 1991, he said that Ukraine would abide 
by all nuclear agreements and treaties and accede to the NPT. In addition, Ukraine would 
―welcome U.S. expertise to assist in the safe storage, transfer, and destruction of its 
nuclear forces‖ and that nuclear forces on its territory would be ―inactivated‖ (quoted in 
Baker 1995: 583). Through its commitments to the 1991 Alma Ata Declaration, Kiev 
agreed to the removal of all tactical nuclear weapons from its territory by 1 July, 1992 and 
all strategic weapons by 1994. Such pledges seemed to confirm its non-nuclear weapons 
position. 
 Soon after the Alma Ata Declaration, Russia began removing tactical nuclear 
weapons from Ukraine. By late February 1992, a substantial amount of these weapons 
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had been withdrawn (Reiss 1995: 94). However, on 12 March, Ukraine suddenly stopped 
shipping tactical nuclear missiles to Russia. Kravchuk stated that he had suspended the 
withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Ukraine because Ukraine ―cannot guarantee 
that weapons transported to Russia will be destroyed or that they will not fall into 
undesirable hands‖ (quoted in Lockwood 1992: 19). Kravhcuk‘s announcement was 
clearly a marked contrast from what was agreed through the Alma Ata agreement. 
However, despite his March 1992 statement, Kravchuk added that Ukraine still intended 
to eventually become a nuclear weapon free state (Lockwood 1992: 19). 
In addition, in early 1992, opposition to Ukrainian unilateral disarmament 
emerged within the Ukrainian Parliament‘s (Rada) debate on the removal of nuclear 
weapons from Ukraine (Nahaylo 1993: 32). Rada Deputy Yurii Kostenko consistently 
argued in favour of keeping the nuclear weapons for an ―unstated period‖ (quoted in 
Kincade 1993: 13). In addition, Major General Volodymyr Tolubko, a powerful Rada 
Deputy, continually advocated a nuclear-weapon-state status for Ukraine (Kincade 1993: 
13). Tolubko was formerly of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces. 186  Three reasons 
accounted for why some Ukrainian parliamentarians insisted on retaining the nuclear 
weapons. First, it seemed unwise to surrender nuclear weapons to Russia – the state that 
posed the greatest security threat to Ukraine (from a Ukrainian perspective). Second, it 
seemed imprudent to relinquish the nuclear weapons without securing positive security 
guarantees from the nuclear powers (Nahaylo 1993: 32). Third, several parliamentarians 
agreed that if the nuclear arsenal was removed, Ukraine would lose the attention and 
focus of the international community and therefore not be considered a powerful state 
(Macilwain 1993: 599). 
                                                 
186 The Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces operated all Soviet ground-based intercontinental, intermediate-
range, and medium-range nuclear missiles with ranges over 1,000 km. 
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 Yet, in spite of these oppositions to unilateral disarmament, the Rada reaffirmed 
the country‘s intention to become a non-nuclear weapon state. It established that it was 
Expedient not to transfer tactical nuclear weapons from the territory of Ukraine 
until the mechanism for international control of their destruction has been 
worked out and implemented with Ukraine‘s participation (quoted in Nahaylo 
1993: 33). 
 
The ―mechanism for international control‖ for the destruction of the nuclear weapons 
would be the CTR Program. In order to become a nuclear weapon-free state, Ukraine 
required technical and financial assistance since it ―lacked the means, expertise, and 
resources to accomplish this‖ (Bernstein and Wood 2010: 11). In fact, in early May 1992, 
prior to his visit to Washington, D.C., President Kravchuk emphasised the importance of 
Western economic and technical assistance to dismantle nuclear weapons (Nahaylo 1993: 
33). 
Based on the above, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine shared several similarities. 
Apart from inheriting the nuclear weapons and (eventually) pledging to rid them from 
their respective territories, the three new republics required financial and technical 
assistance in doing so. Furthermore, in all cases, such assistance was required from and 
asked of the U.S. Since the August 1991 coup, members of the epistemic community 
were actively working on concrete policy and technical solutions to these issues that were 
implemented by the U.S. government as the CTR Program. Over the successive years, 
―umbrella agreements‖ – discussed below – were signed between the U.S. and the 
nuclear-inheriting states before the implementation of the CTR Program could be 
realised (Ellis 2001: 138, footnote 47).  
 
Umbrella Agreements 
Persuading Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to become non-nuclear weapon states by 
voluntarily returning to Russia the strategic nuclear weapons that each inherited was not 
going to be an easy task. The CTR Program, however, provided the funds to assist in this 
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endeavour. In order for the CTR Program to be implemented, ―umbrella‖ agreements 
needed to be signed between the U.S. and the nuclear-inherited states. These agreements 
addressed the scope of the cooperation and the maximum amount of CTR Program 
money to be made available for each agreement (Goodby 1995: 2). In addition, they 
designated the Department of Defense (DOD) as the executive agent for the U.S. 
government for implementation. In their role as executive agent, DOD officials would 
sign the implementing agreements for specific projects and programmes (Ellis 2001: 
117–118). 
The first of such umbrella agreements was signed between the U.S. and the 
Russian Federation on 17 June 1992. Once the U.S. government had committed $400 
million for the dismantling of nuclear (chemical and biological) weapons in the former 
Soviet Union, it was imperative to get Russia involved in the CTR Program. Russian 
policymakers were initially sceptical of this cooperative effort as they claimed it ―violated 
Russian sovereignty‖ (Orlov 1997: 86). According to Interview IX,  
Russian officials, steeped in 70 years of anti-western propaganda, were quite 
suspicious of U.S. intentions. They would not accept the fact that we [U.S.] 
would be willing to put up $400 million just to ensure the safety and security of 
Soviet weapons. Many saw this as an attempt to further ―put down‖ Russia or as 
an overt spying attempt. 
 
Yet, Russian decision makers knew that Russia needed U.S. funding and technical 
assistance in their dismantling endeavour (Orlov 1997: 86–87). Colonel-General Evgenii 
Maslin, head of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defence, observed, 
―We would like to carry out the process of nuclear warhead dismantlement by ourselves, 
but we should be realists – there is a lack of financial resources in Russia‖ (quoted in 
Orlov 1997: 87). In addition, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Mamedov said, 
―Agreements concluded with the U.S. on the Nunn-Lugar fund fully reflect Russia‘s 
national interests and meet Russia‘s concerns‖ (Orlov 1997: 92). As a result, on 17 June 
1992, the U.S. and the Russian Federation signed an umbrella agreement for CTR 
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Program assistance concerning the safe and secure transportation, storage, and 
destruction of weapons and the prevention of weapons proliferation. The agreement 
established the international legal framework for the U.S. providing technical and 
financial assistance to Russia in three critical areas: destruction, transportation, and non-
proliferation. The agreement provided assistance in the destruction of nuclear, chemical, 
and biological weapons; safe and secure transportation and storage of those weapons in 
connection with their destruction; and establishment of additional verifiable measures 
against the proliferation of these weapons (17 June 1992 Umbrella Agreement between the 
U.S. and the Russian Federation).187 The umbrella agreement helped Russia deal with the 
technical and financial challenges it faced as the state responsible for the storage and 
dismantlement of Soviet nuclear weapons. 
Once it was signed with Russia, further U.S. umbrella agreements were signed 
with the remaining nuclear-inherited states: Belarus, 22 October 1992; Ukraine, 25 
October 1993; and Kazakhstan, 13 December 1993 (Skootsky 1995: 71; 82; 79). These 
agreements provided a legally binding framework to provide material, technical, and 
financial assistance to eliminate the strategic offensive nuclear weapons deployed on each 
of the new republics‘ territory. 
 
START I, Lisbon Protocol, and the Trilateral Agreement 
The pre-existing START Treaty signed between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on 31 July 
1991 had committed both nations to reduce their strategic nuclear warheads over seven 
years by 25–35%. But when on 31 December 1991, the Soviet Union officially dissolved, 
the entry into force of START was delayed. As such, it was important to ensure the 
transfer of treaty obligations to all relevant parties. While an obvious and practical 
                                                 
187 The full name of this agreement was ―Agreement Between the United States of America and the 
Russian Federation Concerning the Safe and Secure Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons 
and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation‖. It was signed by Presidents George Bush and Boris Yeltsin 
in Washington D.C. on 17 June 1992.  
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solution might have been to regard Russia as the sole legitimate inheritor of the Soviet 
Union‘s nuclear arsenal and, therefore, transfer treaty obligations to Moscow alone, the 
other republics did not find that acceptable. The Lisbon Protocol signed by the U.S., 
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine on 23 March 1992 became the ―compromise 
solution‖ (Ellis 2001: 7). 
 Under the Lisbon Protocol, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine would sign the 
START I Treaty and agreed to sign the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states ―in the 
shortest possible time‖ (de Andreis and Calogero 1995: 12, Combs 1997: 47). In addition, 
the heads of state of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine pledged to eliminate all the 
strategic weapons on their territories within the seven-year START reduction period.188 
The Lisbon Protocol therefore committed Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to become 
non-nuclear weapon states and to transfer all strategic warheads to Russia, the funding of 
which would be covered through the CTR Program (Goodby 2000: 109). Until the 
weapons were removed from Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, they were to remain 
subject to the ―safe, secure, and reliable control of a single unified authority‖ (Ellis 2001: 
7). 
 In order to enter into force, START I required ratification by all five parties, 
which took place between July 1992 and December 1994 (see Table 7.1 for further 
details). The two year delay was due to Ukrainian President Kravchuk‘s insistence that 
Ukraine would need U.S. assistance (political and financial) to proceed with the transfer 
of nuclear warheads to Russia and to complete the elimination of strategic offensive arms 
in Ukraine (Goodby 2000: 116). According to the U.S. chief negotiator of the Nunn-
Lugar umbrella and implementing agreements with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine, President Kravchuk stipulated three conditions before it would agree to START 
                                                 
188 Both the U.S. and Russia made it a condition of their respective ratifications of START I that each of 
the five states agree to the treaty‘s terms before it would enter into force (Ellis 2001: 7). 
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I ratification.189 Kravchuk explained that Ukraine wanted security assurances from Russia 
and the U.S., compensation for the nuclear materials contained in the warheads 
transferred to Russia (including the tactical nuclear warheads already transferred to 
Russia in the spring of 1992), and tangible economic and technical support to offset the 
cost of eliminating strategic offensive delivery systems on Ukrainian soil (Goodby 2000: 
116–117).  
U.S. security assurances were offered in January 1993, and the compensation and 
economic support was made available through the CTR Program. According to Goodby,  
Nunn and Lugar, during a visit to Kiev in November 1992, had told Kravchuk 
that between $100 million and $150 million could be made available to Ukraine 
from the Nunn-Lugar program for dismantling nuclear delivery systems. Bush 
wrote to Kravchuk on December 5 1992 promising up to $175 million for 
assistance to Ukraine from Nunn-Lugar funds (2000: 116–117). 
 
Furthermore, these three elements were the same three that were at the heart of the U.S.-
Russian-Ukrainian trilateral agreement concluded by Clinton, Yeltsin, and Kravchuk in 
Moscow on 14 January 1994. In the Trilateral Agreement, Ukraine promised to eliminate 
all nuclear weapons in exchange for security guarantees and compensation, which it 
received from CTR Program funds. As Goodby (1995: 2) argued, the CTR Program 
played a ―vital role‖ in gaining Ukraine‘s adherence to this accord, START I, the Lisbon 
Protocol, and the NPT. 
 
Ratification of the NPT and Removal of All Soviet Nuclear Warheads 
One of the ways in which the CTR Program facilitated the denuclearisation of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was its role in encouraging these countries to renounce their 
nuclear weapons and become non-nuclear weapon state parties to the NPT. As stated 
earlier, Ukraine and Kazakhstan toyed with the idea of maintaining their inherited nuclear 
weapons. For example, a statement signed by 162 deputies in Ukraine‘s Rada declared 
                                                 
189  James E. Goodby‘s role as U.S. chief negotiator of the Nunn-Lugar umbrella and implementing 
agreements with Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine was from March 1993–March 1994. 
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that Ukraine ―must confirm its right of ownership of the nuclear weapons that are 
located on its territory‖ (Skootsky 1995: 74).190 Equally, Kazakh President Nazarbayev 
stated on 3 February 1993 that he could ―veto the use of the nuclear weapons located in 
Kazakhstan‖ (quoted in Skootsky 1995: 73). In contrast, the Belarusian Parliament 
proceeded swiftly with ratification of both the START I Treaty (4 February 1993) and 
the NPT (22 July 1993) mostly in part due to the widespread anti-nuclear sentiment 
following the Chernobyl disaster of April 1986.  
As a quid pro quo, the U.S. government offered considerable CTR assistance to 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan in return for prompt denuclearisation and ratification of 
START I and the NPT. 191   According to Gloria Duffy (former Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense and Special Coordinator for CTR), the example of Ukraine offers 
the clearest indication of how the availability of assistance made a difference. She argues 
that the Ukrainian Rada made the receipt of adequate U.S. denuclearisation aid one of 
the conditions for ratifying START I and the removal of all nuclear weapons from 
Ukrainian soil.  
Until this condition was fulfilled, START I could not go into effect. Until 
Ukraine became committed to START, NPT accession was impossible. In 
Ukraine, from the beginning to end of the process, the relationship between U.S. 
assistance and denuclearisation was quite clear (1997: 28). 
 
Through CTR Program assistance, by 1996, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine 
had denuclearised and had become non-nuclear weapon states. Having ratified the 
START I Treaty (by virtue of the Lisbon Protocol) and acceded to the NPT as non-
nuclear weapon states by the end of 1994, the next two years saw the massive 
transportation of nuclear weapons back to Russia, which as Interview XV argued, was 
―the first and most urgent task of CTR‖. By 1996, all nuclear warheads inherited from 
the Soviet Union were removed from the three states‘ territories. On 24 April 1995, 
                                                 
190 This statement was signed on 27 April 1993 (Skootsky 1995: 74–75). 
191 The dates of ratification can be seen in Figure 7.1. 
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Kazakhstan transferred its last strategic weapons to Russia, followed by Ukraine on 1 
June 1996, and Belarus on 27 November 1996. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, it can be argued that the role of an epistemic community was an important 
factor in the creation of the CTR Program, an international policy coordination effort 
which facilitated the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. The 
uncertainty surrounding the break-up of the Soviet Union marking the end of the Cold 
War, coupled with the uncertainty surrounding which state would control 27,000 Soviet 
nuclear weapons (including Russia‘s share), encouraged the emergence of the epistemic 
community. This community comprised a network of American and Soviet/Russian 
professionals with recognised expertise in the area of nuclear (non) proliferation. In line 
with the existing studies on epistemic communities, members of this epistemic 
community comprised of both technical experts (i.e., academics and foreign policy 
research analysts/specialists) and government/state officials. Carter, Hamburg, Kokoshin, 
Perry, Rogov, and Steinbruner comprised the former group; while Aspin, Nunn, Lugar, 
Mikhailov, and Yakovlev comprised the latter group. In addition, both clusters of 
groupings were especially important in the thinking behind the creation of the CTR 
Program and in its subsequent implementation as policy. The academics involved in the 
Harvard Soviet Nuclear Fission study and the broad Cooperative Security project provided 
the intellectual framework, including detailed policy proposals, for the CTR Program. 
Equally, the roles of Senators Nunn and Lugar were similarly important since not only 
did both senators consistently engage in the initiative, but they also presented the 
epistemic community‘s proposal to the U.S. Senate. 
All members of the epistemic community believed that the three new nuclear 
republics required technical and financial assistance from the U.S. in order to 
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denuclearise. They were able to effectively frame the issue of non-proliferation as a 
security interest not only because they were respected within their own disciplines, but 
also because they had access to the major actors in the policy coordination and 
policymaking process (i.e., Nunn and Lugar), and as a result, were able to influence U.S. 
decision makers to implement the CTR Program as policy.  
Once this programme was enacted in U.S. law at the end of 1991, umbrella 
agreements implementing CTR Program assistance were signed between the U.S. and 
each of the new nuclear republics (including Russia). It was clear that between 1992 and 
1996, the CTR Program was an integral part in assisting the denuclearisation of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine since it led to their ratification of the START I Treaty, the 
Lisbon Protocol, the Trilateral Agreement (Ukraine only), the NPT, and the removal of 
all Soviet nuclear warheads from their respective territories. These outcomes were all 
made possible under the auspices of the CTR Program. 
Reflecting on the successes of the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program, in speaking to his 
colleagues in the U.S. Senate in December 2009, Senator Lugar noted that as of 
December 2009, the CTR Program had dismantled or eliminated 7,514 nuclear warheads, 
768 ICBMS, 498 ICBM sites, 155 bombers, 651 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 32 
nuclear submarines, and 960 metric tons of chemical weapons (2009: 2).192 He concluded 
by stating, 
I have never considered the Nunn-Lugar Act to be merely a program, or a 
funding source, or a set of agreements. Rather, it is an engine of non-
proliferation cooperation and expertise that can be applied around the world. [...] 
It has demonstrated that the threat of weapons of mass destruction can lead to 
extraordinary outcomes based on mutual trust (2009: 3). 
                                                 
192 See ―The Nunn-Lugar Scorecard – Destroying Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction Through 
Cooperation,‖ available at http://lugar.senate.gov/nunnlugar/scorecard.html (Accessed 26 August 2010). 
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusions 
 
―Without the convergence of interests and the diffusion of ideas between 
the specialist network and the  leaderships, there would be no story at 
all.‖ 
 
S. E. Mendelson (1993: 328) 
 
This thesis has presented a novel investigation of the role of epistemic communities in 
nuclear non-proliferation policy formulation. It was explained in Chapters One and Two 
that the application of the epistemic community framework has been particularly 
prevalent in the realm of natural scientific and environmental policies (Haas 1989; 1990; 
1992c, Peterson 1992, Hjorth 1994, Baark and Strahl 1995, Raustiala 1997, Ringius 1997, 
Betsill and Peilke 1998, Lidskog and Sundqvist 2002, Sauvé and Watts 2003, Dunlop 
2010). Consequently, this thesis applied the framework of ―a group of experts 
knowledgeable in niche-issue areas‖ to explore the process behind the creation of two 
significant and underexplored cases of cooperative nuclear non-proliferation agreements: 
ABACC and the CTR Program.193 These agreements verified the non-nuclear weapon 
status of Argentina and Brazil and facilitated the denuclearisation of Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine, respectively. The analytical framework drew specific attention to how 
epistemic communities emerged and how they facilitated the creation and subsequent 
implementation by state decision makers of certain non-proliferation policies. The 
findings from this thesis illustrate that the role of epistemic communities can be 
considered an important factor in shaping these countries‘ eventual non-proliferation 
outcomes. 
Chapters Two and Three provided this study‘s theoretical framework and 
research methodology, respectively. Chapters Four–Seven illustrated the emergence, 
                                                 
193 It should be noted that the focus of the case studies analysis were on the creation, rather than on the 
maintenance, of these policies. 
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composition, and influence process of the epistemic communities in the chosen case 
studies. The latter chapters suggest that the actions and influence of epistemic 
communities are an important and additional factor to consider in understanding the 
process by which Argentina and Brazil remained non-nuclear weapon states and Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine became non-nuclear weapon states.  
This concluding chapter is structured in four parts. First, it synthesises the 
theoretical and empirical findings from Chapters Four–Seven and considers the broader 
implications that these findings have for the added value of the epistemic community 
approach. Second, it evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of the epistemic community 
framework based on the empirical material in the thesis. Third, it explains the limitations 
of the study and proposes suggestions for further research. Finally, it highlights this 
thesis‘ overall contributions. 
 
8.1 Key Theoretical and Empirical Findings 
The application of the epistemic community framework in the creation of ABACC and 
the CTR Program illustrates that knowledgeable experts with access to decision makers 
can influence the creation of new non-proliferation policies. Therefore, such a 
framework deserves a central place in our understanding of how and why such policies 
are created. Theoretically, the findings from the thesis illustrate that the epistemic 
community framework can be applied to issue areas other than the environment and the 
natural sciences through the application of the influence mechanisms identified by Adler 
and Haas (1992). Empirically, the thesis provides a detailed explanation of the origins of 
ABACC and the CTR Program. It examined how and why these cooperative nuclear 
non-proliferation agreements emerged, from where and whom the ideas behind these 
policies originated, and how their subsequent implementation as policy by state decision 
makers was facilitated. In addition, it analysed how both non-proliferation agreements 
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were important in the eventual non-proliferation outcome of Argentina and Brazil, in 
one case, and Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in the other case. The in-depth case 
studies did however reveal differences in the emergence, composition, and influence 
mechanisms of the two epistemic communities (presented in Table 8.1), which are 
considered in turn below. 
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Table 8.1 
Comparison between the ABACC and CTR Program Epistemic Communities 
 
Epistemic Community ABACC CTR Program 
   
Emergence  Born out of an incipient 
epistemic community 
developed during 1965–1980 
 Uncertainty and 
complexity: 
Imminent collapse 
of USSR 
  Creation of  JWG and PCNA   
 
 
Composition 
 
 
 Argentine and Brazilian 
scientists 
 Argentine and Brazilian 
government officials (e.g., 
representatives from both 
foreign ministries) 
 
 
 U.S. academics 
 U.S. and Soviet/ 
Russian research 
analysts 
 U.S. and Soviet/ 
Russian government 
officials  
 
Influence Mechanisms 
 Knowledge 
 
 
 
 
 Access to decision 
makers 
 
 Policy Innovation 
 
 
 
 
 Policy Diffusion  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Policy Selection 
 
 Policy Persistence 
 
 
 Expertise in mutual 
safeguards/ inspections 
 
 
 
 Through representatives 
from the foreign ministries 
 
 Throughout the 1980s: 
Development of  a common 
nuclear policy  
 
 
 Between 1985 & 1990: 
negotiations amongst 
JWG/PCNA; joint 
declarations;  technical/ 
presidential mutual visits 
 
 
 Role of  Argentina 
 
 Established in 1991, still in 
existence today 
 
 
 ―The Cooperative 
Security Project‖, 
particularly the 
Harvard Study 
 
 Through Hamburg  
 
 
 Between August & 
December 1991:  
Potential ―loose 
nukes‖ catastrophe 
 
 Between August & 
December 1991: 
regular consultative 
exchanges and 
mutual exchange of  
information 
 
 Role of  Hamburg 
 
 Passed as law in 
1991, still in 
existence today 
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Emergence  
The theoretical framework of the epistemic community approach posits that when 
decision makers are faced with uncertainty and complexity (particularly regarding 
technical issues), they often demand particular sorts of scientific or technical information. 
In Chapter Two, it was explained that epistemic communities are one possible provider 
of such information because they consist of experts who are capable of producing and 
providing this information due to their possession of policy-relevant knowledge. 
Therefore, uncertainty and complexity provide an opportunity for an epistemic 
community to emerge (Haas 1992b). 
In the cases explored in this thesis, the emergence of the epistemic communities 
differed. In the case of ABACC, the epistemic community behind the mutual safeguards 
and inspections regime was born out of an incipient epistemic community that began to 
develop during the 1965–1980 period. That is not to say that the epistemic communities 
were one and the same. Rather, the incipient epistemic community had started to 
develop in the 1965–1980 period based on Argentine and Brazilian common positions 
(i.e., their shared ideas) taken against the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, 
that by the 1980–1991 period, it had realigned in ways that made a process of 
cooperation, and by extension, ABACC, possible. This was facilitated once the epistemic 
community was given greater legitimacy when the 1985 Joint Declaration of Nuclear 
Policy established an ad-hoc Joint Working Group on nuclear issues (JWG), which by 
1988 had been institutionalised as a Permanent Committee on Nuclear Affairs (PCNA). 
The JWG/PCNA – the institutionalised epistemic community – engaged in a mutual 
exchange of information and regular scientific and technical consultative exchanges 
surrounding the technical and complex nature of the mutual safeguards system – the 
modus operandi of ABACC.  
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However, that is not to say that moments of uncertainty and complexity were 
absent. Indeed, these two conditions were constantly present, but the evidence presented 
in the case study analysis indicates that they were not necessarily the facilitators of the 
emergence of an epistemic community. During the 1950s–1980s, Argentina and Brazil 
were uncertain about each other‘s unsafeguarded nuclear facilities especially since they 
had both indigenously developed some aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle and possessed 
nuclear facilities that were not subject to regional or international safeguards. 
Furthermore, both countries underwent a recurrent change in government as well as in 
government type (from military rule to democracy), adding further uncertainty and 
complexity. 194   However, it was argued that against the backdrop of uncertainty and 
change in the Argentine and Brazilian governments, the similarities and shared ideas in 
relation to their nuclear programmes and the non-proliferation regime facilitated the 
emergence of an epistemic community.  
In the case of the CTR Program, the epistemic community behind the financial 
and technical assistance programme to the former Soviet nuclear-inherited states 
emerged during moments of uncertainty and complexity. In this case, the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union/Russia were uncertain about the command, control, and safety of 27,000 
Soviet nuclear weapons after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. The  
fall of the Soviet Union itself was mired in uncertainty and complexity involving such 
issues as food shortages, a lack of sufficient heating in the winter months, an impending 
―brain drain‖ crisis, the prospect of high unemployment, and the command and control 
of an overwhelming number of Soviet nuclear weapons. With its dissolution, 15 new 
independent states emerged, including Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine – the 
                                                 
194 In Argentina, during the military government, there were three different leaders (General Roberto Viola, 
1981; General Leopoldo Galtiere, 1981–1982; and General Reynaldo Bignone, 1982–1983). Then, with the 
return to democracy, Argentina saw two different presidents from 1983–1991 (President Raúl Alfonsín, 
1983–1989 and President Carlos Menem, 1989–1995). Similarly, in Brazil, while there was only one military 
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inherited nuclear weapon states. In addition, the U.S. and Russia were equally uncertain 
about the nuclear intentions of the successor states, especially since Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine toyed with the idea of maintaining their inherited nuclear weapons.195 
In this case, unlike that of ABACC, decision makers did not solicit expertise. This 
empirical finding challenges the theoretical proposition that when decision makers are 
faced with an issue with which they are not familiar and in which they lack specialist 
knowledge, they will seek advice from an epistemic community (Haas 1992a). Instead, in 
the CTR Program case, the epistemic community offered its suggestions and advice to 
decision makers on how to assist the newly independent states with the elimination or 
reduction of their inherited nuclear weapons. Even though decision makers in one case 
did solicit scientific and technical expertise, and decision makers in the other case did not 
solicit scientific and technical expertise, in both cases, members of the epistemic 
communities used their expertise in a niche issue area to help craft the implemented 
nuclear non-proliferation cooperative agreements of ABACC and the CTR Program. 
 
Composition  
In Chapter Two, it was explained that epistemic communities are described as ―network 
of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative  claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area‖ (Haas  
1992b: 3). While the term ―professionals‖ has yet to be defined within the framework, 
much of the literature posits that epistemic communities consist of ―experts‖ who come 
from a wide variety of disciplines and backgrounds. These include at least one group of 
scientific or technical experts with knowledge of particular issue areas and of at least one 
                                                                                                                                            
leader (General João Figueiredo, 1979–1985), with the transition to democracy, Brazil saw two different 
presidents (President José Sarney, 1985–1990 and President Fernando Collor de Mello, 1990–1992). 
195 In Chapter Seven, it was explained that out of the three new independent nuclear states, Belarus 
consistently maintained its desire to be nuclear weapons free, mainly due to the 1984 Chernobyl nuclear 
reactor accident. 
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group of relevant government officials who are responsible for making policy within the 
issue area. 
In line with the existing literature on epistemic communities, the network of 
professionals involved in creating the policies behind ABACC and the CTR Program 
comprised scientific/technical experts and government officials. These included 
representatives from national nuclear energy commissions, foreign policy analysts and 
academics, and officials charged with making nuclear policy. In the case of ABACC, the 
epistemic community was less inclusive of professionals from disciplines and professions 
outside the fields of science and government. In addition, they were difficult to identify, 
in terms of names and numbers. In this epistemic community, membership comprised 
both the scientific community (including representatives from CNEA and CNEN – the 
nuclear energy commissions in both states) and government officials (especially the 
representatives from the foreign ministries). Both clusters of groupings were equally 
important in the thinking behind the creation of ABACC and in its subsequent 
establishment. On the one hand, the scientists were responsible for outlining the ways in 
which the mutual safeguards inspection regime could be created, from a scientific and 
technical perspective. On the other hand, the government officials promoted the 
negotiations for bilateral nuclear inspections. Therefore, while government officials 
endorsed the idea behind ABACC and ultimately implemented it as policy, it was 
primarily the scientists who developed the entire concept and framework.  
In the case of the CTR Program, the epistemic community was more inclusive of 
professionals from disciplines and professions outside the fields of science and 
government. In addition, they were easier to identify in terms of names and numbers (see 
Table 6.2). In this epistemic community, membership comprised a network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in security and defence issues 
and who were all renowned experts in these issues, including nuclear proliferation. Their 
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network included U.S. and Soviet/Russian representatives from government bodies, 
academia, research institutes/think tanks, and a funding corporation. They provided both 
the intellectual and political impetus behind the CTR Program. They intellectualised the 
issue by arguing that a solution to curb the spread of further proliferation would be 
through an American-sponsored technical and financial assistance programme. The 
strong political influence came from U.S. Senators Nunn and Lugar, who presented the 
idea behind the programme to the U.S. Senate.  
 
Influence Mechanisms  
Adler and Haas argue that an epistemic community influences state decisions through the 
following four processes: policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy selection, and policy 
persistence (Adler and Haas 1992: 375–387). In the two cases explored in this thesis, 
these influence mechanisms were facilitated through members of epistemic communities‘ 
knowledge and access to decision makers. In the case of ABACC, devising and 
implementing a bi-national system of mutual inspections and verification of indigenous 
non-safeguarded nuclear installations between the two states required specific knowledge 
and expertise, coupled with the means with which to introduce the concept to the 
countries‘ decision makers. The scientists‘ contingent of the epistemic community used 
their knowledge and expertise to devise the mutual inspections system, while the 
government officials‘ contingent of the epistemic community (particularly representatives 
from the Argentine and Brazilian foreign ministries) provided them access to the 
countries‘ decision makers. Through their knowledge, expertise, and access to decision 
makers, the epistemic community influenced the creation and subsequent 
implementation of ABACC. 
Similarly, in the CTR Program case, devising and implementing a U.S. financial 
and technical assistance programme for Russia and the three nuclear-inheriting states 
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required specific knowledge and expertise, coupled with the means with which to 
introduce the concept to U.S. decision makers. The Cooperative Security project, 
particularly the Harvard study, provided the ―knowledge‖ of the issue at hand and lent 
empirical and analytical weight to the argument senior U.S. senators had been making 
earlier. All the experts within the epistemic community used their knowledge and 
expertise to devise the assistance programme, which, through the government officials‘ 
contingent of the epistemic community, was presented to the U.S. Congress. Through 
their knowledge, expertise, and access to decision makers, the epistemic community 
influenced the creation and subsequent implementation of the CTR Program. 
 Reflecting on Adler and Haas‘ influence mechanisms, the analysis of both cases 
suggests that there was greater involvement of the epistemic communities in some 
mechanisms over others. The epistemic community developing ABACC, for example, 
worked for a longer time than did the epistemic community developing the CTR 
Program in both policy innovation and policy diffusion. In the former case, there were 
four phases involved in policy innovation. The first phase took place throughout the 
1950s–1970s, when both Argentina and Brazil shared a desire to acquire nuclear 
technological autonomy. This desire fostered an inherent and mutual shared disdain 
towards the international non-proliferation regime throughout the 1970s, which marked 
the second phase. The criticisms against the nuclear non-proliferation regime espoused 
by both Argentina and Brazil fostered a shared understanding on nuclear development, 
which, in part, led to the May 1980 agreement. Throughout the 1980s, a common nuclear 
policy was developed, marking the third phase. Having established a common nuclear 
policy, the two countries entered the final phase of establishing a mutual safeguards 
regime. Between the 1985 joint declaration and the November 1990 agreement calling 
for a bilateral inspection system, five years of intense ―diffusion‖ activities – including 
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negotiations and the presidential and technical mutual visits to nuclear installations – 
took place amongst the representatives from the JWG/PCNA.  
On the other hand, in the case of the CTR Program, policy innovation and policy 
diffusion took place over an intense five month period. Soon after the attempted August 
1991 coup in the Soviet Union, U.S. senators, defence experts (from both academia and 
think tanks), and Soviet dignitaries/academics began thinking of solutions to avert the 
potential ―loose nukes‖ catastrophe. Once all the experts converged, they agreed that the 
most likely way to prevent further nuclear weapons proliferation would be though a U.S. 
technical and financial assistance programme, which, by late December 1991, was passed 
by the U.S. Congress. The fact that the CTR Program took less time to develop than 
ABACC was probably because the dissolution of the Soviet Union was more of a 
pressing crisis that required immediate attention, given the thousands of nuclear weapons 
at stake.  
 Finally, it is important to reflect on the remaining two influence mechanisms: 
policy selection and policy persistence. In both cases, there was a key ―connector‖ whose 
role was equally important in policy selection. In the ABACC case, the role of Argentina 
was especially important in terms of selecting the policy of mutual safeguards since it 
took and led the initiative on a cooperative and collaborative joint nuclear partnership – 
steps that led to the establishment of ABACC. In the CTR Program case, David 
Hamburg‘s role as the key ―connector‖ was instrumental, as he introduced the non-
governmental experts (Carter, Perry, and Steinbruner) to both Senators Nunn and Lugar, 
thereby granting the experts access to decision makers.   
 With regards to policy persistence, in both cases it came from the countries‘ 
leaderships. In the case of ABACC, policy persistence came from the two presidents who 
implemented the policy behind ABACC in July 1991, leading to its establishment in 
December 1991 and continued operation to this day. Soon after the creation of ABACC, 
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Argentina and Brazil integrated into the non-proliferation regime, signing safeguard 
agreements with the IAEA and signing both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. In 
the case of the CTR Program, policy persistence came from the U.S. Congress passing 
the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991. This act was subsequently signed into 
law by President George H. W. Bush on December 12, 1991, and over the following 
years came to be known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, which is still in 
existence today. 
 
8.2 Evaluating the Analytical Framework 
Having reviewed the key theoretical and empirical findings, it is important to present the 
strengths and weaknesses of the epistemic community framework. The analytical 
framework guided investigation of the role of epistemic communities in the creation of 
nuclear non-proliferation policies – a hitherto unexplored area.   
 
Strengths 
One of the main strengths of the epistemic community framework can be found in the 
way it helps to think about where the ideas behind implemented policies come from. 
While ABACC and the CTR Program have now been in existence for close to 20 years, 
an understanding of their creation is undoubtedly taken for granted. As such, the 
framework calls attention to the relevance of thought leaders and expert communities. 
This matters for the study of International Relations, particularly international security, 
an area teeming with many issues that need to be resolved.  
 As a framework, the epistemic community approach illustrates how decision 
makers were influenced to accept and implement certain non-proliferation policies. The 
framework suggested four mechanisms through which epistemic communities could 
exert their influence on decision makers: policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy 
selection, and policy persistence (Adler and Haas 1992: 375–387). In all stages, 
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knowledge, communication, and access to decision makers were equally important to the 
influencing process. All members of the epistemic community were knowledgeable in 
nuclear issues (technical and non-technical). Furthermore, regular consultative meetings 
enabled the diffusion of ideas and of policies. Finally, access to decision makers resulted 
in the epistemic community‘s proposals being heard and ultimately selected. In fact, in 
both cases, members of the epistemic community later went on to occupy senior 
government positions in their respective countries in order to implement the suggested 
policy. For example, in the case of ABACC, Professor José Goldemberg, one of Brazil‘s 
outspoken critics of the country‘s nuclear weapons programme and a key thinker behind 
the mutual safeguards inspection regime, served as President Collor‘s Minister for 
Science and Technology. Similarly, in the case of the CTR Program, Dr. Les Aspin, Dr. 
William Perry, and Dr. Ashton Carter – three of the main architects behind the idea of 
securing the loose nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union – went on to occupy 
senior government positions in the Clinton Administration. 196  One of their main 
responsibilities was managing the CTR Program. 
 
Weaknesses 
With regards to the framework‘s weaknesses, one limitation is its concept of ―elitism‖. 
Described as a ―model of elites by elites and for elites‖ (Jacobsen 1995: 303), the 
epistemic approach ignores the role of other important pressure groups, including civil 
society and the media. While the media was an important diffusion outlet in both cases in 
that members of both epistemic communities published op-eds and letters in widely read 
newspapers and journals, the role of civil society is largely ignored by the framework. 
 In addition, the framework does not help predict in which countries specific 
ideas will emerge. While it can infer which ideas are most likely to be influential and 
                                                 
196 Aspin became Secretary of Defense (1993–1994), Perry became Deputy Secretary and later Secretary of 
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when – ideas that resonate closely with decision makers‘ interests and during times of 
technical uncertainty and complexity – the framework is not designed to aid in the 
prediction of which countries these ideas are likely to emerge from. Notwithstanding 
these weaknesses, the thesis posits that with its focus on the influence mechanisms, the 
framework provides scholars with a good starting point to carry out a systematic 
investigation of when, where, and how certain policies originate.  
 
8.3 Avenues for Future Research 
The analysis in this thesis indicated that epistemic communities contribute to a deeper 
understanding in explaining nuclear non-proliferation outcomes since it focuses on the 
process of the creation of non-proliferation policies. An interesting further line of 
enquiry would be to investigate the role of an epistemic community in other nuclear 
capable countries that opted for security guarantees (e.g., Japan, South Korea, 
Yugoslavia), signed the NPT (e.g., Sweden, Romania), subscribed to the non-
proliferation norm (e.g., Switzerland, South Africa), or transitioned to democracy (e.g., 
Spain). Such an examination would assess the broader role of an epistemic community in 
non-proliferation decisions. 
Another avenue for further research is to examine a case of proliferation in order 
to understand the overall argument regarding the relationship between epistemic 
communities and non-proliferation. How can we be sure that epistemic communities only 
influence non-proliferation policy as opposed to proliferation policy? It would be 
interesting to explore whether epistemic communities were indeed present in influencing 
state decision makers to pursue the bomb. Such a study would be in a position to address 
three very important policy questions. First, to what extent are epistemic communities 
necessary in order to curb nuclear weapons proliferation? Second, to what extent do 
                                                                                                                                            
Defense (1993–1994; 1994–1997, respectively), and Carter became Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
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epistemic communities play a role in the decisions of some countries to acquire a nuclear 
weapons capability and in the decisions of others not to do so? Third, to what extent are 
such communities influential in the decisions of countries to pursue nuclear weapons? 
The problem of proliferation is still with us 60 years after the inception of the atomic 
bomb. Currently, there is widespread speculation that a nuclear-armed Iran might 
prompt a nuclear cascade in the Middle East. Thus, a more sophisticated understanding 
of the reasons behind proliferation and non-proliferation – beyond proliferation 
begetting proliferation – will be useful well into the future. 
 
8.4 Overall Thesis Contributions 
This thesis makes a contribution in the theoretical, empirical, and policy realms 
surrounding the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. One of the original theoretical 
contributions this thesis makes is by illustrating how an epistemic community facilitates 
the creation and subsequent implementation as policy of cooperative nuclear non-
proliferation agreements. In addition to the four influence mechanisms identified by 
Adler and Haas (1992), this study argues that without both knowledge and access to 
decision makers, it is unlikely that an epistemic community could have been as effective 
in influencing national decision makers to implement non-proliferation policy.  
The findings from this research also provide an empirical contribution. To date, 
there has not been any academic research analysing the role of an epistemic community 
in the creation of ABACC and the CTR Program. By illustrating the role played by 
epistemic communities in the creation of these two cooperative nuclear non-proliferation 
agreements, the analysis presented in this thesis shed new light on the process which led 
to the eventual non-proliferation outcomes of Argentina, Brazil, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine. As stated in Chapter One, the concept of extended deterrence (i.e., the 
                                                                                                                                            
International Security Policy (1993–1996). 
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provision of security guarantees), integration within the nuclear non-proliferation regime 
(notably the NPT), subscribing to the non-proliferation norm, and democratisation were 
not fully sufficient to explain their non-proliferation outcomes. As such, the empirical 
findings from this research complement the existing explanations for these countries‘ 
non-proliferation outcomes.  
 Finally, this analysis makes an important policy contribution. Research in this 
area of epistemic communities can contribute to understanding the many factors that 
influence non-proliferation outcomes and better inform policymakers on the range of 
tools that might be at their disposal to achieve non-proliferation objectives. 
Understanding the role of an epistemic community in the non-proliferation outcome 
leads to the possibility of creating more effective non-proliferation policies in the future. 
In addition, it hints at the need to sustain non-proliferation epistemic communities in all 
countries that can provide input to the global proliferation problem until it is solved. 
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APPENDIX I – Interview Questions 
 
In the following tables, I highlight the leading questions and follow-up questions asked 
of all interviewees. The leading questions were broad on purpose so that it gave the 
respondent room to elaborate where he/she sees fit. The follow-up questions were 
included in case the respondent failed to cover these issues when answering the leading 
question.  
 
ABACC: 
 
Leading Questions Follow-up Questions 
 
1. How was the decision to 
not pursue a nuclear weapons 
option identified? 
 
 When was it identified? 
 Why? 
 Who identified it? 
 Who were the key actors 
(details of people involved: 
scientists, government 
officials, academics, etc.)? 
 
  
2. How often did Argentines 
meet with their Brazilian 
counterparts to discuss 
nuclear issues? 
 Monthly? 
 Bi-monthly? 
 Who initiated the meetings? 
 Conference 
participation/workshops/ 
Track II meetings? 
 Were there more meetings 
amongst scientists and 
government officials, or 
amongst government 
officials and 
academics/analysts? 
  
3. In which ways did the 
actors communicate? 
 Domestic level? Who was 
involved? 
 Transnational level? Who 
was involved? 
 Follow-up phone calls after 
meetings? 
 Regular contact? 
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The CTR Program: 
 
Leading Questions Follow-up Questions 
 
1. How was the goal of 
denuclearising Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine 
identified? 
 
 When was it identified? 
 Who identified it? 
 Who were the key actors? 
 (If respondent mentions 
U.S. and Russia as the key 
actors, I will probe for 
details of the people 
involved) 
  
2. How often did Americans 
meet with their Russian 
counterparts to discuss CTR? 
 Monthly? 
 Bi-monthly? 
 Who initiated the meetings? 
 Conference 
participation/workshops/ 
Track II meetings? 
 Were there more meetings 
amongst scientists and 
government officials, or 
amongst government 
officials and 
academics/analysts? 
  
3. In which ways did the 
actors communicate? 
 Domestic level? Who was 
involved? 
 Transnational level? Who 
was involved? 
 Follow-up phone calls after 
meetings? 
 Regular contact? 
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APPENDIX II – Interview Collection 
  
 Interviews Relating to ABACC: 
 
Interview A = Argentine diplomat; former Director of Nuclear and Security Affairs in 
the Argentine Foreign Service, face-to-face interview, The Hague, 8 December 2008.   
 
Interview B = Brazilian diplomat in the Brazilian Ministry for External Relations, 
telephone interview, 5 May 2009. 
 
Interview C = Brazilian diplomat in the Brazilian Foreign Service, telephone interview, 
27 May 2009. 
 
Interview D = Brazilian diplomat, face-to-face interview, London, 28 May 2009. 
 
Interview E = Brazilian scientist; former Brazilian Minister of Science and Technology, 
email correspondence, 29 May 2009; 1 June 2009. 
 
Interview F = Argentine diplomat, face-to-face interview, London, 19 August 2009.  
 
Interview G = Brazilian scientist; former ABACC inspector and former JWG/PCNA 
member, face-to-face interview, Vienna, 2 September 2009.   
 
Interview H = Argentine scientist and former Director of International Affairs at CNEA, 
face-to-face interview, Vienna, 2 September 2009.   
 
Interview J = Argentine scientist from Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear (Argentina‘s Nuclear 
Regulatory Authority); former JWG/PCNA member, telephone interview, 30 September 
2009. 
 
Interview K = Argentine scientist; former Head of International Affairs at CNEA, Email 
correspondence, 2 October 2009. 
 
Interview L = Argentine diplomat in the Argentine Foreign Service, email 
correspondence, 9 September 2009. 
 
Interview M = American academic, email correspondence, May–June 2009.  
 
Interview N = Brazilian scientist, email correspondence, 12 August 2009. 
 
Interview O = Argentine diplomat in the Argentine Foreign Service, email 
correspondence, 7 September 2009. 
 
Interview P = Argentine diplomat; former Director of Nuclear Affairs in the Argentine 
Foreign Service, email correspondence, 23 September 2009. 
 
Interview Q = Safeguards Research Analyst at the IAEA, Email correspondence, 
November–December 2008, and face-to-face interview, San Diego, 4 August 2009.  
 
Interview R = American academic, face-to-face interview, San Diego, 28 July 2009.  
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Interview S = Argentine diplomat, telephone interview, 11 September 2009.  
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Interviews Relating to The CTR Program: 
 
Interview I = U.S. negotiator for the Nunn-Lugar/CTR Program, email correspondence, 
April–May 2009.  
 
Interview II = Senior U.S. official; former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, telephone 
interview, 17 July 2008. 
 
Interview III = U.S. negotiator for the Nunn-Lugar/CTR Program, telephone interview, 
14 August 2008. 
 
Interview IV = Former U.S. Department of State official and former Director of the U.S. 
National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control, 
face-to-face interview, Washington, D.C., 3 April 2009. 
 
Interview V = U.S. scientist/former director of a U.S. national laboratory, telephone 
interview, 2 September 2008. 
 
Interview VI = Former Colonel in U.S. Air Force, telephone interview, 24 July 2008. 
 
Interview VII = Senior U.S. official (National Security Council); former staff assistant at 
Harvard‘s Belfer Center International Security Program, face-to-face interview, 
Washington, D.C., 7 August 2008; and email correspondence, 14 April 2009.  
 
Interview VIII = Former project manager for Swedish-Russian cooperation projects in 
destroying FSU‘s chemical weapons stockpiles, email correspondence, June 17 2009. 
 
Interview IX = Former U.S. Department of Energy Senior Advisor, telephone interview, 
15 August 2008. 
 
Interview X = Russian scientist from Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, email 
correspondence, June 14 2009.  
 
Interview XI = Former senior advisor to Senator Richard G. Lugar, telephone interview, 
7 July 2008. 
 
Interview XII = Former director of a renowned U.S. public policy research institution, 
telephone interview, 2 September 2008. 
 
Interview XIII = Russian academic, email correspondence, 10 June 2009. 
 
Interview XIV = U.S. academic, telephone interview, 14 August 2008. 
 
Interview XV = Former representative at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Department of Arms Control and Disarmament, email correspondence, 30 April – 1 May 
2009.  
 
Interview XVI = U.S. academic, telephone interview, 12 August 2008. 
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Interview XVII = Former employee of a U.S. defence contractor who was involved in 
managing the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program with the U.S. Department of Defense, 
telephone interview, 15 August 2008. 
 
Interview XVIII = Former high-level official in Soviet/Russian diplomatic service, email 
correspondence, 27–28 May 2009.  
 
Interview XVIX = Former Swedish diplomat and politician, face-to-face interview, 
Stockholm, 10 July 2009.  
 
Interview XX = U.S. expert in arms control and non-proliferation issues and senior 
associate at a renowned U.S. public policy research institution, telephone interview, 31 
July 2008. 
 
Interview XXI = Senior U.S. official, face-to-face interview, Washington D.C., 15 July 
2008. 
 
Interview XXII = U.S. expert in arms control and non-proliferation issues and senior 
associate at a renowned U.S. public policy research institution, face-to-face interview, 
Washington D.C., 15 July 2008. 
 
Interview XXIII = U.S. academic and former government official, telephone interview, 9 
July 2008. 
 
Interview XXIV = U.S. expert in arms control and non-proliferation issues and director 
at a renowned U.S. public policy research institution, face-to-face interview, Washington, 
D.C., 8 July 2008.  
 
Interview XXV = U.S. expert in arms control and non-proliferation issues and senior 
associate at a renowned U.S. public policy research institution, face-to-face interview, 
Washington, D.C., 30 June 2008.  
 
Interview XXVI = U.S. expert in arms control and non-proliferation issues and former 
official and consultant to U.S. government, face-to-face interview, Washington, D.C., 30 
June 2008.  
 
Interview XXVII = U.S. academic, telephone interview, 14 July 2008. 
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APPENDIX III: Nuclear Fuel Cycle197 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
197 This diagram is courtesy of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory that was presented at a ―Public 
Policy Nuclear Threats‖ workshop convened at the University of San Diego, California (24 July – 2 August 
2009). 
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APPENDIX IV: Governments of Argentina and Brazil (1946–1995) 
Argentina: 
 
Government Type Dates in Power Leader 
 
First Peronist Term: 1946–1955 
Civilian 1946–1955 President Juan Domingo Perón 
 
Revolución Libertadora: 1955–1958 
Military 20 Sept. – 23 Sept. 1955 General José Domingo Molina Gómez 
Military 23 Sept. – 13 Nov. 1955 General Eduardo Lonardi 
Military  1955–1958 General Pedro Eugenio Aramburu 
 
Argentine Republic: 1958–1966 
Civilian 1958–1962 President Arturo Frondizi 
Civilian 1962–1963 President José María Guido 
Civilian 1963–1966 President Arturo Umberto Illia 
 
Revolución Argentina: 1966–1973 
Military 1966–1970 General Juan Carlos Onganía 
Military 1970–1971 General Roberto M. Levingston 
Military 1971–1973 General Alejandro A. Lanusse 
 
Second Peronist Term: 1973–1976 
Civilian 25 May – 13 July 1973 President Héctor José Cámpora 
Civilian 13 July – 12 Oct. 1973 President Raúl Alberto Lastiri 
Civilian 1973–1974 President Juan Domingo Perón 
Civilian 1974–1976 President Isabel Perón 
 
Proceso de Reorganización Nacional: 1976–1983 
Military 1976–1981 General Jorge Rafael Videla 
Military 1981 General Roberto Viola 
Military  1981–1982 General Leopoldo Galtieri 
Military 1982–1983 General Reynaldo Bignone 
 
Return to Democracy: 1983–Present 
Civilian 1983–1989 President Raúl Alfonsín (Dr.) 
Civilian 1989–1995 President Carlos Menem 
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Brazil: 
 
Government Type Dates in Power Leader 
 
The Republic of 1946 
Civilian 1946–1951 President Gaspar Dutra 
Civilian 1951–1954 President Getúlio Vargas 
Civilian 1954–1955 President Café Filho 
Civilian 1955 President Carlos Luz 
Civilian 1955–1956 President Nereu Ramos 
Civilian 1956–1961 President Juscelino Kubitshcek 
Civilian 31 Jan. – 25 Aug. 1961 President Jânio Quadros 
Civilian 25 Aug. – 7 Sept. 1961 President Ranieri Mazzilli 
Civilian 1961–1964 President João Goulart 
 
The Military Dictatorship: 1964–1985 
Civilian 2 – 15 April 1964 President Ranieri Mazzilli 
Military 1964–1967 General Castelo Branco 
Military  1967–1969 General Costa e Silva 
Military 1969 Military junta: 
General Augusto Rademaker 
General Aurélio de Lira 
General Márcio Melo 
Military 1969–1974 General Emilio Medici 
Military 1974–1979 General Ernesto Geisel 
Military 1979–1985 General João Figueiredo 
 
The New Republic: 1985–Present 
Civilian 1985–1990 President José Sarney 
Civilian 1990–1992 President Fernando Collor de Mello 
 
 
 
 
 
 238 
APPENDIX V: Argentina and Brazil Nuclear Cooperation Agreements/ 
Declarations 
 
Date Name of Agreement 
  
17 May 1980, Buenos Aires Agreement on Cooperation for the 
Development and Application of the Peaceful 
Uses of Nuclear Energy 
  
29 November 1985, Foz de 
Iguaçu 
Declaration of Iguaçu 
(highlights the significance of the 
inauguration of the ―International Bridge‖ 
connecting the Brazilian city of Porto Meira 
with the Argentine city of Puerto Iguaçu as a 
physical and symbolic link representing union 
between both nations) 
  
30 November 1985, Foz de 
Iguaçu 
Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy 
(establishes a Joint Working Group on 
nuclear issues under both countries‘ foreign 
ministries) 
  
10 December 1986, Brasilia Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy 
(reiterates the commitment to use nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes and identify 
nuclear cooperation as an important means of 
building mutual confidence) 
  
10 December 1986, Brasilia Protocol on Nuclear Cooperation (n. 17) 
(defines the areas of joint cooperation and 
development in nuclear issues, Carasales 
1992: 76)198 
  
17 July 1987, Viedma Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy, Viedma 
(states the mutual intention to (i) end any 
secrecy surrounding their nuclear programme 
and (ii) continue to deepen their cooperation) 
  
8 April 1988, Iperó 
 
Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy, Iperó 
(transforms the Joint Working Group into 
the Permanent Committee on Nuclear Affairs 
under the direction of both countries‘ foreign 
ministries and the heads of CNEA and 
CNEN) 
  
29 November 1988, Ezeiza Joint Declaration on Nuclear Policy, Ezeiza 
(reaffirms their commitment to pursuing 
dialogue and further cooperation on nuclear 
issues) 
                                                 
198 This is a purely technical agreement and it promotes nuclear sector integration between the two states. 
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6 July 1990, Buenos Aires Joint Statement, Buenos Aires 
(endorses the nuclear cooperation accords 
reached by their predecessors, and reiterates 
their countries‘ commitment to the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy) 
  
28 November 1990, Foz de 
Iguaçu 
Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy, Foz 
de Iguaçu 
(creates the Common System for Accounting 
and Control of Nuclear Materials, begins 
reciprocal inspections, starts negotiations with 
IAEA for joint safeguards agreement, works 
towards the full entry into force of the Treaty 
of Tlatelolco) 
  
18 July 1991, Guadalajara Agreement for the Exclusively Peaceful Use 
of Nuclear Energy (Guadalajara Accord) 
(establishes ABACC to implement the 
bilateral inspection system SCCC. In addition, 
both parties agree to abstain from carrying 
out the testing, use, manufacture, production 
or acquisition by any means of any nuclear 
explosive device) 
  
13 December 1991, Vienna Quadripartite Agreement 
(establishes the technical equivalent of full-
scope IAEA safeguards on all Argentinean 
and Brazilian nuclear sites) 
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APPENDIX VI: Argentina’s Nuclear Infrastructure199 
 
Argentina has two nuclear power plants in operation, and one nuclear power plant under 
construction: Atucha I (Lima, Buenos Aires) – supplied by the West German company 
Siemens – a natural-uranium heavy-water power reactor that came online in 1974; 
Embalse (Rio Tercero, Cordoba) – supplied by Atomic Energy Canadian Ltd. - a heavy-
water power reactor that came online in 1983; and Atucha II (Lima, Buenos Aires), a 
projected heavy-water power reactor whose construction started in 1980 under a contract 
with Siemens, but to date remains an incomplete project in view of start-up dates being 
postponed and spiralling estimated costs. Work on Atucha II ceased in 1994, but was 
restarted in August 2006, and it is scheduled to come online by 2010.200 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
199 Diagram taken from IAEA Country Nuclear Power Profiles, 2002: 26 
200  This is according to the Atucha 2 website: Atucha II – Nucleoeléctrica Argentina S.A. website: 
http://www.atucha2.com/images (Accessed 30 December 2009). 
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APPENDIX VII: Brazil’s Nuclear Infrastructure201 
 
Brazil has one nuclear power plant in operation, one nuclear power plant under 
construction, and one nuclear power plant that was suspended: Angra I (Itaorna, Rio de 
Janeiro) – purchased from the U.S. company Westinghouse in 1971 – a light-water 
nuclear power plant which commenced commercial operation in 1984; Angra II (Itaorna, 
Rio de Janeiro) – is a pressurised water reactor currently under construction202, but was 
initially meant to be supplied by West Germany as part of Brazil‘s June 1975 ―nuclear 
deal of the century‖ 203 ; and construction of Angra III (Itaorna, Rio de Janeiro), a 
pressurised water reactor, has been indefinitely suspended. 
 
 
 
                                                 
201 Diagram taken from IAEA Country Nuclear Power Profiles, 2002: 118 
202 Delays and spiralling costs have made this reactor one of the world‘s most expensive nuclear power 
stations (Doyle 1997: 136). 
203 This was a multi-billion dollar agreement whereby Brazil agreed to purchase two 1300 MWe light-water 
reactors, with an option for six more units. As part of the arrangement, West Germany agreed to supply 
Brazil with a complete nuclear package of fuel fabrication, reprocessing, and a ―nozzle‖ type enrichment 
facility. This represented the first sale of the complete nuclear fuel cycle, and one of the largest transfers of 
nuclear technology to a developing nation (Redick 1995: 7). 
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APPENDIX VIII: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1946–2008 
 
Figure 1: Argentina – Authority Trends: 1946–2008204 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
204 Please note that these diagrams have been from ―The Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800–2008‖, a respected online resource that charts the authority characteristics of states 
in the world. Details of the government type and the dates of when they were in power are elucidated in 
Appendix IV. 
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Figure 2: Brazil – Authority Trends: 1946–2008205 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
LEGEND EXPLANTORY NOTES: 
 
Democracy: +6 or above 
Autocracy: -6 or below 
Vertical line: end of the Cold War – 1991 
Coup d'état (defined as a military or military-backed forcible ouster of an established 
executive with little or no change in regime authority): Bold Black ―C‖ 
Autocratic Backsliding (defined as a five-point or greater change towards more autocratic 
authority that forcibly replaces an established regime): Bold Black ―X‖ 
Green dashed line: ―Transition‖ 
Solid blue line: ―Democracy‖ 
Solid red line: ―Factionalism‖ 
 
 
                                                 
205 Please note that these diagrams have been from ―The Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics 
and Transitions, 1800–2008‖, a respected online resource that charts the authority characteristics of states 
in the world. Details of the government type and the dates of when they were in power are elucidated in 
Appendix IV. 
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